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SURVEY OF MARYLAND COURT
OF APPEALS DECISIONS
THE INHERENT POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION -
STATE DEPARTMENT OF ASSESSMENTS
AND TAXATION v. CLARK
Maryland courts have frequently claimed an inherent power to review
and correct arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable administrative
decisions.' Recently, however, in State Department of Assessments and
Taxation v. Clark,2 the Maryland Court of Appeals restricted the scope of
this power by finding that a circuit court did not have jurisdiction to
determine whether administrative authority to reduce a real property
assessment pursuant to article 81, section 67 of the Maryland Code was
exercised in an arbitrary fashion.3 The Court of Appeals held that the circuit
courts' jurisdiction is limited to questions concerning the constitutionality of
the administrator's actions. 4 Clark implicitly recognized that circuit courts
1. E.g., Zion Evangelical Luth. Church v. State Highway Admin., 276 Md. 630,
634-35, 350 A.2d 125, 128 (1976); Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486,
500-01, 331 A.2d 55, 65 (1975); Baltimore Import Car Serv. v. Maryland Port Auth.,
258 Md. 335, 342, 265 A.2d 866, 869-70 (1970) (dictum); State Ins. Comm'r v. National
Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 300-01, 236 A.2d 282, 286 (1966) (dictum);
Town of Dist. Heights v. County Comm'rs, 210 Md. 142, 146, 122 A.2d 489, 492 (1956)
(dictum); Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. v. Dishong, 198 Md. 467, 473-74, 84 A.2d 847,
850 (1951); Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280-81, 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945).
Inherent judicial power has been described in terms of: (1) powers that were
not granted by the legislature, and that cannot be taken away by the legislature; (2)
powers that are essential to the court's existence and protection; and (3) those powers
essential to the due administration of justice. See State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior
Court, 78 Ariz. 74, 77-78, 275 P.2d 887, 889 (1954). The term "inherent judicial power"
has been understood as "that which is essential to the existence, dignity and
functions of the court from the very fact that it is a court." In re Integration of Neb.
State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 287, 275 N.W. 265, 267 (1937). In analyzing this
inherent power, the Nebraska court aptly stated that "'[t]he judicial power of this
court has its origin in the Constitution, but when the court came into existence, it
came with inherent powers. Such power is the right to protect itself, to enable it to
administer justice whether any previous form of remedy has been granted or not.'" Id.
at 287, 275 N.W. at 267 (quoting In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 55, 248 N.W. 735, 737
(1933)). For additional cases describing inherent judicial power, see 20 AM. JUR. 2d
Courts §§ 78 & 79 (1965). A thorough discussion on the scope of inherent judicial power
is found in In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts, 308 Minn. 172, 241 N.W.2d 781 (1976).
2. 281 Md. 385, 380 A.2d 28 (1977).
3. Id. at 411, 380 A.2d at 42-43.
4. Id.
(242)
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may continue to review administrative determinations in other contexts, but
its analytic underpinnings suggest the possibility that such review might be
destroyed for all administrative actions and raise serious problems
pertaining to judicial checks on administrative determinations and the
separation of powers in Maryland's system of government.
Fitzhugh and Geraldine Clark, appellees, owned a tract of land in
Montgomery County, Maryland. In 1970 this tract was rezoned from rural-
residential to multiple family, medium density. A year later this rezoning
(combined with a general property reassessment) resulted in a more than
tenfold increase in the property's assessment for the 1972 tax year.5 The
Clarks did not protest this reassessment, and it became final on January 1,
1972. In May of 1972, however, the Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission imposed a moratorium on new sewer extensions and hook ups
in parts of Montgomery County, including the Clark land, effectively
precluding its use for multiple family, medium density housing during the
1972 tax year.6 Because the 1971 reassessment was based upon the
availability of the Clark land for such use in 1972, the moratorium resulted
in an overvaluation of the land for tax purposes in that year. The finality of
the 1972 assessment prevented the Clarks from protesting the assessed
value of the property through ordinary channels. 7 Article 81, section 67,
however, provides a mechanism for reducing an assessment after it has
become final if the reduction is approved by the county supervisor of
assessments, the county director of finance, and the appeal tax court.8
5. The land assessment increased from $12,640 for the taxable year 1971 to
$132,150 for the taxable year 1972. Brief for Appellant State Dep't of Assess. &
Taxation at 11, State Dep't of Assess. & Taxation v. Clark, 281 Md. 385, 380 A.2d 28
(1977).
6. The resolutions of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission restricted
authorizations for sewer extensions and connections to the then existing sewer lines
in Montgomery County. Id.
7. Article 81 of the Maryland Code (1975) contains a comprehensive procedure
for challenging assessments. Under § 29(a), notice of the assessment is required and
the opportunity to lodge a timely protest must be provided. A taxpayer may then,
pursuant to § 255(a), request a hearing before the supervisor of assessments. A further
hearing may be demanded before the property tax assessment board under § 255(b),
and § 256 provides for appeal to the Maryland Tax Court. These administrative
procedures are available as of right, provided the assessment is protested before the
date of finality.
Upon exhaustion of administrative remedies, the taxpayer may appeal from
the Tax Court to the county circuit court (or, in the case of Baltimore City residents, to
the Baltimore City Court). MD, ANN. CODE art. 81, § 229(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Appeal
may be taken to the Court of Special Appeals, id. § 229(p), and the Court of Appeals
may be requested to review the Court of Special Appeals' decision. MD. CTS. & JUD.
Paoc. CODE ANN. § 12-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
8. At the time this litigation began, article 81, § 67 read in pertinent part:
The final assessing authority [in Montgomery County, the Appeal Tax Court],
the supervisor of assessments and the county treasurer (in Montgomery
County the director of finance) of each county and in Baltimore City, the city
solicitor, and the director of the department of assessments, . . . may by an
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Pursuant to this provision, in August of 1972 the Clarks requested the
Supervisor of Assessments for Montgomery County to grant them an
abatement. The three assessing authorities decided upon a twenty-five
percent reduction of the original assessment.
Dissatisifed with this result, the Clarks sought a declaratory judgment
from the Montgomery County Circuit Court to enjoin the collection of taxes
levied upon their property without providing them a rehearing on the
question of the effect of the sewer moratorium on the property's value. They
also sought a declaration that section 67 as it applied to them was
unconstitutional in that it violated their equal protection and due process
rights, and amounted to a taking without just compensation. 9 The case was
decided on cross motions for summary judgment. First, the trial court held
that it had jurisdiction over the case because of its inherent power to review
administrative actions for arbitrariness, illegality, capriciousness, and
unreasonableness.10 It then found the administrative actions taken pursuant
to section 67, which had resulted in the twenty-five percent abatement, were
in fact arbitrary, capricious, and illegal." The Court of Special Appeals
agreed that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the case, but reversed
the circuit court's determination that the abatement figure was arrived at
arbitrarily 2 and remanded the case to the trial court for resolution of the
order, decrease or abate an assessment after the date of finality for any year,
whether the protest against said assessment was filed before the date of
finality or not, in order to correct erroneous and improper assessments and to
prevent injustice, provided, that such reasons for such decrease or abatement
shall be clearly set forth in such order.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 67 (1975).
9. State Dep't of Assess. & Taxation v. Clark, 281 Md. 385, 390, 380 A.2d 28,
31-32 (1977).
10. The trial court reasoned that the legislature had no obligation to provide § 67
relief, but once it had decided to provide some relief, the inherent power of the court
could be exercised to correct "abuses of discretion, and arbitrary, illegal, capricious or
unreasonable acts." Id. at 397, 380 A.2d at 35.
11. The trial court found two instances of arbitrary action: (1) adoption of a 25%
reduction without consideration of data pertinent to the Clarks' unique situation, and
(2) selection of 25% as an abatement figure without consideration of the other county
property affected by the moratorium. In other words, the abatement figure did not
represent an average decrease in value. The supervisor of assessments explained that
the reduction figure took into account a moratorium that would possibly last for three
years. The supervisor utilized an 8% annual interest rate over this period to arrive at
25%. This figure was regarded by the trial court as being" 'without any basis in fact'"
because: (1) the moratorium's duration was uncertain, and (2) the relationship of the
8% interest to the three-year period was "totally undemonstrated." State Dep't of
Assess. & Taxation v. Clark, 34 Md. App. 136, 149-50, 367 A.2d 61, 77-79 (1976)
(quoting the trial court), aff'd, 281 Md. 385, 380 A.2d 28 (1977).
12. Judge Lowe thought that the trial court had erred in granting the Clarks'
motion for summary judgment on the issue whether the abatement was arbitrary as a
matter of law. Id. at 150-52, 367 A.2d at 78-79. This conclusion was based on the
Court of Special Appeals' belief that similar cases were reviewed; time prospects were
considered; and an interest rate two percent above the maximum legal rate in
[VOL. 38
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unaddressed constitutional issues. Before remand, a writ of certiorari was
issued on petition of the appellants. The Court of Appeals did not reach the
issue of arbitrariness, holding instead that the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction over that issue. 13 The court then concluded that the circuit court
had jurisdiction to decide whether the administrative determination was
unconstitutional. 14 Rather than remand this question, the Court of Appeals
examined the record to determine whether any constitutional violations had
in fact taken place. Finding none, it remanded the case to the Court of
Special Appeals to enter judgment in accordance with its opinion.
REVIEW TO CORRECT ARBITRARY, ILLEGAL, CAPRICIOUS, OR
UNREASONABLE ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCT
Judge Orth began his discussion of a court's power to review
administrative determinations by pointing out that if a statute provides a
special form of remedy for a specific type of case, the statutory remedy
should be followed in lieu of a declaratory judgment proceeding. 5 He then
discussed the statutory scheme for assessing the value of real property in
Maryland, and distinguished between attempts to challenge property
Maryland was employed. Id. Thus, such an abatement could not be said to be
arbitrary as a matter of law in the sense that assessing authorities did not refuse to
consider evidence or make ai essential finding without supporting evidence. See id. at
149, 367 A.2d at 77.
There are other factors that support the Court of Special Appeals' finding that
the assessing authorities were not arbitrary as a matter of law. First, § 67 does not
specify that reassessment must be at its "full cash value." This observation, however,
loses much of its persuasiveness when juxtaposed with § 14, which requires that
property valuations be at full cash value (reflecting actual land use and current
zoning).
A second factor unmentioned by the court, but which strongly supports its
decision, is found in the statutory structure of a § 67 decision. Section 67 requires that
the director of finance approve an abatement before it can become effective.
Significantly, the director has no statutory duties concerning assessment of property.
His inclusion in the tripartite agreement arguably reveals a legislative intent to
protect county tax revenues after the date of finality and after the tax rate has been
determined. Thus, a § 67 decision may legitimately be supported by factors other than
the actual cash value of property. Proponents of this argument would stress that
assessing authorities (not the courts) are the proper determiners of the weight given to
a relevant factor in arriving at an assessment. See Fields v. Supervisor of Assess., 255
Md. 1, 4, 255 A.2d 417, 419 (1969).
13. See 281 Md. at 411, 380 A.2d at 42-43 (1977).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 391, 380 A.2d at 32. It is unclear why Judge Orth began his analysis
with a discussion of the necessity of invoking special statutory remedies. In fact, later
in the opinion, the court stated that "there was no failure to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided by the statute." Id. at 404, 380 A.2d at 39. In the
circumstances of this case, the Clarks availed themselves of all of the procedures open
to them under article 81. Because the moratorium was enacted after the date of
finality, the only statutory course of action available to them was pursuant to § 67.
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assessments before and after they become final for a taxable year. He stated
that, when invoked before this date of finality, 16 a statutory right to protest
an assessment exists and that this statutory right encompasses judicial
review of the administrative action taken on the protest,17 but that after the
assessment becomes final, section 67 provides the only avenue of relief
ordinarily available from an onerous assessment."9 Judge Orth's opinion for
the court concluded that there was no statutory authority giving a circuit
court jurisdiction over a section 67 real property assessment reduction. 9
Only after laying this foundation did the court directly address the first
issue before it on appeal: whether the trial court had an inherent,
nonstatutory right to correct administrative abuses of discretion and
arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable acts, which gave it jurisdiction
to make such determinations with respect to section 67 proceedings. 20 Judge
Orth first examined Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould,2" the
case upon which the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals primarily
relied. 22 Gould, a crime victim, filed for an award under the Criminal
Injuries Compensation Act. When no award was allowed, he sought judicial
review of the administrative determination rejecting his claim. Despite
explicit statutory language precluding Gould from obtaining judicial review
of this administrative determination, 23 the Court of Appeals held that Gould
was in fact entitled to judicial review, and invoked the inherent power of the
court to review and correct actions of an administrative agency that were
arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable. 24 The Clark court noted that
the Court of Special Appeals had interpreted Gould to mean that:
After the supervisor of assessments, the director of finance, and the appeal tax court
granted a 25% abatement, the Clarks' statutorily created remedies were exhausted.
The Clark opinion as it originally appeared in the unofficial slip sheets
contained an even greater emphasis on the necessity of following special statutory
remedies. The slip opinion stated: "The foundation of our determination that the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County did not have jurisdiction. .. is the requirement
... that when a special statutory remedy exists it must be followed." State Dep't of
Assess. & Taxation v. Clark, 77-23, slip op. at 6 (Md. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1977).
16. The date of finality is the first day of January. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 29A(a) (1975).
17. 281 Md. at 393, 380 A.2d at 33-34. See note 7 supra.
18. See 281 Md. at 394, 380 A.2d at 34. For the text of § 67, see note 8 supra.
19. 281 Md. at 396, 380 A.2d at 35. As pointed out by the court, § 67
determinations are not subject to the provisions of the State Administrative Procedure
Act. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 255 (1978). The State Department of Assessments and
Taxation is not considered to be an agency under the Act. Id. § 244(a).
20. 281 Md. at 396-403, 380 A.2d at 35-38.
21. 273 Md. 486, 331 A.2d 55 (1975).
22. 281 Md. at 397, 380 A.2d at 35.
23. 273 Md. at 494, 331 A.2d at 61. Under the statutory scheme, only the Attorney
General and the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services can commence a
proceeding to obtain judicial review. As to all other persons, the statute provides that
"[tjhere shall be no judicial review of any decision made or action taken by the Board
.... " Id.
24. Id. at 500-01, 331 A.2d at 65. The Gould court stated: "this Court in a long line
of cases, has consistently held that the Legislature cannot divest the courts of the
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"A legislature may not circumvent the system of checks and balances
which guarantee that no branch of government, however designated,
may be granted an untrammelled right arbitrarily to grant or withhold
that which is derived from the people, be it due as a matter of right,
sought as an aspiration, or bestowed as largess. '25
The Court of Appeals then purported to distill this language to its essence,
concluding that the right of a court to utilize its inherent powers to prevent
illegal, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious administrative action is
predicated upon the legislature's failure to provide expressly for judicial
review and that the provision of a reasonable method of judicial review
would make impossible unchecked assertions of arbitrary administrative
authority. 26 Thus, if a statutory right to review exists, the inherent power to
review for arbitrariness cannot be invoked. 27 The Court of Appeals next
attempted to distinguish Gould from Clark, arguing that no statutory right
of review existed in Gould, and that the inherent power of the court to review
for arbitrariness could only be asserted in that case because of the absence
of such a statutory right,28 but that in Clark a statutory right of judicial
review was fully available to the appellees prior to the date on which the
1972 assessment became final. 29 Although the court recognized that no
statutory judicial review was available in a proceeding under section 67, it
concluded that section 67 could not be isolated from the other provisions of
article 81 pertaining to the assessment of real property. Because section 67 is
part of a comprehensive scheme for property assessment, and because
statutory judicial review is fully available under the statutory scheme to all
taxpayers protesting prior to the date upon which assessments become final,
the court concluded that in the absence of a statute providing for review,
judicial review was unavailable to a person requesting a reassessment after
the date of finality under section 67.30
The foundation upon which the Clark court rested its decision was the
proposition that a right to review was available under the applicable statute.
Judge Orth in fact stated that the availability of statutory review
constituted the "manifest distinguishing feature" between Clark and
Gould.3' In holding that the right to judicial review was statutorily available
to the Clarks, however, the Court of Appeals used the term "available" in an
unwarranted and unprecedented manner. Even if section 67 is viewed in the
inherent power they possess to review and correct actions by an administrative
agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable." Id.
25. 281 Md. at 399, 380 A.2d at 36 (quoting State Dep't of Assess. & Taxation v.
Clark, 34 Md. App. 136, 145, 367 A.2d 71, 76 (1976)) (emphasis supplied by the Court of
Appeals).
26. 281 Md. at 399, 380 A.2d at 37-38.
27. Id. at 402, 380 A.2d at 38.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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context of a comprehensive statutory scheme, there is still an absence of
statutorily provided judicial review for persons in the Clarks' position.
Because of the timing of the moratorium, the Clarks could not avail
themselves of the statutory pre-finality right to judicial review. It is
meaningless to speak of the Clarks' right to judicial review under the
comprehensive statutory scheme when they could not have availed
themselves of such review. Under article 81, statutory review was available
only to those petitioning for review prior to the date of finality. The court
was correct in stating that the Clarks had a statutory right to judicial review
prior to the date of finality. In focusing on this aspect of the case, however, it
failed to recognize that the Clarks did not appeal their assessment, per se,
before the circuit court. Rather, in alleging arbitrary and capricious action,
they challenged the legitimacy of the process by which their property was
reassessed, and contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, such review is
not available under the statutory scheme for section 67 proceedings. 32 The
issue of the legitimacy of a section 67 proceeding can never be raised in the
statutory review provided pre-finality determinations of an assessment's
propriety, for section 67 cannot be invoked until after the date of finality.
Thus, under the circumstances of the case before the court, no statutory
right to judicial review was available to the Clarks, and it appears that
Clark and Gould are indistinguishable on this ground.
The apparent consequences of the court's analysis are startling. The
Clark opinion permits an entire class of administrative actions, that is,
section 67 proceedings, to escape any judicial review no matter how
arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable the actions might be, so long
as they comprise part of a comprehensive statutory scheme. Clark appears
to permit the insulation of administrative determinations from review
whenever statutory judicial review is provided for different determinations
involving the same subject matter, so long as the determinations are part of
the same comprehensive statutory scheme. It thus appears that, using the
Clark rationale, the legislature could preclude judicial review of an
32. Review for arbitrariness and capriciousness is not, of course, designed to
allow de novo review of the result reached by the decisionmaker. It merely ensures
that the determination was reached in a permissible fashion. In reviewing for
arbitrariness, the judiciary must take care not to interfere with the "legislative
prerogative, or with the exercise of sound administrative discretion .... Hecht v.
Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280-81, 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945). There must not be a de novo
substitution of a court decision for an administrator's discretion. Department of
Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 217, 334 A.2d 514,
519-21 (1975). Judicial review, in other words, "must not be either judicial fact-finding
or a substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment." State Ins. Comm'r v.
National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 309-10, 236 A.2d 282, 292 (1967).
The Maryland Constitution has been interpreted to forbid courts from exercising
nonjudicial functions; therefore, courts must not sit as administrative boards of
review. 274 Md. 211, 226, 334 A.2d 514, 524 (1975); Tawes v. Williams, 179 Md. 224,
228, 17 A.2d 137, 139 (1941); Mayor of Baltimore v. Bonaparte, 93 Md. 156, 158-59, 48
A. 735, 735-36 (1901).
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administrator's arbitrary action throughout a statutory scheme by provid-
ing for statutory judicial review under one provision in the scheme.
Blatantly arbitrary action might be taken pursuant to a nonreviewable
section, and the court could merely point out that statutory sections cannot
be interpreted in isolation from other portions of the statutory scheme.
Under the rule enunciated in Clark, a court would ultimately be forced to
hold that because review was "available" under the statutory scheme, no
subsequent review of actions taken pursuant to the nonreviewable sections
would be available.
Even more importantly, permitting any class of administrative actions
to escape review for arbitrariness implies, if carried to its logical conclusion,
that the legislature has the authority to preclude judicial review of any
administrative determination. By holding that courts are without jurisidic-
tion to review possibly arbitrary decisions made pursuant to section 67, the
Clark court in effect treated the inherent power to review administrative
actions for arbitrariness as a common law power rather than an inherent
judicial power rooted in the Constitution.33 If a court's authority to review
for arbitrariness is based solely on the common law, then the far-ranging
consequence of Clark is that the legislature has the authority to limit or
preclude such review regardless of whether review is provided in another
part of some statutory scheme.34
33. Treating the inherent power to review for arbitrariness as a common law
power subject to legislative abrogation would seem to be contrary to fundamental
constitutional principles. Professor Henry Hart has stated that it is "a necessary
postulate of constitutional government - that a court must always be available to
pass on claims of constitutional right to judicial process, and to provide such process
if the claim is sustained." Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372 (1953). See
Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1968).
There is some question as to the specific nature of this inherent judicial power
to review for arbitrariness. In addition to the constitutional separation of powers
argument, and its attendant emphasis on judicial checks on arbitrary action even in
instances in which traditionally recognized rights are not at stake, see notes 35 to 41
and accompanying text infra, the inherent power to review may alternatively be
grounded in due process. Professor Jaffe explains that "[tihe proposition that due
process may require a certain amount of judicial process may be thought just another
way of saying that the judiciary is the constitutional organ for determination of
questions of legal power." Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARv. L. REV. 769,
798 (1958).
A litigant's ability to invoke the inherent power of a court to review for
arbitrariness has been recognized as a constitutional right. Cohen, Maryland
Administrative Law, 24 MD. L. REV. 1, 36 (1964); Tomlinson, Constitutional Limits on
the Decisional Powers of Courts and Administrative Agencies in Maryland, 35 MD. L.
REV. 414, 423 (1976). See Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand &
Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 223, 334 A.2d 514, 523 (1975).
34. The common law is obviously subject to modification by the General
Assembly. MD. CONST., Decl. of Rts., art. 5. See, e.g., Health v. State, 198 Md. 455, 464,
85 A.2d 43, 47 (1951); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934); In re Davis,
17 Md. App. 98, 102, 299 A.2d 856, 859 (1973).
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This result cannot be justified under established principles of Maryland
and constitutional law. The inherent judicial power to review for arbitrari-
ness is grounded in the constitutional precept of separation of powers 35 -
the judiciary, a coordinate and independent branch of government, has its
source of power in the Maryland Constitution,36 and the power to review
arbitrary actions, which vested upon the establishment of the courts, is
necessary to fulfill the purpose for which this branch of government was
created.37 In viewing the overall structure of government it is clear that
legislative interference with the inherent powers of the courts is an
impermissible encroachment on the constitutional vesting of the judicial
power.38 Because the purpose of a tripartite government with checks and
balances is to prevent the government from acting in an arbitrary or illegal
fashion, 39 judicial review for arbitrariness appears to be essential to the
administration of justice, and hence a part of the inherent judicial power
upon which the legislature may not trespass. This notion of check was the
rationale underlying the constitutional holding in Gould4° and in the Court
of Special Appeals' decision in Clark.41 It appears that the Clark court's
interpretation of the statutory scheme for property assessments resulted in
an indefensible conception of available statutory remedies which provided
an insufficient basis for distinguishing Clark from Gould. This operated to
obscure the consequences of such an analysis, namely, encroachment on the
inherent judicial power to review arbitrary administrative action.
In addition to the existence of a right to judicial review created
elsewhere in the statutory scheme, two other factors appear to have
35. See Jaffe, supra note 33, at 795-97.
36. Quenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11, 18, 194 A. 354, 357 (1937); Day v. Sheriff of
Montgomery County, 162 Md. 221, 224-25, 159 A. 602, 604 (1932). See MD. CONST. art.
IV, § 1 (1867, amended 1971).
37. 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 179-80 (1970). See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1867,
amended 1971).
38. It is elementary that a constitutionally prohibited encroachment occurs when
one of the three branches exercises powers that are within the sovereignty of another
branch. Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md.
211, 220-21, 334 A.2d 514, 521; Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 472, 87 A. 413, 416
(1913). See Cohen, supra note 33, at 36 (quoting Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379, 45
A.2d 73, 76 (1945)).
39. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.09, at 68-69 (1958). In
emphasizing the importance of the principle of judicial check, Professor Davis goes so
far as to distinguish this principle from the precept of separation of powers. His
fundamental concern is not that a given agency possesses a mixture of three kinds of
power, but rather that unchecked administrative power must be minimized. Davis'
approach is consistent with the arguments advanced here except insofar as he states
that the principle of separation of powers is not at issue. From a structural point of
view, it seems elementary that the separation of powers principle rests firmly on the
foundation of the principle of check.
40. See Tomlinson, supra note 33, at 423 (analyzing the Gould decision, 273 Md.
486, 331 A.2d 55 (1975)).
41. 34 Md. App. 136, 145, 367 A.2d 69, 76 (1977).
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influenced the court's decision: section 67 review was a matter of grace
rather than of right,42 and statutory judicial review of the assessment was
available for the following tax year.43 The court's reliance on the fact that
relief under section 67 is a matter of grace and not right44 seems to be
grounded in the discredited constitutional doctrine of right versus privilege.
This doctrine's underlying rationale was that the government may impose
whatever conditions it wishes on citizens receiving its largess (that is,
benefits or privileges the government need not give, as opposed to "rights,"
or those things owed people as of right).45 Because the scope of such
conditions was viewed as being unrestricted, due process, and hence review
for arbitrariness, did not have to be afforded the recipient of a privilege from
the government. Early Court of Appeals decisions followed this rationale;46
however, later Supreme Court cases rejected the doctrine and now recognize
that due process protections must be afforded in many instances when
traditional property or personal rights are not at stake.47 This modern view
was reflected in Gould. Discussing previous Maryland law, the Gould court
observed that "the impairment of 'personal or property rights' [was] a
condition precedent to judicial review of alleged arbitrary, illegal or
capricious actions of an administrative board, '48 but went on to point out
that "[the Court of Appeals'] later decisions unqualifiedly seem to permit
such judicial review without conditioning it upon the existence of such
rights,"49 and that:
There are benefits, privileges, mere licenses and entitlements which, in
our modern society, are awarded by governmental action, not as a
42. 281 Md. 385, 402, 380 A.2d 28, 38 (1977). Judge Orth relied on two earlier Court
of Appeals decisions that found the potential relief offered by § 67 to be entirely
discretionary - in other words, a matter of grace and not of right. See Montgomery
County Council v. Supervisor of Assess., 275 Md. 339, 348, 340 A.2d 302, 307 (1975);
Labelle v. State Tax Comm'n, 217 Md. 443, 451, 142 A.2d 560, 564, cert. denied, 358
U.S. 889 (1958).
43. 281 Md. at 402-03, 380 A.2d at 38.
44. Id. at 402, 380 A.2d at 38.
45. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.12, at 175-80 (1972).
46. See Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. v. Dishong, 198 Md. 467, 473-74, 84 A.2d 847,
850 (1951); Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945).
47. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). See Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1439 (1968).
48. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 507-08, 331 A.2d 55, 68
(1975).
49. Id. at 508, 331 A.2d at 68-69. See County Council v. Investors Funding Corp.,
270 Md. 403, 434-37, 312 A.2d 225, 242-43 (1973); State Ins. Comm'r v. National
Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 300, 236 A.2d 282, 286 (1967). Contra, 273
Md. at 522, 331 A.2d at 76 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) ("where no pre-existing personal
or property right is present the legislature may couple the award of a gratuity with a
condition precluding judicial review.").
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matter of right but through the exercise of sound discretion .... [T]hese
"grants" have been held to be within the ambit of judicial review of the
action of the agencies created to administer them.50
The court in Gould did not explicitly address the due process aspect of
judicial review of arbitrary agency action; rather, the inherent power to
review was perceived as resting upon the theoretical basis of the residual
judicial power to check improper administrative action.51 A due process
analysis, however, is equally apt under the circumstances. Perhaps the state
is under no obligation to provide post-finality administrative review of
property assessments, but once this review has been granted it must comply
with the requirements of due process. This means that the administrative
determination must not be arbitrary; and the only way to ensure this result
is by permitting judicial examination of the administrative determination.5 2
The Clark court's second argument pertained to the fact that statutory
judicial review as of right was available for the following tax year.53 The
availability of judicial review of the following year's assessment, however, is
irrelevant to the assessment for the year in question. The Clarks, it will be
recalled, argued for a reassessment that would have covered the next six-
month period of 1972; their specific grievance did not arise out of the
assessment for the 1973 tax year. Regardless of the existence of a scheme
providing for review on an annual recurring basis, it is clear that an
abatement for 1973 would not serve to refund the taxes paid in 1972. 54 In
short, the court perceived a limitation on the inherent power to review
arbitrary action in year one because of an opportunity to obtain statutory
review in year two for a year two assessment. In holding that an
opportunity for review in 1973 patently precluded review in 1972, it appears
50. 273 Md. at 508, 331 A.2d at 69.
51. Id. Discussion of judicial checks on administrative determinations can be
found in decisions prior to Gould. See County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270
Md. 403, 434-37, 312 A.2d 225, 242-43 (1973); State Ins. Comm'r v. National Bureau of
Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 300, 236 A.2d 282, 286 (1967). These discussions,
however, referred to the traditional condition that in order for a court to review
arbitrary action, a personal or property right had to be at stake. The Gould decision
was the first instance in which the court expressly posited that infringement upon
personal and property rights was not a condition precedent to invoking the inherent
power of judicial review. The emphasis in Clark on the discretionary nature of § 67
proceedings seems to reaffirm the earlier position of the court.
52. See notes 98 & 99 and accompanying text infra.
53. 281 Md. at 402, 380 A.2d at 38.
54. Although not addressed by the court, fundamental issues were raised
concerning the possibilities of a tax refund in the event of an abatement. Appellees
argued that article 81, § 214 provided for a return of taxes paid. Brief for Appellee at
13-15. The Court of Special Appeals noted that it would be incongruous for the
legislature to provide relief pursuant to § 67 if there were no authority to refund. 34
Md. App. at 156, 367 A.2d at 81. Appellants, on the other hand, relied on Raply v.
Montgomery County, 261 Md. 98, 110-11, 274 A.2d 124, 130-31 (1971), in arguing that
there is no common law right to a refund of taxes paid.
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that the court either misconstrued or ignored the real issue before it - an
injury to aggrieved citizens in 1972. A tax had to be paid for the 1972 tax
year and, under the court's ruling, if the amount of that tax was determined
in an improper fashion, the plaintiffs had no remedy to challenge that
determination.
At least five reasons for the court's reluctance to review for arbitrariness
may be hypothesized. First, determining whether the agency action is
arbitrary is difficult where, as in the case of section 67 proceedings, no
standards delineate the limits on the "discretionary" nature of the action.55
When a statute provides no guidance, a time consuming investigation of the
agency's functions may be necessary to determine the relevant decisionmak-
ing criteria. Second, the court may have (legitimately) believed that agencies
only rarely act arbitrarily and that allowing judicial review of administra-
tive determinations poses a substantial risk of wasting judicial resources by
forcing courts to entertain frivolous suits. 5 6 Third, the court may have feared
that it was encroaching on the legislature's domain in permitting review of a
statutorily prescribed procedure when the legislature had not provided for
such review.5 7 The problem with relying on these concerns as the basis of
the Clark holding, however, is that these same problems exist whenever the
court utilizes its inherent, nonstatutory power to review an administrative
determination. Furthermore, these concerns have not prevented courts from
exercising this power in the past. In Gould, for example, an understanding
of the agency's decisionmaking criteria was necessary; the potential of a
frivolous suit existed; and the legislature had explicitly attempted, to bar
judicial review. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that Gould was
entitled to review of the administrative determination for arbitrariness.5 8
The Clark court also may have been concerned that the statutory
scheme for assessing property values would be thrown into disorder if
review of section 67 proceedings was allowed.5 9 Taxpayers might short-
circuit the series of administrative hearings provided under pre-finality
procedures by waiting until after the date of finality, applying for relief
under section 67 and, if dissatisfied with the administrator's action, filing
55. See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to
Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367, 380-82 (1968).
56. Id. at 381.
57. The courts, of course, are powerless to encroach upon or interfere with the
legislature's constitutional exercise of power. See McBriety v. Mayor of Baltimore, 219
Md. 223, 234, 148 A.2d 408, 415 (1959). The Maryland Declaration of Rights provides
"[t]hat the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers of Government ought to be
forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions
of one of said Department shall assume or discharge the duties of any other." MD.
CONST., Decl. of Rts., art. 8. See Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 472, 87 A. 413, 415
(1913) (dictum) (no branch is subordinate to another); Magruder v. Swann, 25 Md. 173
(1866) (dictum) (each branch within its own sphere is independent of the others)
(construing former constitution). See Jaffe, supra note 33, at 796 (1958).
58. 273 Md. at 513, 331 A.2d at 71.
59. See Brief for Appellant Director of Finance for Montgomery County at 32-35.
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suit in the circuit court charging the administrator with arbitrary
behavior.6° The court's discussion of exhaustion,6 1 a doctrine which,
although inapplicable in this instance, is designed to prevent such "short-
circuiting" of administrative procedures, indicates a serious concern for this
problem. There are two difficulties with this scenario. First, no taxpayer
would willingly choose a section 67 proceeding over a pre-finality
determination of his assessment, for a taxpayer proceeding under section 67
must meet a more stringent standard of proof. Pre-finality petitioners need
only produce affirmative evidence to show an incorrect assessment,62 while
petitioners who are dissatisfied with section 67 relief must take on the
onerous burden of establishing arbitrary agency action. Second, this burden
is one that.the petitioner who is truly attempting to "short-circuit" the pre-
finality appeal process could never meet. If the reason for requesting the
reassessment existed prior to the date of finality, the availability of the
statutory appellate process to the property owner would provide a rational
basis for refusing an abatement of assessment.
Finally, the Clark court's reluctance to review section 67 determinations
may have been due to judicial speculation that the legislature, because of
cost considerations, would not have implemented a post-finality remedy if it
had foreseen disruption of revenue from the property tax assessment scheme
through large abatements as a result of judicial review. In choosing between
a situation in which some petitioners receive arbitrarily decided abatements,
and a situation in which no one receives any reduction (as would be the case
if the legislature had not enacted section 67), the first alternative clearly
seems the lesser of two evils. There are, however, other ways to achieve an
abatement scheme that is both cost controlled and nonarbitrary. One
alternative would be to enact standards to guide administrators in arriving
at abatements. 63 This perhaps could be achieved by devising a formula, with
appropriate abatement ceilings for a given year, that would restrict the
maximum allowable abatements to a figure consistent with a balanced
budget. Arbitrary abatements are not only repugnant from a policy point of
60. The argument here is-that a taxpayer who failed to protest an assessment, for
whatever reason, could obtain relief under § 67 and then immediately request circuit
court review. This would obviously be a more direct route to judicial review than the
method of obtaining review under pre-finality procedures.
A favorite shortcut currently used by Baltimore City taxpayers to bypass the
first stages of administrative appeal is to file appeals with the supervisor of
assessments and appeal board, and then fail to appear for their hearings. The
assessor and board simply reaffirm their earlier assessments, and the homeowner is
thereby enabled to appeal to the next level, the Maryland Tax Court, the first stage of
the process at which a record is made. The Evening Sun (Baltimore), Jan. 19, 1978,
§ C, at 1, col. 4. In Howard County, however, appeals of taxpayers who do not appear
for hearings are dismissed, and there is no further right of appeal. The Evening Sun
(Baltimore), Jan. 20, 1978, § D, at 18, col. 1.
61. 281 Md. at 401-05, 380 A.2d at 37-39.
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 229(h) (1975).
63. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 39, § 2.00-04 (Supp. 1976).
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view; they also are legally unjustifiable, 4 and, therefore, judicial reluctance
founded on the aforementioned considerations is ill-considered.
Notwithstanding covert or overt expressions of judicial reluctance to
review in situations similar to Clark, it is unlikely, in view of the court's
numerous pronouncements on the inability of the legislature to limit
inherent judicial review power, that the Clark decision will spawn an array
of explicitly review-proof legislation. The real danger of the court's decision
lies in the manner in which the court justified a denial of review by
employing the "comprehensive scheme" analysis to distinguish Clark from
Gould.65 This analysis, however, is amorphous and should not be viewed as
necessarily precluding judicial review. For example, a court might avoid the
more extreme results of the Clark analysis by concluding that a given
statutory scheme is divisible. Within one article of a statute, the court with
little difficulty could find two schemes affecting two different classes of
persons. In the Clark case, for instance, two schemes within article 81 could
be recognized: the statutory provisions applicable to a pre-finality challenge,
and the provisions relevant to a post-finality appeal. The court could then,
under well-settled precedent, invoke its inherent power to review a section 67
proceeding. The ease with which two different results can be reached by
applying the same basic analysis is not, however, an indication that the
opinion is satisfactory. Rather, the potential for abuse of such an escape
device is yet another indication of the dangers involved in employing the
"comprehensive scheme" approach.
INHERENT POWER OF JUDIcIL REVIEW TO DETERMINE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION
Having disposed of review for arbitrariness, the court next addressed
the appellees' arguments pertaining to the constitutional issues of equal
protection and eminent domain. The Clarks asserted that they had been
found to be entitled to relief under section 67 and, therefore, their right to
equal protection entitled them to be treated in the same manner as other
persons who were similarly affected by the moratorium.66 According to the
Clarks, there was only one legitimate class of persons at issue, namely all
persons whose property assessments were affected by the sewer moratorium.
Because taxpayers unable to file timely protests were automatically
restricted to a twenty-five percent abatement, while those who timely filed
were not similarly restricted, the date of finality was characterized by the
Clarks as an illegitimate basis for classification.
The Court of Appeals' examination of the facts revealed that the
Supervisor of Assessments for Montgomery County had adopted a policy
64. See notes 97 to 99 and accompanying text infra.
65. See 281 Md. at 402, 380 A.2d at 38.
66. Id. at 406, 380 A.2d at 40.
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whereby section 67 protestors were in fact limited to a twenty-five percent
reduction in assessment.67 It was, however, unclear whether pre-finality
protestors were similarly limited to a twenty-five percent abatement.
According to a memorandum of November 16, 1973 from the Montgomery
County Supervisor of Assessments to the appeal tax court, the twenty-five
percent policy was adhered to in both section 67 cases and in instances of
pre-finality interests.68 This statement of policy was contradicted by a
member of the appeal tax court who stated that it was the practice of the
court to reduce assessments affected by the moratorium "'to the full extent
that we thought they were warranted"' if such assessments were timely
protested.69 On the other hand, when relief was sought pursuant to section
67, only twenty-five percent abatements were granted as a matter of policy
even if a particular property warranted a greater reduction.70
The Court of Appeals addressed this equal protection claim by pointing
out that the purpose of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection was
to shield individuals against intentional and arbitrary discrimination
whether it be by explicit statutory classification or by improper enforcement
of statutory policy. 71 According to the standard applied by the court, only
"'[i]ntentional and systematic undervaluation by assessors of other taxable
property in the same class violates the constitutional right of a person taxed
upon the full value of his property. . . . There must be something which in
effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of
practical uniformity.' "72 The court further observed that "'the assessment
of the property of others at a lower proportion of its value than that of a
complaining taxpayer, which is not assessed at more than its fair cash
value, does not make the tax on the latter invalid, unless the assessment
was fraudulently made."' 73 Upon application of this standard to the facts
before it, the Clark court held that there was no violation of equal protection
of the laws even though pre-finality date protestors may have received
larger abatements than property owners protesting through section 67.74
Although the Court of Appeals may have reached a correct conclusion
on this issue, it did so by employing a seemingly inapplicable standard.
First, the Clarks did not allege that other property was being systematically
undervalued; rather, they asserted that in obtaining abatements, pre-finality
protestors were not restricted to the full extent warranted under the
circumstances, and that they, in contrast, were limited to a twenty-five
percent reduction. Second, the application of the twenty-five percent policy
67. Id. at 407-08, 380 A.2d at 41.
68. Id. at 408, 380 A.2d at 41.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 408-09, 380 A.2d at 41-42.
72. Id. at 409, 380 A.2d at 41-42 (quoting Rogan v. Commissioners, 194 Md. 299,
310, 71 A.2d 47, 51 (1950)).
73. Id.
74. 281 Md. at 409-10, 380 A.2d at 42.
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to post-finality protests was not attacked by the Clarks as persons in the
position of being taxed upon the full value of their property. Rather, their
position was that the twenty-five percent policy resulted in an assessment
that was greater than the fair cost value of their land. In essence, the Clarks
alleged that their assessment for 1972 was greater than the fair value of
their property, and that they were legally entitled to the same unrestricted
relief that was available to pre-finality protestors.
For the foregoing reasons, it appears that the court should have simply
applied the traditional "rational relationship" test in order to determine the
validity of the equal protection claim. Under this test there is a minimum
requirement that a state classification have some rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose. 75 The administrative policy at issue employed the
date of finality to divide taxpayers into pre-finality and post-finality classes.
It is a relatively simple matter to justify the need for imposing such a
classification: "[a] final determination of property tax assessments is vital
in the ascertainment of a tax base, the fixing of tax rate, the accurate
calculating of future revenues and a timely levying of taxes, so that a
balanced budget may be obtained. '76 Thus, the restriction on post-finality
abatements appears to be rationally related to the legitimate state purpose
of protecting county revenues and budgetary commitments for a given tax
year. It is obvious that the Clarks' equal protection claim fails not only
under the test adopted by the court in this case, but also under this more
appropriate rational relationship standard.
The Clarks' second constitutional argument, seemingly raised as an
afterthought, focused on the allegedly unconstitutional taking aspect of the
appellant's refusal to grant adequate relief. Without citation of authority,
the Clarks contended that the insufficient abatement amounted to a
deprivation of their property rights in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution.77 They did not challenge the legality of the sewer
moratorium, but instead argued that they were deprived of their right to use
their property as zoned because inadequate relief was provided when the
ban was declared. In conformity with settled principles, the court pointed
out that a case for an unconstitutional deprivation is not made out unless
the restriction deprives the taxpayer of "any reasonable use" of his
property.78 Because the Clarks still had use of the property as a residence,
the court justifiably held that there was no deprivation.
75. See, e.g., Aero Motors, Inc. v. Administrator, Motor Vehicle Admin., 274 Md.
567, 575-78, 337 A.2d 685, 692-94 (1975); National Can Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n.,
220 Md. 418, 429-35, 153 A.2d 287, 293-97 (1959); Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 617-18, 150 A.2d 421, 427-28 (1959).
76. 281 Md. at 392, 380 A.2d at 33 (1977).
77. Brief for Appellee at 12-13.
78. 281 Md. at 410, 380 A.2d at 42.
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THE UNADDRESSED CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A final fundamental constitutional issue that was not addressed by the
court must also be considered. This issue arises out of the Clarks' claim that
section 67 as applied to them resulted in a denial of due process. In Clark,
the court refused to consider whether the action taken with respect to the
relief provided in section 67 was arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasona-
ble,79 restricting its review to an examination of whether the assessing
authorities had complied with constitutional standards in reaching their
determination. 8° After finding that the Clarks had not been denied equal
protection and had not been deprived of their property without just
compensation, the Court of Appeals concluded that the abatement decision
was not constitutionally infirm. 81 The court's distinction between review for
arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable action, and review for
compliance with constitutional standards is, however, questionable. Implicit
in the court's distinction is the assumption that arbitrary, illegal, capricious,
or unreasonable agency action does not violate due process rights, but, in
drawing a distinction between these two types of review, the court
apparently overlooked the fact that arbitrary administrative action may
violate constitutional due process rights.82 The problem with the court's
formulation of these two types of review is the failure to recognize that
administrative arbitrariness may deprive an individual of constitutional
rights in addition to denying statutory or nonconstitutional rights to be free
from administrative arbitrariness. In order to disperse the confusion that
may arise from the court's distinction between the two different types of
review, the possible meanings of administrative arbitrariness must be
elaborated.
The question of how arbitrary administrative action affects due process
rights has received scant judicial attention in Maryland. This may be
partially explained by the fact that allegations of arbitrary and capricious
action can normally be reviewed under Maryland's Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA),83 or under a specially provided appeals statute outside the
ambit of Maryland's APA, or pursuant to the inherent power of a court to
review for "common law" arbitrariness; 4 and therefore if one of these
79. See id. at 396-403, 380 A.2d at 35-38.
80. Id. at 403-11, 380 A.2d at 38-43.
81. Id. at 411, 380 A.2d at 43.
82. See notes 97 to 99 and accompanying text infra.
83. Maryland's Administrative Procedure Act is found in MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§§ 244- 256A (1978). Section 255(g)(8) of the Act deals with judicial review of arbitrary
or capricious agency action.
84. See, e.g., Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500-01, 331 A.2d
55, 65 (1975); State Ins. Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292,
300-01, 236 A.2d 282, 286 (1966) (dictum); State Dep't of Health v. Walker, 238 Md.
512, 522-23, 209 A.2d 555, 561 (1965); Town of Dist. Heights v. County Comm'rs,
210 Md. 142, 146, 122 A.2d 489, 492 (1956) (dictum); Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138,
143-44, 49 A.2d 75, 77 (1946); Mahoney v. Byers, 187 Md. 81, 85-86, 48 A.2d 600, 603
(1946); Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280-81, 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945).
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options is exercised there is no need to address constitutional issues. An
examination of past cases in which the court has defined arbitrary action
indicates that the issue of arbitrariness typically has arisen in two different
contexts: mistaken interpretations of law,85 and cases in which factual
findings are insufficient to support agency decisions.8 6 The Court of Appeals
has commonly referred to two different standards of review to determine if a
factual finding is arbitrary. One of these standards, the substantial evidence
test, appears to be grounded in nonconstitutional considerations. 87 A second
type of judicial review for arbitrariness entails inquiry into whether a
finding is without supporting evidence. 88 Under certain circumstances, this
85. See, e.g., Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 521, 331 A.2d 55,
76 (1975); State Dep't of Health v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 523, 209 A.2d 555, 561 (1965);
Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138, 143-44,49 A.2d 75, 77 (1946); Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md.
271, 280-81, 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945). In Hammond, the court pointed out that "illegal
action is reviewable, as such, without characterizing it as 'arbitrary'" action. 187 Md.
at 145, 49 A.2d at 78.
86. See notes 90 & 91 infra.
87. See Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assess., 273 Md. 245, 255-56,
329 A.2d 18, 24-25 (1974); State Dep't of Health v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 523, 209 A.2d
555, 561 (1965); Snowden v. Mayor of Baltimore, 224 Md. 443, 445, 168 A.2d 390, 391
(1961); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Meyer, 207 Md. 389, 401, 114 A.2d 626, 631 (1955).
88. See note 95 and accompanying text infra.
In the recent case of Mayor of Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 79-6,
slip op., (Md. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 1979), the Court of Appeals elaborated upon past case
law and articulated a new standard for judicial evaluation of administrative decision-
making. A two-pronged standard was adopted for evaluating whether an agency
decision was arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable. According to the court, a
threshold inquiry must determine whether the agency decision was "fairly debata-
ble," that is, whether its" 'determination involved testimony from which a reasonable
man could come to different conclusions."' Id. at 18 (emphasis supplied by the court)
(quoting Eger v. Stone, 253 Md. 533, 542, 253 A.2d 372, 377 (1969)). Because the issues
before the agency in Annapolis Waterfront were "debated" and "subject to
controversy," the court deemed them to have been "fairly debatable." Slip op. at 20.
The second prong of the new test requires that the reviewing court determine, when
the scope of review is not specified by statute, whether the administrative findings
were supported by substantial evidence. The court retained the traditional standard of
substantial evidence review: "'whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have
reached the factual conclusion the agency reached."' Id. at 21 (quoting State Ins.
Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 309, 236 A.2d 282, 292
(1967)). Thus, according to the court's test, an agency's decision must be affirmed if it
is fairly debatable and supported by substantial evidence.
It is important to recognize that although past cases have occasionally used
the fairly debatable and substantial evidence tests concurrently, Annapolis Water-
front is the first case in which the Court of Appeals has expressly elaborated and
synthesized these tests into a single standard. In past cases the substantial evidence
test and the fairly debatable standard have functioned to ensure that an appropriate
degree of judicial restraint is exercised when agency decisions are reviewed. Such
restraint fosters the beneficial exercise of administrative expertise. The fact that the
court used similar language to define these standards, which are obviously designed
to further the same essential purpose, raises doubt as to whether any material
differences exist between the two prongs. There is, however, no doubt that the court
now considers these two standards to be different. The trial court was, in fact,
reversed partially because it had failed to consider whether the issues were fairly
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second standard may serve as a restricted form of review for constitutional
violations.8 9 In the many instances in which the Court of Appeals has
indicated the meaning of arbitrary action, 9° and in cases wherein the court
has referred to its inherent power to review for arbitrary, illegal, capricious,
debatable - despite its finding that the agency decision was unsupported by
substantial evidence. Id. at 19.
The wisdom of the court's formulation of a new review standard may be
challenged on the ground that it is unclear that the two prongs of the standard are
different. An examination of their language reveals that each test requires the court to
engage in an apparently identical inquiry. Under either test an agency decision is
reviewed according to a reasonable man standard - both tests specify that a
reasonable man be able to reach the conclusion arrived at by the agency. The
substantial evidence test, however, includes the additional language that a reasonable
man "reasonably could have reached" the conclusion. Because the obvious inference
from the fairly debatable test is that a reasonable man reaches reasonable
conclusions, it appears that this additional language should be ignored as surplusage.
If this inference is justified, then the two tests are in fact identical and the
formulation of a standard of judicial review in terms of two ostensibly different
analyses is incorrect and unnecessarily confusing. In past cases, the fairly debatable
test has been viewed by the court as generating the inquiry required by the
substantial evidence test. In fact, in its discussion of the two prongs, the Annapolis
Waterfront court quoted with approval State Ins. Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas.
Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 309, 236 A.2d 282, 292 (1967), in which the court stated
that the differences between the fairly debatable and substantial evidence tests were
slight and that under either standard judicial review essentially reduces to a
determination of "'whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the
factual conclusion the agency reached.'" Slip op. at 20 n.8.
It is now apparent, however, that the Court of Appeals has infused new
meaning into the fairly debatable test so as to give greater latitude to agency
decisions. Instead of limiting the meaning of the fairly debatable test to whether a
reasonable man could have reached different conclusions, this test may now be
interpreted with an emphasis on the term "debatable." This interpretation appears
plausible in view of the Annapolis Waterfront court's attempt to explain the fairly
debatable test through reliance on authority that emphasized the literal meaning of
"debatable" - a determination subject to dispute or contention. Id. at 18. If
"debatable" is interpreted in this commonly understood sense, almost any conceivable
agency action would at least satisfy the first prong.
The adoption of the two-pronged test may be further criticized on the ground
that even if the first prong is broader than the second, it nevertheless serves no
legitimate purpose. It is clear that in some cases an agency determination deemed
fairly debatable may or may not be supported by substantial evidence. It is similarly
obvious that a determination that was not fairly debatable could not satisfy the
substantial evidence test. Thus, no function is served by the first prong that is not
already served by the second prong, and the first step of the process appears to be
superfluous because the class of decisions that are fairly debatable are subsumed
within the class of determinations supported by substantial evidence. It is also clear
that a determination supported by substantial evidence could not fail under the fairly
debatable test. Despite the fact that the first prong of the two-pronged test is
superfluous, however, litigants should nevertheless draft their pleadings to include
the litany specified by the two-step standard articulated in Annapolis Waterfront.
89. See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
90. See Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assess., 273 Md. 245, 255-56,
329 A.2d 18, 24-25 (1974) (a finding unsupported by substantial evidence); State Ins.
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or unreasonable action, 91 no mention has been made of how arbitrary action
affects due process rights. Such cases in fact seem to suggest the existence of
a nonconstitutional right to be free from arbitrary agency action. Upon
allegations of this nonconstitutional form of arbitrariness, a substantial
evidence standard of review frequently has been applied by the Court of
Appeals. 92 When a statutory right to judicial review exists, but the statute
fails to specify the standard of review, the court has applied the substantial
evidence test.93 In instances when the legislature has not provided a
statutory right of judicial review, the court has applied the substantial
evidence test 94 and the "no supporting evidence" standard.95 If no statutory
appeal is available, and if the Maryland APA is inapplicable, a reviewing
court will grant appropriate relief through a writ of mandamus, an
injunction, or other means, upon a showing that the administrative decision
is arbitrary or capricious. 96 In addition to the nonconstitutional form of
Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 300-01, 236 A.2d 282,
286 (1967) (action unsupported by sufficient facts or proper factual inferences); State
Dep't of Health v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 523, 209 A.2d 555, 561 (1965) (decision contrary
to law or unsupported by substantial evidence) (citing Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138,
49 A.2d 75 (1946)); Snowden v. Mayor of Baltimore, 224 Md. 443, 445, 168 A.2d 390, 391
(1961) (decision not based on substantial evidence); Board of Zoning Appeals v.
Meyer, 207 Md. 389, 401, 114 A.2d 626, 631 (1955) (a finding devoid of substantial
evidence); Williams v. McCardell, 198 Md. 320, 330, 84 A.2d 52, 56-57 (1951) (finding
unsupported by evidence or conclusions contrary to law or facts); Heath v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 305, 49 A.2d 799, 804 (1946) (essential finding made without
supporting evidence upon which to base a rational judgment).
91. See, e.g., Zion Evangelical Luth. Church v. State Highway Admin., 276 Md.
630, 634-35, 350 A.2d 125, 128 (1976); Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md.
486, 500-01, 331 A.2d 55, 65 (1975); Baltimore Import Car Serv. v. Maryland Port
Auth., 258 Md. 335, 342, 265 A.2d 868, 869-70 (1970) (dictum); State Ins. Comm'r v.
National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 300, 236 A.2d 282, 286 (1967)
(dictum); Town of Dist. Heights v. County Comm'rs, 210 Md. 142, 146, 122 A.2d 489,
492 (1956) (dictum); Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280-81, 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945).
92. See note 90 supra.
93. See Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assess., 273 Md. 245, 255-56,
329 A.2d 18, 25 (1974). The substantial evidence test is applied by the court to
determine "'whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual
conclusion the agency reached. This need not and must not be either judicial fact-
finding or a substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment.'" Id. at 256, 329
A.2d at 25 (quoting State Ins. Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248
Md. 292, 309-10, 236 A.2d 282, 292 (1967)). See Tomlinson, supra note 33, at 422-23
(1976).
94. See State Dep't of Health v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 523, 209 A.2d 555, 561 (1965);
Snowden v. Mayor of Baltimore, 224 Md. 443, 445-46, 168 A.2d 390, 391 (1961); Board
of Zoning Appeals v. Meyer, 207 Md. 389, 400-01, 114 A.2d 626, 631 (1955).
95. Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. v. Dishong, 198 Md. 467, 473-74, 84 A.2d 847, 850
(1952); Williams v. McCardell, 198 Md. 320, 329-30, 84 A.2d 52, 56 (1951); Heath v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 305, 49 A.2d 799, 804 (1946); Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md.
372, 380, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945).
96. See Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 503, 331 A.2d 55, 66
(1975); State Dep't of Health v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 522-23, 209 A.2d 555, 561 (1965);
Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945).
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arbitrariness, there also appears to be a type of arbitrariness that gives rise to
constitutional due process issues. The Court of Appeals has stated in dictum in
several cases that administrative arbitrariness in the form of decisions
unsupported by any evidence may violate article 23 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. 9 These decisions offer little elucidation of the term "any
evidence." It is uncertain whether "any" should be read in the literal sense
such that even a scintilla of evidence would satisfy constitutional
requirements. Even if the production of "any evidence" would satisfy state
constitutional requirements, federal due process standards must also be met.
According to a number of relatively recent federal decisions, arbitrary
administrative acts are subject to substantive due process constraints.9"
97. Article 23 provides "[tlhat no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or
desseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any
manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or by the Law of the land." Mo. CONST., Del. of Rts., art. 23. See Luxmanor
Citizens Ass'n v. Burkart, 266 Md. 631, 647, 296 A.2d 403, 411 (1972) (dictum); Dundalk
Holding Co. v. Horn, 266 Md. 280, 283, 292 A.2d 77, 78-79 (1972) (dictum); State Ins.
Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 310-11, 236 A.2d 282,
293-94 (1967) (Barnes, J., dissenting). Cf. Johnstown Coal & Coke Co. v. Dishong, 198
Md. 467, 474, 84 A.2d 847, 850 (1952) (dictum) (citing Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 380,
45 A.2d 73, 76-77 (1945)) ("[A] finding unsupported by any evidence is beyond the
power of an administrative agency as a denial of due process of law."); Howard Sports
Daily v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 179 Md. 355, 359, 18 A.2d 210, 214 (1941) (due process is
violated when an administrative body arbitrarily discriminates or acts contrary to
statutory authority).
98. The cases in the substantive due process area for the most part fall within
either the category of administrative decisions made by school boards, see Staton v.
Mayes, 552 F.2d 908, 915-16 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977) (for due
process purposes a decision-maker should state the reason and evidentiary basis upon
which the determination is based); Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1973)
(nontenured teacher's dismissal is arbitrary and capricious if the reasons underlying
dismissal are trivial, or unrelated to educational process or to working relationships,
or is wholly unsupported by a basis in fact) (quoting McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451
F.2d 1109, 1111 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972)); Miller v. Dean, 430 F.
Supp. 26, 28-29 (D. Neb. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1977) (dictum) (state action
depriving life, liberty, or property rights must have a rational basis); Canty v. Board
of Educ., 312 F. Supp. 254, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (dictum), or decisions made by state
correctional authorities, see Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 690-91 (3d Cir. 1976)
(dictum) (parole board must follow appropriate statutory criteria and its decision must
not be arbitrary and capricious or based on impermissible considerations); Wilword-
ing v. Swenson, 502 F.2d 844, 851 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 412 (1975)
(punishment allegedly imposed without any evidence being offered against prisoner);
Beatham v. Manson, 369 F. Supp. 783, 791-92 (D. Conn. 1973) (substantive due
process guarantees apply against arbitrary or capricious official action even when
procedural due process does not; an assertion of arbitrary power violates due process).
Substantive due process issues have arisen in other contexts. See Garvey v.
Freeman, 397 F.2d 600, 610 (10th Cir. 1968) (dictum) (a United States Department of
Agriculture order without factual support is without due process); Bell Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 263 F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (the requirements of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act govern Interstate Commerce Commission order and are
essential to due process); Sterling Davis Dairy v. Freeman, 253 F. Supp. 80, 82-83
(D.N.J. 1968) (dictum) (Secretary of Agriculture's milk marketing order not supported
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Some courts have in fact stated that due process requires that administra-
tive decisions have a rational basis of support.99
The Maryland Court of Appeals' treatment of this due process issue has
been limited, but the constitutional ramifications of arbitrary administrative
action have been more widely explored in other jurisdictions. Despite one
commentator's conclusion that "[i]t is no more possible to encompass the
scope of 'arbitrariness' within a single definition than to define satisfactor-
ily 'reasonable care' or 'due process' or 'fraud,' 100 it is useful to examine a
by substantial evidence violates due process because of its inherently arbitrary
character). Cf. Thomson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1973) (city ordinance
mandating that veteran employees have honorable discharge ruled unconstitutional;
"[tihe government must act, when it acts, in a manner which is neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable"); Saffiotti v. Wilson, 392 F. Supp. 1335, 1344-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(dictum) (governor's action in vetoing a bill that would have released petitioner on
bail pending his appeal is not beyond due process); United States ex rel. Cameron v.
New York, 383 F. Supp. 182, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (court decision pertaining to
petitioner's right to be released on bail pending his appeal). See generally Vatjtauer v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) (dictum) ("[D]eportation
without a fair hearing or charges unsupported by any evidence is a denial of due
process."). See also Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (conviction upon
a charge unsupported by any evidence denies due process). For commentary on the
issue of the constitutionality of administrative arbitrariness, see Berger, Administra-
tive Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55-58, 82-83, 88-89
(1965); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness - A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 783, 785-86 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51 MINN.
L. REV. 601, 603-04 (1967); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78
YALE L.J. 965, 980-86 (1969); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness is Not Always
Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV. 643, 644-46, 650-51 (1967).
99. See Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 690-91 (3d Cir. 1976); Wilwording v.
Swenson, 502 F.2d 844, 851 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 912 (1975); Drown v.
Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1108 (1st Cir. 1971); Canty v. Board of Educ.,
312 F. Supp. 254, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Department of
Environmental Protection, 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199, 299 A.2d 751, 759 (1973), aff'd per
curiam, 131 N.J. Super. 38, 328 A.2d 246 (1974).
Under federal APA standards, it appears that an administrative action must
similarly rest on a rational basis in order to avoid being found arbitrary and
capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). See Bowman Transport, Inc. v. Arkansas-
Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284-86 (1974); Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061, 1067
(10th Cir. 1975); Scanlan v. United States Army Test and Evaluation Command, 389
F. Supp. 65, 69-70 (D. Md. 1975) (dictum); Temple Univ. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 361
F. Supp. 263, 270-71 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 40,
46 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Sterling Davis Dairy v. Freeman, 253 F. Supp. 80, 82 (D.N.J.
1965). Review under § 706(2)(A) necessitates inquiry into whether the administrative
decision was based on "a consideration of all the relevant factors and whether there
has been a clear error of judgment." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). Thus, an agency's decision may be arbitrary and capricious
even if it is supported by substantial evidence. 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974).
100. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REv.
55, 82 (1965).
Some courts have even resorted to dictionary definitions. In First Nat'l Bank
of Fayetteville v. Smith, 365 F. Supp. 898, 902-03 (W.D. Ark. 1973), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 930 (1975), the court said:
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possible definition of the terms arbitrary and capricious, set out by one court
as follows:
"arbitrary" and "capricious" embrace a concept which emerges from the
due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution and operates to guarantee that acts of
government will be grounded on established legal principles and have a
rational factual basis. A decision is arbitrary and capricious when it is
not supported by evidence or when there is no reasonable justification
for the decision.'0 '
The due process embodied in this definition must be recognized as the
substantive rather than procedural component of constitutional due process.
In view of the reasonable procedural safeguards in effect, it is clear that due
process claims in cases similar to Clark are based on substantive due
process. 102
It is a well-recognized principle of constitutional law that statutes must
rest on a rational basis in order to comply with substantive due process
requirements. 103 The notion that government action in the form of
legislation must rest on a rational basis is similarly applicable to actions
taken by administrative agencies. 04 As articulated by the Supreme Court,
"[t]he touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government."'1 5 This right to be free from arbitrary and
Capricious is defined as lacking a standard or norm, marked by variation or
irregularity, lacking a predictable pattern, erratic or whimsical. Webster's
Third New International Dictionary. Arbitrary is said to mean not rational or
not done or acting according to reason or judgment. Black's Law Dictionary
(Rev. 4th Ed.). The terms taken together, "arbitrary and capricious" has been
defined as an act done without adequate determining principle or not done
according to reason or judgment.
For a similar dictionary formulation of "arbitrary" action, see United States v.
Carmack, 324 U.S. 230, 243 n.14 (1946).
101. Canty v. Board of Educ., 312 F. Supp. 254, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
102. The Clarks, it will be recalled, were permitted a hearing before the appeal tax
court for Montgomery County, where they appeared with counsel and presented
evidence and argument. State Dep't of Assess. & Taxation v. Clark, 281 Md. 385, 389,
380 A.2d 28, 31 (1977).
103. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc.,
414 U.S. 156, 164-67 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrapa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963); Thompson v.
Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443, 447-49 (5th Cir. 1973).
104. See notes 97 to 99 and accompanying text supra.
105. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). This statement appears in the
context of a procedural due process discussion. Cf. Garrett v. City of Troy, 341 F.
Supp. 633, 635-36 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1973) (unpublished)
(substantive due process protects against arbitrary action). Fundamentally, however,
it must be recognized that there would be little purpose in ensuring proper procedural
safeguards against arbitrary action if arbitrary results were constitutionally
permissible. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 502 F.2d 844, 851 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 912 (1975); McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 1973), modified,
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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capricious action has been recognized even when arbitrary action was not
coupled with other constitutional rights,os and a few courts have recognized
that an arbitrary and capricious deprivation of a "privilege" does not place
the alleged conduct beyond the scope of substantive due process protecti-
on.107 The fourteenth amendment, in short, has been regarded as a general
prohibition against arbitrary and unreasonable government action.108
The notion that an official decision that is unsupported by evidence or
lacking reasonable justification is arbitrary and capricious and thereby
violative of substantive due process rights has potentially far-ranging
implications. Although federal courts have applied this principle with
greater frequency in the past several years, it remains clear that the
substantive due process cases have been limited primarily to certain
relatively well-defined areas. 0 9 Logically, such a limitation is not mandated;
however, an obvious practical drawback to a wide application of the
substantive due process doctrine is the possibility that administrative
authorities would be placed in due process straightjackets. 110 Unless judicial
review for substantive due process is strictly limited, the entire rationale of
establishing agencies as entities capable of efficiently applying their
expertise is jeopardized. The right to substantive due process should not be
used to interfere with decisions properly left to the discretion of administra-
tive authorities; it should be invoked only to the extent necessary to
guarantee that administrative determinations rest on a rational basis."'
Despite these limitations upon judicial review for compliance with
substantive due process, however, it must be fully realized that due process
issues may arise upon the commission of arbitrary administrative action. It
should be evident that even if judicial review in Clark had been restricted to
106. See Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443, 446-47 (5th Cir. 1973).
107. Id. Saffioti v. Wilson, 392 F. Supp. 1335, 1344-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Beatham v.
Manson, 369 F. Supp. 783, 791-92 (D. Conn. 1973). Contra, Jeffries v. Turkey Run
Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3-5 (7th Cir. 1974) (absence of a claim that a liberty
or property interest has been impaired will defeat a substantive due process claim).
108. See Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1973); Nelson v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 420 F. Supp. 1374, 1383 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Saffioti v.
Wilson, 392 F. Supp. 1335, 1344-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
109. See note 98 supra.
110. Cf. North Dakota Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156,
165 (1973) (quoting Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949)) (due process clauses should not be construed to prevent
legislatures' regulation of conditions contrary to the public welfare).
111. Miller v. Dean, 430 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D. Neb. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 266 (8th Cir.
1977). In Miller, the court pointed out that a consideration of some irrelevant evidence
and a failure to make findings of fact did not, per se, constitute a due process violation
when other substantiated reasons were adequate to support the action taken. One
judge has suggested that the use of substantive due process as a basis for judicial
review "inevitably has led to an unwarranted invasion of the duties and responsibili-
ties of state and local governments." Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 191-92 (8th
Cir. 1973) (Mehaffy, C.J., dissenting from a denial of petition for rehearing en banc),
vacated sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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constitutional issues, the Court of Appeals should have permitted the circuit
court to review allegations of arbitrariness in order to ensure administrative
compliance with due process of law.
CONCLUSION
The Clark case is significant because of its definite restriction on the
previously well-established inherent judicial power to review arbitrary,
illegal, capricious, or unreasonable administrative decisions. Clark indicates
that the Court of Appeals is less inclined than it has been in the recent past
to exercise its constitutionally mandated power to check arbitrary adminis-
trative action. The present orientation of the court allows the exercise of
inherent judicial power in this area only in "rare" instances.112 Criticism
has been directed at the court for its failure to perceive that Clark is
essentially indistinguishable from Gould, and for its apparent resurrection
of the right versus privilege doctrine. The comprehensive scheme analysis
used to distinguish Clark from Gould seemingly permits insulation of
administrative arbitrariness from review. Even more disturbing is the
court's apparent treatment of the inherent power of judicial review as a
common law power subject to legislative control rather than a constitution-
ally mandated power of the judiciary. Finally, a criticism has been leveled at
the court's failure to realize that administrative arbitrariness may give rise
to due process issues. Even if the inherent power to review is restricted to
constitutional issues, the court should nevertheless have permitted, as a
matter of substantive due process, review for arbitrariness. Whatever the
long-range impact of Clark, it is clear that the Court of Appeals has in effect
granted supervisors of assessments, directors of finance, and the appeal tax
courts the opportunity to determine abatements arbitrarily.
112. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l
Arena, 282 Md. 588, 608, 386 A.2d 1216, 1224 (1978).
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GENERAL AND SPECIFIC INTENT: THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES -
McBURNEY v. STATE
The distinction between specific and general intent crimes has long been
significant in criminal law.' In McBurney v. State2 the Maryland Court of
Appeals applied this distinction in a novel fashion. It stated that at common
law, venue for a criminal case exists in the county where the offense was
committed. With respect to general intent crimes, the court claimed that
venue lies where the alleged acts constituting the crime were committed. It
indicated, however, that a specific intent crime might be "committed" in
several places and at several times, and that proper venue in a case
involving a specific intent crime might therefore lie in a jurisdiction other
than the one where the alleged criminal acts occurred.3 As will be discussed,
distinguishing between specific and general intent crimes for venue
purposes is inappropriate.
John J. McBurney was counsel for the O'Connor Construction Company
(O'Connor), a company that had agreed to perform certain construction
work for the Cameron-Brown Company (Cameron-Brown). Pursuant to the
agreement, Cameron-Brown sent a check for $8,000 to McBurney's office in
Prince George's County, Maryland, instructing McBurney to release this
money to O'Connor when O'Connor commenced the agreed-upon work.
McBurney acknowledged receipt of the check and promised to comply with
Cameron-Brown's instructions. 4 After holding the check for about one week,
McBurney deposited it in his bank account in Montgomery County,
Maryland and used the account for numerous transactions in his legal
practice - other than for keeping escrow funds. 5 Some time later he
withdrew funds from the account for reasons unrelated to the
O'Connor/Cameron-Brown agreement, reducing the balance below $8,000.
In reducing the account's balance below $8,000, McBurney necessarily
appropriated part of the O'Connor/Cameron-Brown funds to his own use.6
1. See W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CRIMES § 5.06
(7th ed. 1967); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 762-64 (2d ed. 1969).
2. 280 Md. 21, 371 A.2d 129 (1977).
3. Id. at 30-32, 371 A.2d at 134-35.
4. Id. at 24, 371 A.2d at 131.
5. "The monies in that account were used. for other things, for example, his
secretary's salary and other office expenses of various kinds." Id. at 25, 371 A.2d at
131.
6. After the company had begun construction, McBurney had two conversations
with the president of O'Connor regarding the release of the $8,000. At his trial,
McBurney testified that, as a result of the conversations, he thought he had received
permission to borrow the money to loan to the business of the mother of his secretary.
O'Connor's president testified that no such permission had been granted. After the
second conversation, McBurney, in Montgomery County, issued a check, drawn on the
Montgomery County account, to his secretary's mother's business. The issuance of the
check reduced the balance in McBumey's account to less than $8,000. Id. at 25-26, 371
A.2d at 131-32.
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Article 10, section 44(a) of the Maryland Annotated Code7 prohibits an
attorney from commingling funds entrusted to him with his own funds and
also prohibits an attorney from using funds entrusted to him for any
purpose other than that for which they were entrusted. Section 44(c) makes
any willful violation of section 44(a) a misdemeanor. Thus, by his acts
McBurney committed two crimes: commingling the O'Connor/Cameron-
Brown funds entrusted to him with his own funds, and using part of these
entrusted funds for his own purpose.
The Prince George's County Grand Jury indicted McBurney for six
offenses related to this transaction, including the two violations of section
44.8 Before trial, McBurney filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for
improper venue, 9 claiming that his alleged crimes took place in Montgomery
rather than Prince George's County, that the Prince George's County Grand
Jury therefore could not indict him, and that the Prince George's County
Circuit Court was thus an improper forum in which to try him. The circuit
court denied the motion,10 and McBurney was ultimately convicted of the
two section 44 charges. He appealed, assigning error to the denial of his
motion to dismiss for improper venue." The Maryland Court of Appeals,
after issuing a writ of certiorari prior to decision in the Court of Special
Appeals,' 2 held that section 44 offenses were general intent crimes occurring
in only one place for venue purposes. Upon examining the facts in
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44 (1976), in pertinent part, provides:
(a) If any attorney is entrusted with, or receives and accepts, or
otherwise holds, deposit moneys or other trust moneys, of whatever kind or
nature, such moneys, in the absence of written instructions or court order to
the contrary shall be expeditiously deposited in an account maintained as a
separate account or accounts for funds belonging to others. In no event shall
he commingle any such funds with his own or use any such funds for any
purpose other than the purpose for which such funds were entrusted to him.
(c) Any attorney wilfully violating the provisions of this section, in
addition to the penalties [reprimand, suspension, or disbarment] set forth in
subsection (b) hereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor for each such violation
and on conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars
($5,000.00) or be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or both in the
discretion of the court.
The statute had been cited in two earlier cases for reasons unrelated to a prosecution
under its provisions. In neither case was venue an issue. See Bar Ass'n v. Cockrell,
274 Md. 279, 284, 334 A.2d 85, 87 (1975); Andresen v. Bar Ass'n, 269 Md. 313, 327, 305
A.2d 845, 854, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1065 (1973).
8. Id. at 23, 371 A.2d at 130. McBurney was found not guilty of misappropriation
of funds as a fiduciary and of larceny after trust. After the trial commenced, a nolle
prosequi was entered as to counts charging false pretenses and attempted false
pretenses. Id. at 23 n.1, 371 A.2d at 130 n.1.
9. Id. at 27, 371 A.2d at 132-33. See generally MD. R.P. 725b.
10. 280 Md. at 27-28, 371 A.2d at 132.
11. See id. at 28, 371 A.2d at 133.
12. Id. at 23, 371 A.2d at 131. See generally MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 12-201 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-203 (1974).
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McBurney's case the court concluded that the two offenses had occurred in
Montgomery County. Because the court found that venue in Prince George's
County was improper, it dismissed the counts of the indictment relating to
the section 44 offenses. 13
Judge Orth, writing for the court, began his analysis of the case by
stating that the crimes of which McBurney had been convicted occurred in
Montgomery County rather than Prince George's County. He pointed out
that these crimes required only a general intent, and not a specific intent, for
section 44 merely requires an intent to do the proscribed actus reus,14 while
"'some intent other than to do the actus reus' "15 of the crime is needed to
create a specific intent crime.16
Having thus established that the crimes defined in section 44 require
general rather than specific intent, the court relied on this fact to distinguish
McBurney from a line of embezzlement cases upon which the state had
relied in asserting that venue in Prince George's County was proper.
Quoting Martel v. State,17 the opinion implied that these cases established
that "'[in embezzlement, the rule is that proper venue is the county where
the act of appropriation or conversion took place, or where the intent to
embezzle was formed, or where the property was entrusted, or where the
accused is under an obligation to account,' "18 but declined to analogize
section 44 offenses to embezzlement for venue purposes. Instead, Judge Orth
emphasized that, unlike section 44 offenses, embezzlement is a specific
intent offense, stating that the specific intent element in embezzlement is
"'a fraudulent intent to deprive the owner of his property,' ,19 and that "[i]t
is because of this specific intent element that embezzlement may be
'committed' in several places and at several times." 2 Thus, the court
concluded that venue for general intent crimes (such as section 44 offenses),
unlike venue for specific intent crimes (such as embezzlement), is proper in
only one place: where the actus reus concurs with the mens rea, that is, the
place of the crime.
13. 280 Md. at 28-34, 371 A.2d at 133-37. The court declined to decide whether the
Grand Jury for Prince George's County had subject matter jurisdiction in the case. Id.
at 31 n.8, 371 A.2d at 135 n.8. It also did not consider the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the convictions. Id. at 35, 371 A.2d at 137.
14. "The actus reus in the one crime is the commingling of entrusted funds with
an attorney's own funds; in the other crime it is the use of entrusted funds by an
attorney for any purpose other than the purpose for which they were entrusted to
him." 280 Md. at 29, 371 A.2d at 134.
15. Id. at 29, 371 A.2d at 133 (quoting R. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 762).
16. The court noted the provision that an attorney must "wilfully" violate the
statute does not create a specific intent element in the crime, whether "wilfully" is
defined as "intentionally" or "with a bad purpose." 280 Md. at 29, 371 A.2d-at 134.
17. 221 Md. 294, 157 A.2d 437, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960).
18. 280 Md. at 30, 371 A.2d at 134 (quoting Martel v. State, 221 Md. 294, 299, 157
A.2d 437, 440, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960)).
19. 280 Md. at 30, 371 A.2d at 134 (quoting W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, supra note
1, § 5.06).
20. 280 Md. at 30, 371 A.2d at 134.
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The Court of Appeals stressed that the issue raised in McBurney was
proper venue and not the subject matter jurisdiction of the Prince George's
County court.2 It stated that the common law rule of venue - that venue is
proper only in the county in which the crime was committed - is in force in
Maryland, 22 and reiterated that the appropriate county for venue in the case
before it was Montgomery County. Because McBurney had made timely
objection to the Prince George's County venue of his trial, the Court of
Appeals reversed his conviction and dismissed both section 44 counts of the
indictment.23
The rationale for the McBurney decision can be reduced to three
propositions: (1) the common law rule in Maryland is that venue lies where a
crime is committed; (2) specific intent crimes such as embezzlement may be
committed in more than one place, but general intent crimes can be
committed in only one place, where the actus reus and mens rea conjoin; and
(3) violation of section 44 is a general intent crime. The first and third of
these propositions appear to be well founded. With regard to the first, venue
in the county of the commission of a crime, though not mandated by statute
or by any provision of the state's constitution, 24 is clearly the general rule
and accepted in Maryland. 25 With regard to the third, section 44 offenses do
appear to be general intent rather than specific intent offenses: as stated by
21. Id. at 31-33, 371 A.2d at 135-36. See generally MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 1-501 (1974).
22. 280 Md. at 32, 371 A.2d at 135. Many states have codified the common law
rule. See 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §36 n.2 (C. Torcia ed. 1974).
23. 280 Md. at 33-34, 371 A.2d at 136-37. See generally MD. R.P. 875a.
24. See Kisner v. State, 209 Md. 524, 530, 122 A.2d 102, 105 (1956). See generally
MD. CONST., Decl. of Rts., art. 20, which provides "[t]hat the trial of facts, where they
arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estate of the People."
Article 20 has been interpreted as being too indefinite to confer any general right to
trial in the county of a crime's commission. Stewart v. State, 21 Md. App. 346, 350-51,
319 A.2d 621, 623 (1974), aff'd, 275 Md. 258, 340 A.2d 290 (1975); Blume, The Place of
Trial of Criminal Cases, 43 MICH. L. REv. 59, 69-70, 93 (1944).
25. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
As one court has put it, the purpose [of the common law rule] is "to secure the
party accused from being dragged to a trial at a distant part of the state, away
from his friends and witnesses and neighborhood, and thus to be subject to the
verdict of mere strangers, who may feel no common sympathy, or who may
even cherish animosities or prejudices against him, as well as the necessity of
incurring the most oppressive expenses, or perhaps, even to the inability of
procuring the proper witnesses to establish his innocence."
1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 36, at 106 (C. Torcia ed. 1974) (quoting State v.
Robinson, 14 Minn. 447, 454-55, (1869)). See United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405
(1958). The General Assembly has the power to prescribe venue in any county for a
crime, but it has not exercised the power with respect to violations of § 44 as it has
with respect to some other crimes. See Kisner v. State, 209 Md. 524, 531-32, 122 A.2d
102, 106 (1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 586-590 (1976).
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the court, section 44 of article 10 appears to require no intent other than to
perform the proscribed actus reus. 2
6
The court was unpersuasive, however, when it sought to justify its
conclusion that the crimes were not committed in Prince George's County
(and thus that venue was improper there) on the ground that the crimes
required merely a general intent. Three flaws exist in its analysis. First, if
venue properly exists only where the crimes occurred (the common law test
the court purports to follow), a defendant's mere intent, whether specific or
general, should be insufficient to create venue. A basic premise of American
criminal law is that
[t]he law does not deal with a man's inner feelings and unexecuted
purpose and intentions. A mere criminal or guilty intent to do an act
... , not connected with an overt act or outward manifestation, is not in
and of itself a crime, and with it the law has no concern. 27
Thus, as the Court of Appeals has recognized, 28 intent alone is insufficient to
constitute a crime. Absent commission of a new actus reus, the mere
existence of mens rea should not be sufficient to establish venue.
Second, even if, as the court argued, intent is sufficient to create venue,
no reason exists for limiting the consideration of intent to cases involving
specific intent crimes. As in the case of a specific intent crime, the intent to
perform the actus reus of a general intent crime may exist independently of
the commission of the actus reus. The various locations where such general
26. See notes 13 to 15 and accompanying text supra. See generally W. CLARK &
W. MARSHALL, supra note 1, § 5.06.
27. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 152 (J. Ruppenthal ed. 1932). See W. LAFAVE &
A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 25 (1972), which states:
Several reasons have been given in justification for the requirement of an act.
One is that a person's thoughts are not susceptible of proof except when
demonstrated by outward actions.. . . Another reason given is the difficulty
in distinguishing a fixed intent from mere daydream and fantasy. Most
persuasive, however, is the notion that the criminal law should not be so
broadly defined to reach those who entertain criminal schemes but never let
their thoughts govern their conduct.
The mere existence of a criminal intent and a prohibited act, moreover, does not
always create a crime. The mens rea and actus reus must merge so that the mens rea
actuates the actus reus. Id. § 34; R. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 835. In effect, the
required relationship between the mens rea and the actus reus is that they concur in
time. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, supra note 1, § 5.02; L. HOCHHEIMER, THE LAW OF
CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7 (2d ed. 104). Contra, W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr,
supra § 34; R. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 835. The requirement is applicable to all
crimes except those that have no mens rea element. See W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL,
supra note 1, §5.10. McBurney's crimes were not such "strict liability" offenses
because wilfullness was required as an element.
28. "'IT]here are two components of every crime: one of these is objective, the
other is subjective; one is physical, the other is psychical; one is the actus reus, the
other is the mens rea [e.g., intent].'" Id. at 28-29, 371 A.2d at 133 (quoting R. PERKINS,
supra note 1, at 743).
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intent existed independently of the actus reus would therefore appear to be
as appropriate for venues as the locations where a specific intent existed
independently of the actus reus element of a specific intent crime.
Finally, the embezzlement cases on which the court relied do not support
McBurney's reasoning or result. As previously noted, Martel v. State
29 lists
as appropriate venues for embezzlement: (1) the county where the act of
appropriation or conversion occurred; (2) where the intent to embezzle was
formed; (3) where the property was entrusted; and (4) where the accused is
under an obligation to account.30 The first of these is the traditional place of
venue: where act and intent conjoin. The second basis of venue, though close
to the McBurney court's position, makes no mention of the specific intent
nature of embezzlement, and the court's opinion offers no principled basis
for distinguishing between general and specific intent in this context. The
third and fourth, moreover, have nothing to do with the existence of intent.
Thus, the court appears to be stretching precedent to a very substantial
extent in using the line of embezzlement cases to develop a dichotomy
between specific and general intent crimes for venue purposes.
The weakness of McBurney's analysis is indicated further by the failure
of any other case to adopt its analysis. No prior case in Maryland or any
other jurisdiction examined by the writer has argued that the fact that "the
crimes here considered do not have a specific intent as an essential
ingredient is pertinent to the consideration of where they were committed. '31
Similarly, in no case involving a specific intent crime has the Court of
Appeals predicated the propriety of venue upon the specific intent nature of
the crime.
THE EMBEZZLEMENT CASES
The McBurney court's analysis may be misguided, but it was not
developed in a vacuum. The court derived its analysis from the line of Court
of Appeals cases recognizing four appropriate venues for embezzlement,3
2
three of which deviate from the common law rule purportedly followed in
Maryland. In examining the embezzlement cases, two questions must be
resolved. First, was the court's deviation from the common law rule
appropriate in those cases? Second, if such deviation is in fact proper,
should McBurney have followed the deviation rather than the common law
rule?
The Maryland venue rule for embezzlement ultimately derives from
Bowen v. State.33 In Bowen, the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of
29. 221 Md. 294, 157 A.2d 437, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960).
30. Id. at 299, 157 A.2d at 440.
31. 280 Md. at 30, 371 A.2d at 134.
32. See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 286-95.
33. 206 Md. 368, 111 A.2d 844 (1955). Bowen, in his capacity as president of a title
company, had received certain funds in Montgomery County. He later deposited the
funds in the company's trustee account in Washington, D.C., and subsequent
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a defendant who had been found guilty in Montgomery County of
embezzlement 34 and larceny after trust.3 5 Although it reversed the convic-
tions on the ground that the crimes were committed out of state, and thus
that Maryland lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the court devoted a
substantial portion of its opinion to answering the prosecution's contentions
regarding venue. The state had argued that venue for embezzlement could
properly exist not only in the county where the act of conversion occurred
(the traditional common law venue), but also where the fraudulent intent to
convert was formed, where the defendant was under an obligation to
account for the money, or where the money was received. The court
emphasized that its opinion did not decide whether proper venue lies where
an intent to convert is formed or where an obligation to account exists,
because it concluded that, even if the state's contentions were correct, there
was insufficient evidence to show that any of the actions necessary to
establish these venues had occurred in Montgomery County. 36 In answer to
the state's final contention, that venue is proper where the money was
received, the court noted that the case relied upon by the state37 merely held
that an intent to convert is presumed to have been formed where the money
was received. Without indicating whether it approved of such a presumption,
the Court of Appeals stated that "there was not sufficient evidence to show
any intent to convert the money" when it was received in Montgomery
County.38
Despite Bowen's clear refusal to determine whether venue is appropriate
in places other than where the act of conversion occurred, Martel v. State39
relied on Bowen for the proposition that venue is equally appropriate where
the fraudulent intent to convert was formed, where the defendant was under
an obligation to account, and where the money was received. Martel had
been a bartender at a club in Frederick County, Maryland. He was convicted
of larcency after trust, an offense similar to embezzlement, 4° for converting
to his own use club funds entrusted to him. Martel argued that the state had
never proven proper venue existed in Frederick County. The court cited
Bowen 4' as support for its statement that venue in embezzlement cases is
withdrawals were made in Washington which led to the embezzlement and larceny
after trust charges. 206 Md. at 372-74, 111 A.2d at 845-47.
34. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 154 (1951) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 129 (1976)).
35. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 420 (1951) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 353 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
36. 206 Md. at 375-79, 111 A.2d at 847-49. The court concluded that Bowen had
no intent to embezzle or an obligation to account in Montgomery County.
37. Denmark v. State, 44 Ga. App. 157, 161 S.E. 286 (1931).
38. 206 Md. at 378, 111 A.2d at 848.
39. 221 Md. 294, 157 A.2d 437, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960).
40. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 129 (1976) with MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 353 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
41. 221 Md. at 299, 157 A.2d at 440. The court also relied upon 18 AM. JuR.
Embezzlement § 65 (1938), which does support its venue rule.
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appropriate not only at the place of conversion, but also in the three
locations whose legitimacy as venues Bowen had refused to decide. Without
indicating which set of requirements Frederick County met, the Martel court
stated that there was evidence from which the jury could find that any or all
of the venue standards were met by that county.
42
Martel clearly misapplied Bowen in citing it to support the proposition
that venue is proper in counties other than where the act of conversion
occurred. Nevertheless, Martel provided a basis in Maryland for establish-
ing venue for embezzlement and similar offenses in places other than that
provided under the traditional common law rule. The Martel rule was
discussed and expanded in Peddersen v. State.43 Peddersen managed his
employer's farm in Montgomery County, and pursuant to his duties, sold
some cows in Pennsylvania. After failing to deliver the proceeds of the sale
to his employer for four days, Peddersen fled Maryland to avoid an
unrelated suit. Unfortunately, he failed to deliver the proceeds to his
employer before fleeing and consequently was indicted and convicted of
embezzlement in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. 44 On appeal
Peddersen asserted that because no embezzlement was committed in
Montgomery County, and because the jury was improperly instructed that
venue was appropriate where the intent to embezzle was formed, his
conviction should be reversed. 45 The Court of Appeals disagreed and
affirmed the conviction, holding that venue is proper where there is evidence
to show that the defendant had possession of the money or property
appropriated in the indicting county, and also evidence exists to support an
inference that the fraudulent intent to embezzle had been formed in the
same county. 4
6
In so holding, the Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the requirement
that the actus reus of embezzlement, conversion of the property, need have
occurred in the county asserting jurisdiction and venue. The court agreed
with the assertion of Clark and Marshall that:
The offense [of embezzlement] is complete whenever a person who has
been intrusted. . . [with money or property] forms an intent to convert
it to his own use, and has possession with such intent. A person,
therefore, may be indicted for embezzlement in the jurisdiction in which
42. In answer to Martel's objection to venue in Frederick County, the court said:
Almost always in the case of embezzlement, the determination of guilt must
be inferential. There was evidence here from which the jury could find that
any one, or all, of the necessary standards [as stated in text accompanying
note 47 infra] were met as to Frederick County.
22"1 Md. at 299, 157 A.2d at 440.
43. 223 Md. 329, 164 A.2d 539 (1960).
44. Id. at 330-32, 164 A.2d at 540-41.
45. Id. at 332, 164 A.2d at 541.
46. Id. at 337, 164 A.2d at 544.
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he had possession of the property or money with intent to convert it to
his own use . . .47
It went on to note that other jurisdictions did not require the actual act of
appropriation to occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the court if
fraudulent intent could be shown to have been formed in the county where
the property was received or in a county in which the property was
possessed.48 Finally, the Peddersen court quoted Martel to indicate that
previous Maryland authority supported this position. Rather than merely
relying upon Martel, however, the court expanded its prior decision. It
pointed out that the authorities it had discussed clearly indicated that intent
is the "essential element" in embezzlement and that venue for that crime lies
in the county where money or property was received with intent to embezzle,
or where money or property was possessed and the intent to embezzle was
formed, "regardless of the fact that actual conversion may have taken place
in another county or state."'49
The Pedderson court's holding that intent plus possession is sufficient to
establish venue in embezzlement cases- is inconsistent with the notion that
venue lies where a crime is committed: possession of another's money or
goods, without more, cannot reasonably be viewed as an act sufficient to
constitute the actus reus of embezzlement. Mere intent to convert, when
coupled with possession, cannot deprive the owner of his money or property.
Such a deprivation occurs only when the accused goes beyond an intent to
convert and takes some action that constitutes a use or holding adverse to
the owner's interest in the money or property. Because an accused embezzler
originally has lawful possession of the money or property, the actus reus of
embezzlement (conversion) cannot consist of possession alone. As discussed
previously, criminalizing a mere mental state - the intent to embezzle - is
unacceptable in our society.,51 By emphasizing intent as the critical element
47. Id. at 335, 164 A.2d at 543 (quoting W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 3.02 (6th ed. 1958)).
48. The court cited, as support for its position, People v. Goodrich, 142 Cal. 216, 75
P. 796 (1904); People v. Brock, 21 Cal. App. 2d 601, 70 P.2d 210 (1937); State v. Serkau,
128 Conn. 153, 20 A.2d 725 (1941); Woodward v. United States, 38 App. D.C. 323 (1912);
Heughan v. State, 82 Ga. App. 640, 61 S.E.2d 685 (1950); Maynard v. State, 47 Ga.
App. 221, 170 S.E. 265 (1933); State v. Sullivan, 49 La. Ann. 197, 21 So. 688 (1896);
Brown v. State, 23 Tex. Crim. 214, 4 S.W. 588 (Crim. App. 1887).
49. 223 Md. at 337, 164 A.2d at 544.
50. Peddersen's reliance upon W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CRIMES § 3.02 (6th ed. 1958) to support its venue rule is hardly persuasive in
view of the inconsistency within that treatise. Compare id. § 3.02 (see text
accompanying note 47 supra) with id. § 12.21 ("To constitute a conversion so as to
make out a case of embezzlement, the owner must be deprived of his money or
property by an adverse using or holding. Mere secreting of property with intent to
convert it is not enough."). Ironically, the Peddersen court refused to be influenced by
a treatise relied upon by the defendant in that case because, in part, of an
inconsistency (nearly identical to that in W. CLARK & W MARSHALL, supra §§ 3.02,
12.21) within the treatise. See 223 Md. at 334, 164 A.2d at 542-43.
51. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
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in embezzlement and by formulating its purported holding in terms not
requiring that the embezzlement have been committed in the county of
venue, the Peddersen court made possible McBurney's unjustified distinction
between specific and general intent crimes for venue purposes.
52
Neither the suspect origin of the Martel rule in a misapplication of
Bowen nor the emphasis upon intent in Peddersen, however, make the venue
rules stated in those cases valueless. In a crime such as embezzlement, the
elements of which are the fraudulent intent to convert property plus a
conversion of the property, the place at which intent (mens rea) and
conversion (actus reus) conjoin to create an offense may be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to prove. For example, A might travel through
one county collecting money for his employer, return home to another
county, and fail to turn the money over to his employer (without evidence
that he lost or was robbed of the money). The intent to convert the money
might have been formed in either county, but absent proof of some use of the
money inconsistent with the employer's ownership (an act of conversion), it
would be impossible to show where the crime actually occurred. The intent
could not be presumed from the fact of possession, for A had a right to
possess the property. In such a situation, under a strict application of the
common law venue rule, an accused who had clearly embezzled the property
within the state could not be tried because no appropriate venue could be
established. Rather than permit such a result to occur, a court might find
venue in such cases by presuming that actus reus and mens rea concurred in
a county where there is some likelihood that they did in fact concur, or by
establishing venue in a place bearing some relationship to the crime. A
Louisiana case, State v. Cason,53 demonstrates how such a rule might be
applied:
[I]n view of the difficulty of stating with exactness (in some cases) the
place where the felonious conversion occurred, the courts have
established certain legal presumptions which, if not rebutted by other
evidence, suffice to vest jurisdiction in a particular court. Thus, it will be
presumed that the illegal conversion was accomplished in the jurisdic-
tion of the court where the money was entrusted to the accused or at the
place at which an accounting is to be made .... But these
presumptions can be indulged in only in the absence of proof showing
that the conversion of the monies took place within another jurisdiction
54
52. The McBurney court also relied upon Urciolo v. State, 272 Md. 607, 325 A.2d
878 (1974). 280 Md. at 30, 371 A.2d at 134. Urciolo reviewed with approval the
decisions in Bowen, Martel, and Peddersen, and, as in Bowen, the court left open the
possibility that venue might be proper in the county in which an accused is under a
duty to account. 272 Md. at 640, 325 A.2d at 896-97. Like the court in Martel, the
Urciolo court found support in Bowen for the Martel rule despite the fact that Bowen
provided no such support. Id. at 623, 325 A.2d at 888.
53. 198 La. 828, 5 So. 2d 121 (1941).
54. Id. at 832, 5 So. 2d at 123. Though the court in Cason was bound by
Louisiana's constitution and code of criminal procedure, the constitution and code
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The three proper embezzlement venues, in addition to the place of
conversion, approved of in Martel55 might well be used as such presump-
tions. The place where the fraudulent intent was formed obviously bears
some relationship to the crime. Entrustment to an accused initiates his
possession of the money or property and, regardless whether possession is
viewed as a sufficient act to constitute the actus reus of embezzlement, the
act of possession, when coupled with the requisite intent, gives the accused
the ability to commit the crime. Finally, the time and place of accounting
mark the point by which the crime will almost certainly have occurred. At
such time the embezzler will either fail to account or account improperly so
as to conceal his defalcation.
Application of presumptions of this sort should not be restricted to
embezzlement cases. In fact, similar presumptions would be appropriate
whenever the exact locus of a crime is sufficiently unclear so that adhering
to the common law venue rule is difficult or impossible. In McBurney, the
use of the Cason approach would have obviated any reason for relying upon
the inappropriate distinction between specific and general intent crimes for
venue purposes. Had McBurney commingled his funds with those of his
clients and misused the funds in a fashion that made determining the
county of commingling and misuse impossible, resort to a presumption
establishing venue in some place having a relevant connection to the
transaction might have been appropriate. The fact that the place of
commingling and misuse was clear, however, made resort to any such
presumption unnecessary. This reason for not resorting to a presumption in
McBurney, however, stems from the ease of proving the locus of the crime,
not from its character as a general intent crime.
CONCLUSION
McBurney's conclusion that classification of a crime as one requiring
either general or specific intent is relevant to determining proper venue
cannot be supported. Because the court purported to adhere to the rule that
venue lies where a crime is committed, and because a crime cannot be
committed without some kind of act, consideration of the nature of the intent
required for a particular crime is irrelevant for ascertaining venue. Intent
alone cannot determine where a crime is committed. Even if the courts were
to base venue solely on the fact that the intent element of the crime occurred
in a particular county, the McBurney opinion provides no justification for
distinguishing between specific and general intent crimes.
were essentially codifications of the traditional common law venue rule. See LA.
CONST. of 1921, art. 1, §9; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:13(A) (West 1928) (current version
at LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 611 (West 1967)). See also State v. Mispagel, 207 Mo.
557, 106 S.W. 513 (1907).
55. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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Despite their shortcomings, McBurney and the embezzlement cases on
which it relies highlight the need for a venue concept that recognizes the
frequently difficult task of determining where certain crimes are committed.
This need is not served, however, by focusing on the nature of the intent
element of the crime. Nor is it appropriately served by arbitrarily creating
additional venues for offenses when ascertaining the locus of the crime is a
likely problem. Rather, the focus should be on the difficulty in establishing
the locus of a particular crime with which a particular defendant is charged.
If the place where the actus reus and mens rea concurred can be determined
to the court's satisfaction, the traditional venue rule should be applied. If
such a determination is impossible, alternate venues might appropriately be
allowed based upon some relationship of the venue to the offense or a degree
of likelihood that the crime occurred in the venue. This approach
complements rather than contradicts the traditional common law rule of
venue: it utilizes the rule when the place of the crime's commission can be
established. At the same time, it eliminates the possibility that no proper
venue would exist because the site of the actus reus is uncertain.
McBurney focused on an inappropriate distinction between classes of
crimes. The approach developed in the line of cases upon which McBurney
based the distinction, however, served a legitimate function: it supplemented
the common law venue rule in a type of case that did not seem to satisfy the
traditional rule. Understanding this function makes possible the use of the
embezzlement cases to solve similar problems in other crimes, for example,
in determining the locus of the actus reus in some kidnapping-murder cases,
and permits limiting the application of the embezzlement cases to situations
in which their use is appropriate.
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WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: MARYLAND'S
APPLICATION OF BREWER v. WILLIAMS -
WATSON v. STATE
Donald Ray Watson was arrested for armed robbery and use of a
handgun in the commission of a crime of violence and retained private
counsel. Unsure of Watson's guilt, Detective John Hopkins spoke with
Watson's attorney on the day of Watson's second preliminary hearing and
suggested that a polygraph examination be conducted. Watson's attorney
agreed to this suggestion and informed his client that he was not under any
circumstances "to give any statement beyond the polygraph examination."'
Hopkins also agreed with the attorney that he would question Watson only
to the extent necessary to conduct the polygraph examination. 2
When the test was over the polygraph operator told Watson that he had
failed and then telephoned Hopkins to inform him that Watson had failed
and wanted to talk to him. Arriving twenty minutes later from another
office, Hopkins informed Watson that he had twice been unable to reach
Watson's attorney and stated: "I understand you have something you want
to tell me, but, first of all, I'm going to read your rights again."3 Watson was
then informed of his Miranda4 rights for the third time.5 After stating that
he understood his rights, Watson declared that he wished to talk to the
detective and wanted to "get something off his chest."6 An inculpatory
statement followed. In ruling on Watson's motion to suppress this
statement, the trial judge found that it was voluntarily given and, therefore,
1. Watson v. State, 282 Md. 73, 75, 382 A.2d 574, 576 (1978).
2. Further, Hopkins agreed to call Watson's attorney to inform him of the test
results. Brief for Appellant at 3, Watson v. State, 282 Md. 73, 382 A.2d 574 (1978).
3. 282 Md. at 76, 382 A.2d at 576.
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In order to protect an individual's
fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination and to insure that
any statement will be made voluntarily, Miranda imposed procedural safeguards in
the form of warnings as a precondition to the admissibility of a confession or
inculpatory statement resulting from a custodial interrogation. Miranda requires that
prior to any custodial interrogation the individual be warned that: he has the right to
remain silent; anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; he has the
right to the presence of an attorney; and if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Id. at 444.
5. 282 Md. at 76, 382 A.2d at 576. Watson had received Miranda warnings at the
time of his arrest and again at a post-arrest interrogation. Id. at 75, 382 A.2d at 575.
6. Id. at 76, 382 A.2d at 576.
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admissible.7 Watson was subsequently convicted, and the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed his conviction."
Relying on the intervening Supreme Court decision of Brewer v.
Williarms,9 Watson appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that his
statement had been obtained without an effective waiver of his right to
counsel. 0 A four-judge majority, speaking through Judge Smith, rejected
7. Id. at 77, 382 A.2d at 577. Although the trial court's findings of fact agreed
with the state's version of the incident, Watson offered a significantly different
version of the events preceding the statement. He testified that he did not request to
see Detective Hopkins. Moreover, he denied that he had made the inculpatory
statement and stated that his request to call his attorney had been ignored. Id. at 76,
382 A.2d at 576. In his brief to the Court of Appeals, however, Watson admitted that
he had made the inculpatory statement. Brief for Appellant at 7. The trial judge
stated:
"I don't believe the sequence of events as described to me by the
defendant in this case. I will say, however, that the statements given by the
defendant do not indicate to me that he was put upon or lulled into some kind
of sense of false secutity by virtue of having been administered a polygraph
test . . . . I think that the statement was given voluntarily with the
understanding of his Miranda rights, and having been given good advice by
his counsel, he chose to ignore it at that particular time . . . . I will rule that
the statement given on February l1th, '76, is admissible."
282 Md. at 77-78, 382 A.2d at 577.
8. 35 Md. App. 381, 370 A.2d 1149 (1977), aff'd, 282 Md. 73, 382 A.2d 574 (1978).
According to the Court of Special Appeals, the sole question was whether Watson's
statement was the product of a free and unconstrained will that had not been
overborne or compelled. 35 Md. App. at 384, 370 A.2d at 1150-51. The court rejected
Watson's suggestion that his statement was the involuntary result of the coercive
atmosphere generated by the lie detector examination, id. at 385, 370 A.2d at 1151; cf.
Johnson v. State, 31 Md. App. 303, 305, 355 A.2d 504, 506 (1976) (polygraph
examination purposely used to elicit incriminating statement may be considered by
jury as evidence that statement was given involuntarily), finding that Watson had
voluntarily agreed to take the test. 35 Md. App. at 385, 370 A.2d at 1151. In addition,
the court noted that in spite of the alleged coercive effect of having failed the
examination, Watson's inculpatory statement was at least partially exculpatory. The
Court of Special Appeals was apparently of the opinion that Watson's partial attempt
to exonerate himself refuted any suggestion that he was incapable of voluntarily
determining whether to make the statement. See id.
The court also rejected Watson's contention that once an accused is
represented by counsel, he cannot be questioned out of the presence of his attorney
absent a waiver by the accused in the presence of his attorney. According to the Court
of Special Appeals, the right to counsel belongs to the accused and not to his counsel.
The court recognized that the critical inquiry is whether the accused waived that right
and that, absent coercion or trickery, which would negate complete voluntariness, a
volunteered statement given in the absence of counsel is admissible. Concluding that
Watson had chosen to ignore the advice of his attorney, the Court of Special Appeals
upheld the trial court's finding that Watson's statement was voluntarily made after
an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Id. at 388, 370 A.2d at 1152.
9. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
10. The Court of Appeals granted the writ of certiorari expressly to consider the
effectiveness of the waiver in light of Brewer. 282 Md. at 74, 382 A.2d at 575.
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this contention and affirmed Watson's conviction." Judge Eldridge wrote a
dissenting opinion that was joined by Judges Digges and Levine. 12
The Watson majority extensively summarized and quoted from the
Brewer decision, in which the defendant, Williams, on the advice of his
attorney had surrendered to the police in Davenport, Iowa two days after an
arrest warrant had been issued charging that he had abducted a ten-year-old
girl in Des Moines. The defendant, who had been arraigned and was to be
transported to Des Moines, had retained counsel in both Davenport and Des
Moines. The police had agreed with Williams' attorneys that no questions
would be asked during the trip from Davenport to Des Moines, and although
the police did not directly question Williams during the trip, Detective
Learning delivered a lengthy "speech"' 13 that was later admitted to have
been intended to obtain incriminating information. 14 Williams thereafter
made several inculpatory statements and directed the police to the girl's
body.I5 The Supreme Court concluded that Leaming's speech was equivalent
to an interrogation and that Williams had therefore been denied his right to
legal representation. 16 The Court then addressed whether Williams had
waived his right to counsel and concluded that "Williams' consistent
reliance upon the advice of counsel in dealing with the authorities refutes
any suggestion that he waived that right."'17 Therefore, it held that "[tihe
Court of Appeals [for the Eighth Circuit] did not hold, nor do we, that under
the circumstances of this case Williams could not, without notice to counsel,
have waived his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. It
only held, as do we, that he did not."'18
11. Id. at 84, 382 A.2d at 580.
12. id.
13. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977). Detective Learning delivered
what has become known as the "Christian burial speech" to the defendant, a former
mental patient with deeply religious convictions.
"I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the
road .... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions ....
They are predicting... snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the
only person that knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself have
only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be
unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way
into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents
of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl
Id.
14. Id. at 399 & n.6.
15. See id. at 393.
16. See id. at 401; notes 24 to 28 & 41 to 49 and accompanying text infra.
17. 430 U.S. at 404.
18. Id. at 405-06 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). In rather blistering
dissents, Chief Justice Burger, id. at 415-17 & n.1, Mr. Justice White, id. at 430, and
Mr. Justice Blackmun, id. at 441, argued that the police had not engaged in any
unconstitutional conduct and that, because Williams' statements and any testimony
that he had led the police to the girl's body would have to be excluded at a future trial,
any attempt to retry the defendant would be futile. According to Chief Justice Burger,
19781
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Watson majority interpreted these statements as establishing that
the Supreme Court clearly did not hold that an individual may not waive his
right to counsel once he has obtained an attorney. 19 It concluded that the
appropriate standard was, as stated in Justice Powell's concurrence in
Brewer, that a statement would be admissible if it was found that the
defendant "did indeed waive the right to assistance of counsel and then
'freely on his own initiative. . . confessed the crime. . . . "20 In applying
this standard, the Maryland Court of Appeals distinguished the Watson
facts from those in Brewer:
The polygraph test here was no trick or coercive tactic; Watson
willingly submitted to it. It was after this that he took matters in his
own hands. There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that
Watson is in any way other than a normal individual mentally. We have
here no psychological coercion as in Brewer.21
The majority concluded that the facts "clearly add[ed] up to a knowing, in-
telligent, effective waiver of counsel .... -22
Because no single fact in the Watson record provides strong and
compelling evidence that Watson did or did not waive his right to counsel, it
is difficult to evaluate the court's determination that Watson actually had
waived his right to counsel. The analysis employed by-the Watson majority
to reach its result, however, is disturbing. The majority failed to discuss
whether Watson actually had a right to counsel in these circumstances.
Most fundamentally, however, assuming that Watson's right to counsel had
attached, the majority opinion failed to demonstrate an appreciation of
Brewer's constitutional standards for determining whether a waiver had
occurred or the rigorous application of those standards reflected by that
decision.
the public would be punished for the mistakes of its law enforcement officers. Id. at
416.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, disagreed, arguing that evidence of
where and how the body was found and its condition might be admissible on the
theory that the body would have been discovered even if the incriminating statements
had not been elicited from the defendant. Id. at 406 n.12. On retrial, the defendant
sought to exclude evidence of the discovery of the girl's body and the fact of her death.
The trial judge, overruling the defendant's motion to suppress this evidence, held that
the state had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the body would have
been discovered "'in any event,"' and Williams was convicted. Y. KAMISAR, W.
LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 193 (4th ed. Supp. 1979) (excerpt
from trial court's ruling on motion to suppress evidence of the discovery of victim's
body).
19. 282 Md. at 82, 382 A.2d at 579.
20. Id. (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
21. 282 Md. at 84, 382 A.2d at 580.
22. Id.
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Under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution as
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, 3 the accused in a
criminal prosecution is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel. 24
Originally applicable only to the trial itself, the right to the assistance of
counsel has been extended to pretrial proceedings in which a denial of
representation would adversely affect the fairness of the trial.25 The
Supreme Court has stated that the right to counsel attaches upon "the
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings - whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment. information, or arraign-
ment. ' 26 Once the right to counsel has attached, an individual is entitled to
the assistance of counsel at every critical stage of the pretrial proceedings, 27
and a police interrogation of the accused after the initiation of adversary
judicial proceedings is one of several situations that are considered critical.2 8
Strictly speaking, it was not essential that the Watson court expressly
consider whether the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel had
attached when he made his incriminating statement. Watson had partici-
pated in two preliminary hearings before making the statement to Detective
Hopkins, 29 and it is clear that this initiation of adversary proceedings
triggered his right to counsel. 30 He was therefore entitled to the assistance of
23. The sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel has been applied to
state prosecutions by incorporation into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel applies to
all state prosecutions if offense is punishable by imprisonment); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel extended to the states by fourteenth
amendment; applies to all felony prosecutions); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)
(right to counsel in state trial for capital offense is guaranteed by fourteenth
amendment due process clause).
24. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Of
course, the protections afforded by the sixth amendment also apply in federal
prosecutions. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938).
25. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309-13 (1973); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238-39 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-27
(1967).
26. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
27. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970) (preliminary hearing);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (post-indictment lineup
identification); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam) (preliminary
hearing in which defendant enters plea); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)
(arraignment); cf. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1977) (because identification at police
station was pre-indictment, adversary judicial proceedings had not been initiated
against the accused and did not require presence of counsel).
28. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).
29. 282 Md. at 75, 382 A.2d at 576.
30. See, e.g., Kochel v. State, 10 Md. App. 11, 16, 267 A.2d 755, 758 (1970)
(Maryland's preliminary hearing is a critical stage); note 26 and accompanying text
supra.
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an attorney whenever a law enforcement official interrogated him. The
Watson majority, however, failed to inquire whether Watson's statement
was the product of an interrogation, and, because under Brewer an
interrogation is a prerequisite to the accused's right to the presence of his
attorney, 31 this failure to determine whether Watson was in fact "interro-
gated" was a serious omission.
In Miranda v. Arizona,32 the Supreme Court defined custodial interroga-
tion as questioning initiated by law enforcement officials after an individual
has been taken into custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his
freedom of action.33 Under Miranda, an individual has a "limited Fifth
Amendment right to counsel" 34 whenever he is subjected to a custodial
interrogation to protect against compelled self-incrimination.3 5 Previously,
however, in Massiah v. United States,3 6 the Court had employed a
significantly different meaning of interrogation with respect to the sixth
amendment right to counsel. Massiah retained counsel after indictment on
federal narcotics charges. Later, he made incriminating statements to his co-
defendant, who was secretly cooperating with federal narcotics agents. The
co-defendant had permitted the agents to install a transmitting device
under the seat of the car in which the statements were made so that an
agent could overhear the conversation with Massiah. At the defendant's
trial, the agent was permitted to testify as to the content of these
statements.3 7 The Supreme Court held that the defendant was denied the
protection afforded by the sixth amendment right to counsel "when there
was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words,
which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been
indicted and in the absence of his counsel,"38 and that the defendant's
statements "obtained under the circumstances here disclosed, could not
31. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33. See id. at 444.
34. Id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 468-72.
36. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). There are several differences between the right to counsel
under Miranda and Massiah. The right to counsel under Massiah is a sixth
amendment right which only attaches upon the initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings. Id. at 204-05. Because the Miranda fifth amendment right to counsel
applies whenever the accused is subjected to a custodial interrogation, it will have a
broader application, encompassing a greater number and variety of situations, prior
to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. After the initiation of adversary
proceedings, however, because the Massiah sixth amendment right does not require
the accused to be in custody or subjected to an actual interrogation, see text
accompanying notes 37 to 40 infra, the Massiah right will have a broader application.
See United States v. Brown, 569 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1978) (Simpson, J., dissenting).
37. 377 U.S. at 202-03. Because Massiah was not in custody and was not actually
questioned, the agent's conduct would not have qualified as an interrogation under
Miranda. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976).
38. 377 U.S. at 206.
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constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his
trial. ' '39 It seems apparent, therefore, that the Massiah Court did not
consider an interrogation for sixth amendment purposes to be limited to
questioning by the law enforcement officials. Rather, the Court considered
the agent's deliberate elicitation of incriminating evidence to be an
interrogation and hence a critical stage at which the accused was entitled to
the assistance of an attorney. 40
The Brewer Court reaffirmed Massiah, stating that "the clear rule of
Massiah is that once adversary judicial proceedings have commenced
against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the
government interrogates him."'41 Because Williams' arraignment was the
commencement of adversary judicial proceedings, it was clear that his sixth
amendment right to counsel had attached. Moreover, because Detective
Leaming had "deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from
Williams just as surely as - and perhaps more effectively than - if he had
formally interrogated him,"4 2 the "Christian burial speech" was tantamount
to an interrogation. 43 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the fact
"[t]hat the incriminating statements were elicited surreptitiously in the
Massiah case, and otherwise [in Brewer], is constitutionally irrelevant. '4
The Brewer Court concluded that the circumstances of the case before it
were "constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in Massiah"
and that it required "no wooden or technical application of the Massiah
doctrine to conclude that Williams was entitled to the assistance of counsel
guaranteed to him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. '45 The Brewer
Court's finding that the "speech" was tantamount to an interrogation, even
though Detective Leaming's "Christian burial speech" was a declarative
statement 46 and was followed sometime thereafter by an admonition to the
defendant not to respond but just to think about it, 4 7 emphasizes clearly that
the appropriate definition of interrogation for sixth amendment purposes is
the Massiah concept of the deliberate elicitation of incriminating informa-
tion.4 8
39. Id. at 207 (emphasis in original).
40. See id. at 206 (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 1962)
(Hays, J., dissenting) (" 'if such a rule is to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect
and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse."')).
41. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 401 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 399.
43. See id. at 400.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 400, 401.
46. See note 13 supra.
47. 430 U.S. at 393.
48. Prior to Brewer, there had been some confusion among the courts over
whether surreptitious police activity was essential before the Massiah rule could be
invoked. The confusion resulted from several Supreme Court per curiam opinions that
had simply reversed lower court decisions by citing Massiah. For a discussion of the
confusion, see State v. Blizzard, 278 Md. 556, 562-73, 366 A.2d 1026, 1029-35 (1976).
The Supreme Court cases generating the confusion were Beatty v. United States, 389
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The failure of the Watson majority to consider whether Watson had been
interrogated is especially disturbing in view of the Brewer Court's clear
statement that no right to the assistance of counsel "would have come into
play if there had been no interrogation."4 9 Although the court did attempt to
distinguish Brewer and Massiah from the case before it on the ground that
no psychologically coercive or surreptitious police activity had taken place
in Watson,0 its opinion is unclear as to whether the drawing of this
distinction was intended to establish that Watson had not been interrogated
or that his waiver of his right to counsel had been voluntary. It is clear,
however, that the majority erred if it was attempting to state that the
absence of coercive or surreptitious police activity precluded a finding that
an interrogation had taken place. The Brewer Court's statement that the
absence in Brewer of the surreptitious activity present in Massiah was
constitutionally irrelevant to its decision 51 strongly suggests that the
absence in Watson of the type of coercion present in Brewer should also be
constitutionally irrelevant.5 2 As was made clear by Brewer and Massiah, the
crucial inquiry regarding interrogation was whether Watson's incriminating
statements had been deliberately elicited by Hopkins. Although coercive or
surreptitious activity may be viewed as evidence of deliberate elicitation, the
presence or absence of such activity is not conclusive. Both Brewer and
Massiah indicate that the intent of the law enforcement officials is the
controlling factor.53 Further, it has in fact been held that Massiah protects
against only those deliberate efforts of law enforcement agents that are
intended specifically to elicit incriminating statements relative to the
indicted offense.5 4
Affirmative police conduct that encourages an accused to make a
statement should be recognized as the best indication of an intent to elicit
incriminating evidence.55 The record in Watson does not contain any facts
that compellingly indicate that Detective Hopkins intended to elicit
U.S. 45 (1967) (per curiam); McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1964) (per curiam); McLeod
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 582 (1964) (per curiam). See also Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616
(1968) (per curiam) (writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted). For an
excellent analysis of the interrogation issue after Brewer, see Kamisar, Brewer v.
Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter? 67
GEO. L.J 1 (1978).
49. 430 U.S. at 400.
50. 282 Md. 73, 382 A.2d 574.
51. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
52. See id.
53. See notes 38 to 40, 42 & 43 and accompanying text supra; note 55 infra.
54. United States v. Garcia, 377 F.2d 321, 324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991
(1967).
55. For example, in Massiah, the police admitted that they had installed the
transmitter in the co-defendant's car in the hope of obtaining incriminating evidence
from the defendant, 377 U.S. at 206, and in Brewer, Detective Learning admitted that
the "Christian burial speech" was designed to coerce the defendant into revealing the
location of the victim's body, 430 U.S. at 399 & n.6. Even without these admissions,
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incriminating evidence from Watson. Watson asked to see Hopkins after he
had failed the polygraph examination. Upon his arrival, Hopkins told the
defendant that he had twice unsuccessfully attempted to reach his attorney
and said: "I understand you have something you want to tell me, but, first of
all, I'm going to read your rights again."5 These words, in addition to the
reading of the Miranda rights, are the only facts in the record from which
HopJkins' intent can be gleaned.57 By telling Watson about the calls to his
attorney and reading him his rights, however, Hopkins reminded the
defendant of two important facts: Watson had an attorney and he had a
right to have that attorney present. This reminder would appear to have
discouraged Watson from making an incriminating statement, and although
Hopkins undoubtedly was trying to protect the admissibility of any
subsequent statements, his words do not seem to have been designed to
encourage or motivate Watson to give an incriminating statement. Finally,
although Brewer demonstrates that a declarative statement could be
considered an interrogation, Hopkins' declarative statement seems entirely
neutral when compared with the "Christian burial speech"58 delivered by
the officer in Brewer. Hopkins' willingness to accept a statement, which was
evidenced by his largely neutral and passive conduct, does not evince a
deliberate intent to elicit incriminating evidence. 59
however, the factual patterns in both cases made the police official's intent fairly
obvious. See Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 1978) (Russell, J.,
dissenting).
56. 282 Md. at 76, 382 A.2d at 576.
57. For a discussion of the inadequacy of the record in this case, see note 100
infra.
58. Compare note 13 supra with notes 3 to 6 and accompanying text supra.
59. See Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1191 (2d Cir. 1978) (no interrogation
under Brewer or Massiah because cellmate, who was cooperating with police, obtained
incriminating evidence, did not question the defendant, and had been told to listen
only for evidence concerning defendant's accomplices); United States v. Hearst, 563
F.2d 1331, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978)
(government monitoring and recordation of incriminating statements made to
jailhouse visitor, unaware of monitoring and not cooperating with government, did
not amount to an interrogation under Massiah). But see Henry v. United States, 590
F.2d 544, 547 (4th Cir.. 1978) (incriminating inforrration obtained by cellmate-
informant was an interrogation under Massiah even though informant did not ask
any questions).
In Watson, Judge Eldridge stated in dissent that neither the majority nor the
state disputed that an interrogation had taken place and consequently, the
interrogation was express. 282 Md. at 85 & n.1, 382 A.2d at 581 & n.1. Although Judge
Eldridge offered no explanation for his conclusion, it appears that an interrogation
could have been found.
A strong case for interrogation could be made if it appeared that Hopkins had
suggested that Watson take the polygraph examination with the hope that Watson
would fail the test and could then be pressured into making an incriminating
statement. Cf. Johnson v. State, 31 Md. App. 303, 305, 355 A.2d 504, 506 (1976)
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Watson's statement could also be deemed outside the protection afforded
by the sixth amendment under an alternative analysis. Several courts have
concluded that a "volunteered" incriminating statement by an accused does
not implicate a sixth, or even the "limited fifth," amendment right to the
assistance of counsel and is admissible.60 A "volunteered" statement is a
statement that the accused spontaneously and voluntarily "blurts" out.6 1 In
practical effect, a finding that a statement is "volunteered" is tantamount to
a finding that a statement was not the product of a solicitation or
interrogation by law enforcement officials within the meaning of either
Massiah or Miranda, and absent an interrogation, of course, no right to
counsel would exist.6 2  In State v. Blizzard,63 the Maryland Court of
Appeals apparently approved of the "volunteered" statement rule. In
(polygraph used as psychological tool to induce accused to confess). No evidence in
the record, however, supported this conclusion.
It might be argued that an intent to elicit incriminating information is
inferrable from Hopkins' statement to Watson. See note 56 and accompanying text
supra. Hopkins knew that Watson had failed the polygraph test and probably would
be upset or distraught. Further, he knew that Watson had requested to see him and
wanted to talk to him. From this, Hopkins, who knew that Watson was represented by
an attorney, might have anticipated that Watson would make a statement. Thus,
Hopkins might have formed an intent to obtain information. Moreover, upon entering
the room, Hopkins said to Watson, "I understand you have something you want to tell
me," and this statement could possibly be found to have been intended to prompt a
response from Watson. Although Hopkins also read Watson his Miranda rights and
informed him that attempts to reach his attorney had been unsuccessful, these acts
could have been designed merely to safeguard the admissibility of any subsequent
statement, and are not necessarily inconsistent with an intent to elicit incriminating
information. Moreover, the fact that he read the Miranda rights possibly suggests an
intent to interrogate. Thus, even though Hopkins knew that Watson was represented
by counsel and that an agreement not to question Watson had been reached, and
although Hopkins read Watson his rights, his statement to Watson could be
interpreted as reflecting an intent to elicit a response, which might be considered
tantamount to an interrogation. This conclusion would, in fact, be consistent with the
Brewer Court's conclusion that the "Christian burial speech," though declarative and
not actually requesting a response, was tantamount to an interrogation.
60. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (dictum) ("Any
statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of
course, admissible in evidence .... Volunteered statements of any kind are not
barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding
today."); United States v. Gaynor, 472 F.2d 899, 899 (2d Cir. 1973) (no violation of
Miranda rule when incriminating statement was volunteered and not the product of
an official interrogation); United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437, 443 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1057 (1968) (freely volunteered statement does not violate
Massiah); United States v. Garcia, 377 F.2d 321, 324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
991 (1967) (Massiah rule does not apply to spontaneous or voluntary statements made
in presence of government agents); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d
894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (1976).
61. See note 60 supra.
62. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
63. 278 Md. 556, 366 A.2d 1026 (1976).
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Blizzard, an incarcerated defendant summoned a police officer to his cell.
Upon arrival, the officer informed the defendant that the police had him "up
tight" in regard to a certain armed robbery. The defendant's response that
he "knew it" was used at trial to secure a conviction.64 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals implicitly approved the proposition that in the absence of police
coercion or trickery, which would of themselves negate complete voluntari-
ness, a "volunteered" statement given in the absence of counsel is
admissible.65 The court stated that the police officer's statement was not a
violation of the defendant's right to counsel, apparently because the
statement did not amount to an interrogation, and no coercion, trickery, or
cajolery was involved.66 In effect, the court concluded that the statement
was volunteered. Similarly, because Watson's statement could have been
considered spontaneous, and was in fact found to have been voluntary, it is
unclear why the Watson majority failed to discuss the possibility that the
statement had been "volunteered." The majority did conclude that there was
an absence of police coercion or trickery,6 7 and it could have argued
persuasively that Hopkins' statement was essentially neutral and not
intended to be an interrogation. 8 Under this approach, therefore, Watson's
statement, could have been deemed a spontaneous, "volunteered" statement
that did not result from any prompting or interrogation by Hopkins.
In summary, the court did not determine whether Watson's statement
was either the product of an interrogation or a volunteered statement. It did
state, however, that Watson's statement would be admissible only if he had
effectively waived his right to counsel, and then freely and on his own
initiative made the inculpatory statement.69 In analyzing the sixth
amendment issue in this manner, the court apparently failed to realize that
no right to the presence of counsel would have existed unless an
interrogation had taken place, and if there were no such right to counsel,
determining whether Watson had waived his sixth amendment right would
not have been necessary. 7° It cannot, of course, be determined from the
64. Id. at 560, 366 A.2d at 1028.
65. Id. at 573, 366 A.2d at 1035; see Watson v. State, 35 Md. App. 381, 388, 370
A.2d 1149, 1152 (1977), aff'd, 282 Md. 73, 382 A.2d 574 (1978).
66. 278 Md. at 574-75, 366 A.2d at 1036-37 (alternative holding). The ambiguity
of the Blizzard majority opinion makes it difficult to determine the court's actual
holding. Although the court seemed to hold that the defendant's voluntary statement
was not inadmissible because it was not a product of any trickery, cajolery, or
interrogation, it also appeared to hold that the defendant's statement fell far short of
being incriminating. See id. If the statement was not incriminating, however, there
would be no reason to address the voluntariness or interrogation issues. The Blizzard
opinion nevertheless has been interpreted to stand for the proposition stated in the
text accompanying note 65 supra. See Watson v. State, 35 Md. App. 381, 388, 370 A.2d
1149, 1152 (1977), aff'd, 282 Md. 73, 382 A.2d 574 (1978).
67. 282 Md. at 84, 382 A.2d at 580.
68. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
69. 282 Md. at 82, 382 A.2d at 579.
70. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
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court's opinion whether the failure to address the interrogation issue
resulted from a failure to appreciate the import of the controlling
constitutional doctrines or simply from an unstated decision to assume an
interrogation in order to reach the waiver issue. In any event, the majority
simply did not address a potentially narrower ground upon which to base its
decision. Moreover, by neglecting the interrogation issue in a case in which,
at least plausibly, an interrogation had not occurred, the majority implicitly
adopted a broad position concerning the scope of the sixth amendment right
to counsel - its opinion can be interpreted as a declaration that once
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against an accused, no
incriminating statements will be admissible, irrespective of whether there
was an interrogation, unless the accused has effectively waived his right to
counsel.71 Because both Brewer and Massiah required an interrogation
before the accused would be entitled to the right to counsel, 72 neither
decision advocated such a broad application of the sixth amendment right to
counsel.
Although the majority may be faulted for failing to analyze whether
Watson was entitled to the assistance of counsel, a more glaring error is
apparent in its method of analyzing the waiver issue. Initially, the court
examined whether the presence of a defendant's attorney is essential to an
effective waiver of counsel. 73 Massiah did not reach this issue, and cases
decided after Massiah have developed two different rules concerning the
admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant after his right to
counsel has attached. A minority of courts have adopted the "per se" rule,
holding that all statements obtained from an accused by police interview in
the absence of his attorney are inadmissible.74 Although the "per se" rule
does not expressly address waiver issues, it suggests that a waiver may be
effective only if it is made in the presence of the defendant's attorney75 or
after the attorney is given notice of the interrogation and a reasonable
71. The net effect of this position is to undermine and contradict the position
apparently adopted by the Court of Appeals in Blizzard, see notes 63 to 66 and
accompanying text supra, that "volunteered" statements are admissible. The clear
premise of this position is that "volunteered" statements, i.e., those that are not the
product of an interrogation, do not entitle the accused to the assistance of counsel.
Therefore, no reason exists to inquire whether the accused waived that right. By in
effect holding that to be admissible a statement must follow an effective waiver of the
right to counsel, however, the Watson majority apparently declared that even
"volunteered" statements must be accompanied by an effective waiver.
72. See notes 40 & 49 and accompanying text supra.
73. 282 Md. at 78, 382 A.2d at 577.
74. See United States ex rel. O'Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 923 (1969); Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1967); State v.
Green, 46 N.J. 192, 215 A.2d 546 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 946 (1966); People v.
Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
75. See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d
419, 422 (1976) (defendant cannot waive his right to counsel unless his attorney is
actually present).
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opportunity to be present.7 6 The majority rule, which has been adopted in
Maryland, 77 holds that an attorney's absence at the time an incriminating
statement is made does not in itself render the statement automatically
inadmissible. 78 Watson reaffirmed Maryland's adherence to the majority
rule and supported its reaffirmance by pointing to the Brewer Court's
emphasis that it was not holding that Williams could not waive his right in
the absence of counsel.7 9 By negative inference, therefore, Brewer supports
the majority rule adhered to by Watson.
Having concluded that the presence of counsel is not essential to an
effective waiver, the Watson majority examined the question whether
Watson had waived his right to counsel, adopting the standard suggested in
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Brewer: a statement will be
admissible if the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel and then freely and on his own initiative made the statement80 The
court stated simply that Watson was not subjected to psychological coercion
or surreptitious activity as were the defendants in Brewer and Massiah. The
polygraph was not a trick or coercive tactic and Watson simply took matters
into his own hands.81 These facts, in the court's view, clearly added up to an
effective waiver of counsel. 82
Because the majority's opinion is ambiguous, determining which
aspects of the waiver issue the majority was attempting to address is
difficult. Its analysis appears to focus on the voluntariness of Watson's
statement, as if it were examining a fifth amendment, compelled self-
incrimination issue, rather than the question whether Watson waived his
sixth amendment right to counsel. This approach fails to reflect fully the
waiver standards enunciated in Brewer.83 As Judge Eldridge correctly
pointed out in dissent: "The majority makes no serious attempt to view the
facts of this case in light of these [Brewer's] long established standards. It
rests content with the statements, 'he took matters in his own hands [and
76. See United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
932 (1973).
77. See State v. Blizzard, 278 Md. 556, 574-75, 366 A.2d 1026, 1036 (1976).
78. See Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35, 36-37 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Gaynor, 472 F.2d 899, 900 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Tucker, 435 F.2d 1017, 1018
(9th Cir. 1970); United States v. DeLoy, 421 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1970); Arrington v.
Maxwell, 409 F.2d 849, 853 (6th Cir. 1969).
79. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1977).
80. 282 Md. at 82, 382 A.2d at 579. The term "knowing and intelligent" has been
used interchangeably with the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment stand-
ard" adopted in Brewer as the standard for waiver. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464-65 (1938). The waiver standards in Brewer, however, encompass more than a
mere litany that a waiver must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege. See notes 85 to 89 and accompanying text infra.
81. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
82. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 85 to 89 and accompanying text infra.
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appears to be] a normal individual mentally.' This is insufficient. '8 4 This
failure to provide any reasoning other than that alluded to by Judge
Eldridge totally ignores the thrust of the Brewer decision.
Brewer defined waiver as the "intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege."85 According to Brewer, in determining
whether an accused has effectively waived his sixth amendment right to
the assistance of an attorney, courts should indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. Thus, the state is deemed to have a heavy
burden of proof that a waiver occurred. 86 A waiver cannot be found simply
because a statement is eventually made 7 or the defendant fails to assert his
rights.8 8 The ultimate determination of whether an effective waiver has been
made depends upon an application of the above standards to the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding each case as independently evaluated
by the reviewing court.8 9
The Brewer Court's application of these standards demonstrates that
the standards are to be applied strictly and rigorously. Although Williams
had been informed of and appeared to understand his right to counsel, the
Court stressed that "waiver requires not merely comprehension but
relinquishment, and Williams' consistent reliance upon the advice of counsel
in dealing with the authorities refutes any suggestion that he waived that
right."9a Williams had sought the advice of counsel before surrendering to
the police, after his booking and arraignment, and in the discussions he had
with Detective Leaming prior to embarking on the trip to Des Moines.9 '
While in the car, he told the police that he would tell the entire story after
seeing his attorney in Des Moines. The Brewer Court interpreted this as a
clear expression that Williams desired the presence of his attorney prior to
any interrogation. 2 Finally, the Court noted that even before he made the
incriminating statement,
Williams had effectively asserted his right to counsel by having secured
attorneys at both ends of the automobile trip, both of whom, acting as
his agents, had made clear to the police that no interrogation was to
occur during the journey. Williams knew of that agreement and,
particularly in view of his consistent reliance on counsel, there is no
basis for concluding that he disavowed it.93
84. 282 Md. at 87-88, 382 A.2d at 582 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
85. 430 U.S. at 404 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
86. 430 U.S. at 404.
87. United States v. Blair, 470 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 908
(1973).
88. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
89. See 430 U.S. at 403-05.
90. Id. at 404.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 405.
93. Id. (footnote omitted).
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The analysis of the Watson majority discloses no real attempt to
examine the facts according to the standards and rigorous analysis reflected
in Brewer. The court attempted to distinguish Watson from Brewer and
Massiah by noting the absence of psychological coercion or surreptitious
activity in Watson94 and decided the case by comparing the Watson facts to
Brewer, rather than by applying the Brewer standards to the Watson facts.
Yet, as Judge Eldridge correctly stated, the existence of coercion or
surreptitious activity in Brewer and Massiah was relevant only to
determining whether there had been an interrogation and was not addressed
to the waiver issue. 95 In essence the Watson majority simply appropriated
Justice Powell's statement that an inculpatory statement is admissible if it
is found that a waiver occurred and that the statement was freely made.
Because coercion was absent, Watson's statement was apparently found to
be freely made. Without further explaining its reasoning, the majority
concluded that the facts added up to a waiver. Its apparent reasoning was
that the lack of coercion, plus the fact that Watson made a statement,
indicated that Watson had waived his right to counsel.96 The majority did
not, however, analyze the first prong of its own standard to determine if
Watson had waived his right. Its conclusory statement that Watson took
matters into his own hands plainly overlooks the Brewer Court's statement
that proof of an intentional relinquishment of the right is essential to a
finding of waiver.97 In fact, the crucial finding of Brewer was that Williams
had not relinquished his right to counsel.98 In failing to recognize the
rigorous application of the controlling standards to the facts mandated by
Brewer,99 or that the burden is on the state to prove that a waiver occurred
and that a waiver cannot be presumed, 100 the majority in effect placed the
burden on the defendant to prove that he did not waive his right to counsel.
94. See 282 Md. at 83-84, 382 A.2d at 580.
95. See id. at 85-86 n.1, 382 A.2d at 581 n.1 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
96. This reasoning implies that any uncoerced statement is automatically deemed
a waiver of the right to counsel.
97. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
98. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
99. The strict standards of waiver set forth in Brewer can be effective only if they
are conscientiously applied to the facts of each case. A meaningful waiver standard
cannot be developed unless the courts applying it elaborate their reasoning and
describe the facts relied upon in finding effective waivers. In Watson, the Court of
Appeals failed to engage in this process. As a result, the court has implicitly
recognized that the Brewer standards exist, but it has greatly reduced their potential
impact by demonstrating that Maryland courts will not be required to apply them in
any meaningful sense.
100. See notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text supra. The state satisfied its heavy
burden of proof by producing a single witness, Detective Hopkins, who testified very
little about the circumstances surrounding Watson's statement. The polygraph
operator was not called to verify any of Detective Hopkins' testimony, and it has been
suggested that this kind of failure may preclude the state from meeting its heavy
burden of proof. See, e.g., Mercer v. State, 237 Md. 479, 484, 206 A.2d 797, 800-01
(1965) (state's burden to show that a confession was voluntary not met when two of
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If the Court of Appeals had applied the Brewer standards to the facts
found by the trial court, it might nevertheless have been led to conclude that
Watson had waived his right to counsel. Although Brewer and Watson are
factually similar in many respects,""1 several important factual differences
suggest that Watson may have effectively waived his right to counsel.
Unlike Williams, Watson did not expressly or implicitly assert his right to
counsell ° 2 and did not rely consistently on the advice of his attorney 10 3 until
the time that he made an incriminating statement. Watson initiated the
meeting that led to his statement; he was informed by Detective Hopkins of
the attempts to reach his attorney and was reminded for the third time that
he had a right to have an attorney present. Although Watson's attorney had
advised him not to make any statements beyond the polygraph test, the
defendant responded by saying that he understood his rights, that he
wanted to talk to Hopkins, and that he wanted to get something off his
three officers present at interrogation did not testify). In addition, Hopkins failed to
comply with standard police practice by not obtaining Watson's signature on a
waiver-of-rights form. Although Hopkins was never asked whether he attempted to
obtain a signed waiver, a refusal to sign a waiver has been held to be evidence of a
defendant's desire to invoke his right to counsel. See United States v. Jenkins, 440
F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 1971). The record in Watson is surprisingly vague about the
events that occurred before and during Watson's inculpatory statement and contrasts
sharply with the extensive record normally compiled by Maryland courts inquiring
into a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights, See generally Trovinger v. State, 34
Md. App. 357, 367 A.2d 548 (1977); Sabatini v. State, 14 Md. App. 431, 287 A.2d 511
(1972); Anderson v. State, 6 Md. App. 688, 253 A.2d 387 (1969); Fowler v. State, 6 Md.
App. 651, 253 A.2d 409 (1969); Mullaney v. State, 5 Md. App. 248, 246 A.2d 291 (1968);
Robinson v. State, 3 Md. App. 666, 240 A.2d 638 (1968).
101. In Brewer, the defendant, Williams, had retained counsel and had been
advised by counsel to turn himself in. 430 U.S. at 390. Watson had also retained
counsel and had been advised by his attorney to take the polygraph test. 282 Md. at
75, 382 A.2d at 576. Williams was aware of the agreement between his attorneys and
the police that he would not be questioned during the ride to Des Moines. 430 U.S. at
404-05. Similarly, Watson was aware that Hopkins had agreed that no questions,
other than those involved in the polygraph, would be asked. 282 Md. at 75, 382 A.2d at
576. Williams consistently relied on the advice of his attorneys until the time he
revealed incriminating evidence to the police. 430 U.S. at 404-05. Watson consistently
relied on the advice of his attorney until after he had taken the polygraph test. 282
Md. at 76, 382 A.2d at 576.
102. During the trip to Des Moines, Williams told the police that he would tell them
the "whole story" after he had seen his attorney. 430 U.S. at 405. The Brewer court
viewed this as an express assertion of his right to counsel, id., but Watson did not
make any similar assertion.
103. No evidence in Brewer suggests that the defendant ignored the advice of his
attorneys other than the fact that he revealed incriminating evidence. Watson, on the
other hand, relied on the advice of his attorney only until the polygraph test had been
completed. He then asked to see Hopkins and told him that he wanted to make a
statement, something that his attorney had expressly told him not to do. 282 Md. at
76, 382 A.2d at 576. These statements provide additional, independent evidence that
Watson did not consistently rely on the advice of his attorney. Similar evidence was
apparently not present in Brewer.
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chest.104 These statements, which immediately followed Hopkins' warning
that the defendant was entitled to have his attorney present, demonstrate
that Watson's right to counsel was a known right or privilege and could
certainly be viewed as affirmative evidence of Watson's desire to relinquish
his right. This conclusion is undermined to some extent by the fact that
Hopkins made no attempt to determine if Watson wanted to waive his right
to counsel.'0 5 In addition, the state's evidence was arguably insufficient to
carry its heavy burden of proof.10 6
In contrast to the majority, Judge Eldridge in dissent did apply the
Brewer standards. First, he observed that Watson's incriminating state-
ments were made in the aftermath of the polygraph examination, an event
that almost certainly had an unsettling effect on the defendant, especially
after he was informed that he had failed. Even if the statements could be
said to have been voluntary for purposes of the self-incrimination clause of
the fifth amendment, they should not, according to Judge Eldridge, be
deemed voluntary with respect to the higher waiver standards for the sixth
amendment. 10 7 Second, Judge Eldridge noted that Hopkins had told Watson
104. Id. at 76, 382 A.2d at 576. See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475
(1966) (dictum) (express statement by defendant that he was willing to make
statement and did not want attorney followed closely by inculpatory statement could
constitute a waiver).
105. Brewer suggested that if the police had advised the defendant of his rights
and made some attempt to determine if he wished to waive those rights before the
incriminating evidence was revealed, a valid waiver might have been found. 430 U.S.
at 405. Although the Brewer Court claimed that it was not holding that a defendant
could not, in the absence of counsel, waive his right to counsel id. at 405-06, the
rigorous manner in which the waiver standards were applied arguably suggests a
contrary conclusion. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, stated:
All of the elements necessary to make out a valid waiver are shown by the
record and acknowledged by the Court; we thus are left to guess how the Court
reached its holding.
One plausible but unarticulated basis for the result reached is that once a
suspect has asserted his right not to talk without the presence of an attorney,
it becomes legally impossible for him to waive that right until he has seen an
attorney.
Id. at 418 -19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Even if this is not a valid interpretation of the
Brewer majority's opinion, an express waiver of counsel will possibly be required
before the strict standards of waiver can be satisfied. See 45 TENN. L. REV. 111, 124
(1977).
106. The facts found by the trial court probably could support a valid waiver under
the Brewer standards. Judge Eldridge, however, argued in his dissent that several
factors indicated that the state had failed to meet its heavy burden of proving that
Watson had effectively waived his right to counsel. First, Hopkins did not remind
Watson that his attorney had advised him not to make any statements to the police.
Second, Watson was not asked if he wanted to waive his right to counsel. Third,
Hopkins did not contact the defendant's attorney after the test had been completed.
Judge Eldridge urged that these facts, in addition to Hopkins's failure to advise
Watson of the possible consequences of proceeding without an attorney, see text
accompanying note 111 infra, demonstrated that the State had failed to meet its
burden of proof. 282 Md. at 88-89, 382 A.2d at 582-83 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
107. 282 Md. at 88, 382 A.2d at 582 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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"I understand you have something to tell me, but first of all I'm going to
read you your rights," and concluded that the words, "first of all" were a
clear invitation to Watson to ignore the warnings and simply proceed with a
statement once the warnings were concluded, as if the warnings were a mere
formality. Moreover, explained the dissenting opinion, Watson had an
attorney and Hopkins did not ask Watson if he wanted to waive the
assistance of his attorney. 10 8 Finally, Judge Eldridge was disturbed by the
fact that Hopkins had flatly breached his agreement with Watson's counsel
not to question Watson in the attorney's absence. In light of these facts, the
dissenting opinion concluded that the state had not met its heavy burden of
proving that Watson had waived his rights. 09
Although Judge Eldridge's analysis is consistent with the Brewer
standards, it appears to reflect a belief that a stricter set of standards
applies than Brewer actually required. The Brewer Court had stated that its
"strict [waiver] standard applies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to
counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings."' 1 0
From this, Judge Eldridge summarily concluded that an effective waiver of
the right to counsel requires that the individual must have made the waiver
with "an apprehension of the nature of the charges, ... the range of
allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and
circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad
understanding of the whole matter.""' The standard suggested by Judge
Eldridge is based on the inquiry that a trial judge must undertake prior to a
defendant's waiver of his right to counsel at a trial in which the accused will
proceed pro se." 2
It is doubtful that Brewer contemplated such an exacting standard. In
stating that the waiver standard of an intentional relinquishment of a
known right, which applies to a waiver of counsel at trial, would also apply
to a pretrial waiver, the Brewer Court apparently intended only to
demonstrate that it was rejecting the voluntary waiver standard adopted in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte"3 for the waiver of fourth amendment rights.
The Bustamon-te standard requires that a waiver of an individual's fourth
amendment rights through consent to a search must only be voluntary and,
unlike the waiver of counsel standard in Brewer, does not require that the
individual have actual knowledge of the right that he is waiving.1 4
Practical considerations," 5 as well as the actual language of Brewer,
suggest that Judge Eldridge's waiver standard is too strict.
108. Id. at 88-89, 382 A.2d at 582-83 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 89, 382 A.2d at 583 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
110. 430 U.S. at 404.
111. 282 Md. at 87, 382 A.2d at 582 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (quoting Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948)).
112. See note Ill supra.
113. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
114. See id. at 224-49.
115. Because a policeman is not qualified to inform a defendant of all possible
charges, defenses, and punishments and then adequately to determine whether all of
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The waiver analysis of the Watson majority also ventures beyond the
scope of Brewer. By implying that, to be admissible, a statement must be
voluntary even if it is given after an effective waiver of counsel, the Watson
majority appended a fifth amendment self-incrimination standard to the
sixth amendment waiver standard adopted in Brewer. In fact, Brewer
avoided any examination of fifth amendment issues.116 Watson's statement
was held admissible only because he made it freely after knowingly and
intelligently waiving his right to counsel. 1 7 The majority's ruling that
Watson "took matters into his own hands" 118 is evidence of its belief that the
statement had been given voluntarily. Although the Brewer Court's decision
on the admissibility of the incriminating statements was based solely on
whether there had been an effective waiver of sixth amendment rights," 9
the Watson court was apparently of the opinion that waiver alone is not
sufficient to make an incriminating statement admissible.' 2° Although
expressed in slightly different language, this view seems remarkably similar
to the Miranda waiver standard, which requires a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver.' 21 The Watson majority's mode of analysis indicates that
it failed to recognize the significant difference between the sixth amendment
right to counsel, as defined in Brewer, and the judicially created fifth
amendment right to counsel, as defined in Miranda. The sixth amendment
right to counsel attaches only after a criminal investigation has focused on
a particular individual, 122 while the fifth amendment "right" to counsel,
which is designed solely to protect the right against compelled self-
incrimination, applies to persons subjected to a custodial interrogation after
arrest. 23 This difference suggests that a court's analysis of an alleged sixth
these factors are understood, it would seem impractical to attempt to apply the trial-
level waiver procedures at the pretrial stages of a criminal proceeding. A neutral
magistrate or judge would be the only person qualified to administer this procedure,
and even the "per se" rule, described at text accompanying notes 74 to 76 supra, does
not contemplate the involvement of judges or magistrates as a prerequisite to a valid
pretrial waiver of counsel.
116. 430 U.S. at 397-98.
117. 282 Md. at 82, 382 A.2d at 579.
118. Id. at 84, 382 A.2d at 580.
119. 430 U.S. at 397-98.
120. Some commentators have argued that the Brewer Court did not discuss the
fifth amendment self-incrimination issue because it wanted to avoid overruling
Miranda. See 38 LA. L. REV. 239, 249 (1977); 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 778, 784-85 (1977). The
Court, however, did not rule that compelled self-incrimination could not be an issue if
a valid waiver was found; it simply held that it did not have to reach the fifth
amendment issue because it could uphold the reversal of the defendant's conviction on
sixth amendment grounds. 430 U.S. at 397-98. The Maryland Court of Appeals
apparently did not regard Brewer as precluding inquiries into fifth amendment
voluntariness after an effective waiver of sixth amendment rights has been found,
and this certainly seems to be a valid interpretation.
121. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
122. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
123. See notes 32 to 35 and accompanying text supra.
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amendment waiver should, at least in some cases, be much more rigorous
than an inquiry into the waiver of Miranda rights.12 4
The Court of Appeals decision carries with it three implications. First,
the courts of Maryland will only be required to apply superficially the
Brewer waiver standards to the facts of cases before them. Second, the
courts may have to engage in this exercise even if the defendant's statement
is not the product of an interrogation. Third, after an effective waiver of
sixth amendment rights is found, an inquiry must be made into fifth
amendment voluntariness. 125 In Watson the Court of Appeals, while pur-
porting to apply Brewer to the facts before it, has formulated an opinion that
strongly suggests that the rigorous scrutiny required by Brewer will not
have to be applied. Therefore, it appears unlikely that Brewer will have a
significant impact on Maryland law.
124. See United States v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655, 657 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting
Friendly, J., dissenting in United States v. Massimo, 432 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971)); Y. Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams - A
Hard Look at a Distomforting Record, 66 GEo. L. J. 209, 241 (1977). For a comparison,
see the rather lenient waiver standard applied to Miranda waivers in United States v.
Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 (1968).
125. A fourth implication of the court's opinion, suggested by Judge Eldridge in his
dissent, is that agreements made between the police and defense attorneys will not be
recognized by the courts as legally binding. 282 Md. at 90-91, 382 A.2d at 583-84
(Eldridge, J., dissenting). Judge Eldridge argued that cooperation between the defense
attorneys and the state, which is necessary to the orderly and efficient administration
of justice, would be discourged if the courts allowed the state to breach its agreements
with defense attorneys. Id. Although it is possible that Hopkins did not breach his
agreement with Watson's attorney, the majority did not recognize the agreement. This
failure may, therefore, have a negative effect on an attorney's willingness to cooperate
with law enforcement officials in the future.
[VOL. 38298
A LEGAL PROCESS ANALYSIS FOR A STATUTORY AND
CONTRACTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF NOTICE AND PROOF OF
LOSS INSURANCE DISCLAIMERS - GOVERNMENT EM-
PLOYEES INSURANCE CO. v. HARVEY
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Harvey,' the Maryland
Court of Appeals examined an automobile liability insurance policy in light
of two apparently conflicting provisions of the Maryland Code. Government
Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) issued Harvey a policy puirsuant to
Maryland's version of no-fault automobile insurance.2 Under the no-fault
Personal Injury Protection Amendment 3 (PIP), insurers must provide
minimum medical, hospital, and disability benefits in motor vehicle liability
insurance policies.4 A basic purpose of no-fault insurance is to implement
fast, efficient payment of claims on a first party basis (direct payment by
insurer to insured) without resorting to lengthy legal proceedings. 5 Insurers,
however, may condition payment of benefits upon the insured's timely
submission of proof of loss.6 According to article 48A, section 544(a)(1) of the
Maryland Annotated Code7 as it read in 1976, insurers "may prescribe a
period of not less than six months after the date of the accident within
1. 278 Md. 548, 336 A.2d 13 (1976).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 538-547 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Maryland has not
adopted the "pure" no-fault system. A pure no-fault plan would entirely eliminate the
negligence system as a means of compensating traffic accident victims. The tort
liability system in such a plan is replaced by extensive compulsory no-fault benefits.
Maryland's scheme prescribes additional coverages that must be included in every
automobile liability insurance policy. Such a policy must be purchased before a
Maryland citizen can legally drive in the state. Report of Professor Roger C.
Henderson to Special Committee on Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations
Act, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (April
1976), excerpts reprinted in H. SHULMAN, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 667, 669 (3d ed. 1976).
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 538-547 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
4. Section 539 provides:
No policy of motor vehicle liability insurance shall be issued . . .unless
the policy also affords the minimum medical, hospital and disability benefits
set forth herein .... The minimum medical, hospital and disability benefits
shall include up to an amount of $2,500, for payment of all reasonable
expenses arising from the accident and incurred within three years from the
date thereof.... The insurer providing loss of income benefits may require,
as a condition of receiving such benefits that the injured person furnish the
insurer reasonable medical proof of his injury causing loss of income.
Id. § 539 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
5. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
1-6 (1965); J. O'CONNELL, THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT
INSURANCE 94-95 (1971).
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §544(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976). In the legislative
session following Harvey the phrase "proof of loss" was replaced by the words "claim
for benefits." Id. (Cum. Supp. 1977). This change in language does not seem to alter
the respective rights between insurers and insureds. See note 53 infra.
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 544(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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which the original proof of loss with respect to a claim for benefits must be
presented to the insurer. ' 8 GEICO's proof of loss provision was consistent
with this statutory prescription. 9
Viewed in isolation from other provisions of the Insurance Code, section
544 might seem to authorize disclaimer of PIP benefits when proof of loss is
submitted late. Section 482 of article 48A, however, provides that an
insurance company may not disclaim liability if an insured fails to comply
with certain policy provisions unless the insurer establishes that such
failure has caused it actual prejudice. Section 482 provides:
Where any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on any policy of liability
insurance issued by it, on the ground that the insured... breached the
policy by failing to cooperate with the insurer or by not giving requisite
notice to the insurer, such disclaimer shall be effective only if the insurer
establishes . . . that such lack of cooperation or notice has resulted in
actual prejudice to the insurer.10
Statutes similar in purpose to section 482 have been widely adopted and are
designed in most cases to protect insureds from disclaimers that may be
grounded in technical irregularities." Prior to enactment of section 482, an
insurer was not required to have suffered prejudice to be able to disclaim
liability upon an insured's noncompliance with a notice condition prece-
dent. 12
8. Id. (emphasis supplied).
9. GEICO's proof of claim provision provided:
As soon as practicable, within a period not to exceed 6 months after the date
of the accident, the injured person, or someone on his behalf, shall submit to
the Company written proof of claim including full particulars of the nature
and extent of the injuries and treatment received and contemplated and such
other information as may assist the Company in determining the amount due
and payable.
Brief for Appellant, Record at E-4, Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 278 Md.
548, 366 A.2d 13 (1976) (emphasis in original).
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1972) (emphasis supplied).
11. 13 G. CoucH, ON INSURANCE 2d §49:5 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1965).
12. Watson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 231 Md. 266, 189 A.2d 625
(1963). Decisions prior to Watson, without specifically addressing the issue of
prejudice, held that when an insured failed to comply with a condition precedent an
insurer could disclaim liability. Lennon v. American Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 208 Md.
424, 118 A.2d 500 (1955) (notice of the accident and suit); Employer's Liab. Assur. Co.
v. Perkins, 169 Md. 269, 181 A. 436 (1935) (notice of the suit). See State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 582-83, 219 A.2d 820, 824 (1966) (written notice
of the accident).
In instances of noncooperation by an insured, the Maryland rule prior to
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy, 228 Md. 1, 179 A.2d 117 (1962), was that the
insurer did not have to establish prejudice prior to disclaiming liability. After
McConnaughy, insurers were deemed to have the burden of establishing prejudice in
such instances. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 669, 673, 273 A.2d 431, 434
(1970).
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In Harvey, the Court of Appeals had to determine whether the
requirement of actual prejudice, made applicable to notice conditions
precedent by section 482 also applied to insurance disclaimers grounded on
an insured's failure to submit timely proof of loss under section 544(a)(1).
On December 24, 1973, Geneva Harvey sustained injury in an
automobile accident. Harvey notified GEICO of the accident by mailing the
appropriate accident report on January 3, 1974. GEICO responded in a letter
dated January 8, enclosing claim forms to be returned "as soon as possible."
On two occasions GEICO advised Harvey's attorney that a proof of loss
claim had to be submitted within six months of the accident, or recovery
under the policy would be barred. 13 Despite these warnings, Harvey's
attorney forwarded the requisite forms on August 13, 1974, seven weeks after
the six-month period had expired.14 Because the claim forms had arrived
late, GEICO refused to honor Harvey's claim.'6 Harvey sued GEICO in the
District Court of Maryland and recovered a $747 award. The Baltimore City
Court affirmed this award on appeal, holding that section 482's prejudice
provisions applied to a failure to submit timely proof of loss.' 6 Because
13. Ironically, no-fault insurance is supposed to be "lawyerless" insurance. Upon
injury in an accident, one supposedly need only submit a claim in order to receive
payment from one's own insurance company. The Sun (Baltimore), Nov. 26, 1971, § A,
at 1, col. 3. See O'Connell, Contracting for No-Fault Liability Insurance Covering
Doctors and Hospitals, 36 MD. L. REV. 553, 555 (1977).
14. This inaction by Harvey's attorney raises interesting malpractice possibili-
ties. One commentator, however, has pointed out that attorneys often-overlook notice
and proof deadlines. Apparently, insurance companies often implicitly or explicitly
waive such requirements. Sperry & Barker, Notice and Proof of Loss - Pitfalls for the
Unwary, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 31, 31 (1977).
15. GEICO issued insurance to Harvey subject to the condition that "No action
shall lie against the Company unless as a condition precedent thereto, there shall
have been full compliance with all terms of this amendment." Brief for Appellant at 5,
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 278 Md. 548,366 A.2d 13 (1976) (emphasis
omitted).
16. 278 Md. at 552, 366 A.2d at 16. The trial court perceived that the intent of the
PIP legislation was to "provide compulsory medical payment insurance, implemented
by a mandatory provision from which the insurer should not easily escape." Brief for
Appellant, Record at E-24, Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 278 Md. 548,
366 A.2d 13 (1976). The trial judge had additional reasons for finding that § 544(a)(1)
in conjunction with § 482, forbade disclaimer unless the insurer established prejudice.
First, the court asserted that § 482 has an actual prejudice requirement. The trial
court, however, apparently ignored the language in § 482 which limits the burden of
establishing prejudice to situations in which "requisite notice" or "cooperation" is at
issue. It also discussed a number of cases, decided during the period in which
Maryland followed the "no need for prejudice rule," see note 12 supra, in which the
Court of Appeals had nevertheless addressed the need of an insurer to establish
prejudice prior to disclaiming liability. This exception applied to policies issued
pursuant to the absolute liability provision of the Motor Vehicle Financial Re-
sponsibility Act, Mo. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 131(a)(6)(F) (superceded by art. § 66'/2,
§ 7-324 (1970) (repealed 1972)). See Barella v. Stewart, 228 Md. 378, 179 A.2d 886 (1962)
(because the injured members of the public are sought to be protected, the policies are
construed liberally to accomplish their purpose; ordinary defenses of late notice or
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GEICO had failed to demonstrate prejudice at the trial court level, the court
ruled that the contract clause could not be used to prevent Harvey from
recovering under the policy. 1 7 On appeal from the Baltimore City Court,'8
the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a proof of loss
condition precedent lay outside the ambit of section 482,19 and that in view
noncooperation are unavailable to the insurer); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy,
228 Md. 1, 179 A.2d 117 (1962). This act provided that an operator's license and the
owner's registration would be suspended upon involvement in serious accidents unless
a security deposit was posted to cover any judgment arising from the accident. Proof
of future financial responsibility also had to be provided. National Indemn. Co. v.
Simmons, 230 Md. 234, 236-37, 186 A.2d 595, 597 (1962). The act was intended to
"protect the public from the reckless operation of motor vehicles by irresponsible
drivers and to assure the ability of operators and owners against whom judgments
may be entered on account of negligent driving to respond in damages to persons who
may suffer as the result of such negligence." Id. at 237-38, 186 A.2d at 597. Under
such third party liability insurance policies, the Court of Appeals found it
unreasonable to permit an innocent victim's rights to depend upon the omissions of
the party who caused the accident. Id. at 242-43, 186 A.2d at 600. The rationale of the
"absolute liability" cases also extends to PIP policies. See text accompanying note 65
infra.
Although not raised by the lower court, an alternative interpretation would
find § 482 applicable to late proof of loss by equating a failure to submit a timely proof
with a failure to cooperate. Arguably, when the drafters of § 482 chose the word
"cooperate," they selected a word of broad potential meaning. Plainly understood,
"cooperate" connotes action on behalf of the insured which "assists" and does not
"impede." A cooperation clause, in fact, has been construed to obligate an insured to
abide by the terms of the policy. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy, 228 Md. 1,
13, 179 A.2d 117, 123 (1962). "Failure of cooperation" has been established by a refusal
to do a positive act. 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4771 (1962). Cf.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wendler, 117 Ga. App. 227, 160 S.E.2d 256 (1968)
(wilfullness and fraud are essential ingredients to substantiate the defense of failure
to cooperate).
The duty to cooperate, however, has been distinguished from the requirement
to give notice. Rochon v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 118 Conn. 190, 197, 171 A. 429,
432 (1934); 8 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE 281 n.1 (3d ed. F. Lewis
1965). Compare 8 id. §342.11 with 8 id. §341.1. Past cases have in fact uniformly
treated the "failure to cooperate" clause as a term of art in insurance policies, see, e.g.,
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 669, 273 A.2d 431 (1970); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
McConnaughy, 228 Md. 1, 179 A.2d 117 (1962); Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Garlitz, 180 Md. 615, 26 A.2d 388 (1942), to signify the insured's duty to make a "fair,
frank and truthful disclosure to the insurer for the purpose of enabling it to determine
whether or not there is a genuine defense, and the obligation in good faith, both to aid
in making every legitimate defense to the claimed liability and to render assistance in
the trial." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. at 673, 273 A.2d at 433-34 (citations
omitted). Thus, in view of the established meaning of the term "cooperation," the
legislature apparently did not intend to incorporate the failure to provide timely proof
as a possible type of noncooperation.
17. See Brief for Appellant, Record at E-27, Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Harvey, 278 Md. 548, 366 A.2d 13 (1976).
18. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 12-305 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
19. 278 Md. at 553, 366 A.2d at 17.
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of the legislative authorization contained in section 544 permitting a time
limit for submission of proof of loss, GEICO had a contractual right to deny
liability.20
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals first examined the
history of section 482 in order to determine its applicability to a proof of loss
provision. According to the court, this section was enacted in response to the
rule of law stated in an earlier Court of Appeals decision, 21 Watson v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.22 Chief Judge Murphy explained that in
Watson the insured failed to give timely notice of an automobile accident,
and that because Watson failed to comply with the notice condition
precedent in his liability insurance policy, the insurer was found to have had
a contractual right to disclaim liability regardless of whether the insurer
had suffered prejudice by receipt of late notice.23 The Harvey court continued
its analysis by examining the legislative enactments that followed the
Watson decision and noted that section 482, as originally introduced before
the General Assembly, required an insurer to prove that it had been actually
prejudiced before it could disclaim liability "for any reason."2 4 The Court of
Appeals pointed out that prior to final adoption of this section the words
"for any reason" were deleted,25 and as ultimately enacted, an insurer's
obligation to establish actual prejudice was limited only to those instances
when a disclaimer was based on an insured's "[failure to] cooperate with the
insurer or by not giving requisite notice to the insurer. '26 In the final step of
his analysis Chief Judge Murphy asserted, without citing any authority,
that the distinction between "proof of loss" and "notice of accident" is well
recognized.27 From this rather brief examination of the history and
language of section 482, the court concluded that its provisions do not apply
to disclaimers based on an insured's failure to submit timely proof of loss. 28
Thus, under the court's holding, unless compliance with the proof of loss
condition is waived, a failure to comply with the proof provision bars
recovery on the policy.
The court, however, prematurely held section 482 to be inapplicable to a
late proof of loss. If section 482 had been examined in light of the legislative
purposes behind its enactment, the Harvey court would have been led to
conclude that the section covered proof of loss. The court's conclusion that
20. Id. at 554, 366 A.2d at 17.
21. Id. at 552, 366 A.2d at 16. The court's conclusion rested on the inference it
drew from the fact that § 482 was enacted at the 1964 legislative session, which was
the legislative session following the decision in Watson v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 231 Md. 266, 189 A.2d 625 (1963). See note 24 infra.
22. 231 Md. 266, 189 A.2d 625 (1963).
23. See id. at 272-73, 189 A.2d at 627-28.
24. 278 Md. at 552, 366 A.2d at 16-17. For the official text of the bill, see ch. 185,
§ 1, 1964 Md. Laws 444.
25. 278 Md. at 532, 366 A.2d at 16-17.
26. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
27. 278 Md. at 553, 366 A.2d at 17.
28. Id.
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section 482 does not apply to proof of loss provisions rested upon the
assertion that "proof of loss or claim is separate and distinct from notice of
accident. '29 Because the opinion does not cite any authority distinguishing
the nature and purpose of notice and proof of loss provisions, this conclusion
appears to be based primarily upon the rule of statutory interpretation that
unambiguous statutory language usually renders statutory construction
unnecessary and unwarranted. 30 The assumption that section 482's
language unambiguously excludes proof of loss provisions, however, is open
to question. According to the court, the main purpose of a proof of loss
provision is to "acquaint the insurance company with certain facts and
circumstances as relative to the loss, forming a basis for further steps to be
taken by the company." 31 This same basic rationale, however, is recognized
both in Maryland and elsewhere as applying to notice clauses in insurance
policies.3 2 Other jurisdictions, moreover, have recognized that proof of loss
constitutes notice to the insurer,3 3 and that notice may serve as proof of
loss.a 4 Finally, a previous Court of Appeals decision stated in dictum that
proof of loss constitutes notice to the insurer as to what has been damaged. 35
The similarity of purpose for the two types of provisions, combined with the
previous treatment of proof of loss as a form of notice, indicates that
sufficient ambiguity exists in section 482 to permit the interpretation that it
covers proof of loss provisions. This ambiguity is not resolved by the fact
that GEICO included separate notice and proof of loss provisions in its
policy, for the proof of loss provision was obviously designed only to permit
29. Id.
30. The court stated, without elaboration, that it was "clear from the history and
language of § 482 that its provisions do not apply to insurance disclaimers grounded
on the insured's failure to submit proof of loss within the time specified in the policy."
Id. Its reference to the history of § 482 was clearly confined to the substitution of
"[failure to] cooperate with the insurer or by not giving the requisite notice to the
insurer" for "for any reason" discussed in the text accompanying notes 24 to 26 supra.
For examples of the application of the plain meaning rule in Maryland, see Harden v.
Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399, 406, 354 A.2d 817, 821 (1976); Atlantic, Gulf & Pac.
Co. v. State Dep't. of Assess. & Tax., 252 Md. 173, 177, 249 A.2d 180, 182-83 (1969);
Falcone v. Palmer Ford, Inc., 242 Md. 487, 494, 219 A.2d 808, 810 (1966). See Reynolds,
The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance - Part II:
Craftsmanship and Decision-Making, 38 MD. L. REV. 165-67, (1978), for a criticism of
the plain meaning rule.
31. 278 Md. at 553, 366 A.2d at 17.
32. E.g., Lennon v. American Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 208 Md. 424, 430, 118 A.2d
500, 502-03 (1955); Lewis v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 74, 371 A.2d 193, 197
(1977); 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 16, § 4731; 13 G. CoucH, supra note 11, § 49:2, 7 AM.
JUR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 139 (1963).
33. Pickering v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 109 R.I. 143, 160, 282 A.2d 584, 593
(1971) ("We include within the term 'notice' such items as the furnishing of a proof of
claim and a copy of the summons and complaint.").
34. 8 D. BLASHFIELD, supra note 16, § 331.5 (where notice contains "virtually
everything required to be shown by the formal proofs").
35. National Liberty Ins. Co. of America v. Thrall, 181 Md. 19, 25, 27 A.2d 353,
356 (1942) (dictum).
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the company to take advantage of any separate rights section 544 might
afford. Because the meaning of "requisite notice" is fairly susceptible of
more than one construction and may encompass not only notice of loss but
also the related concept of proof of loss, sufficient ambiguity exists to
necessitate resort to statutory construction of section 482.
The objective of statutory interpretation is, of course, to ascertain and
give effect to the legislature's intent.36 The Court of Appeals has in the past
applied certain rules of statutory construction as an aid in determining the
legislature's intent. An examination of section 482 in light of these canons
will ultimately show that this section should be read to cover proof of loss
conditions. Prior to demonstrating that section 482 should be construed to
cover proof of loss, an attempt will be made to continue with the analysis
that the Court of Appeals should have employed upon encountering the
ambiguity inherent in section 482. The arguments supporting the Court of
Appeals' conclusion will be shown to be plausible but unconvincing in light
of the purposes behind enactment of section 482.
POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR THE COURT'S CONCLUSION
The language of a statute is the primary source to consider in
ascertaining legislative intent.37 Because the Harvey court believed that the
meaning of section 482 was clear, however, the statutory language was not
carefully examined. If the terms "liability insurance" and "prejudice" had
been analyzed, the court would have found support for its conclusion.
Section 482, by its terms, applies to liability insurance policies. The third
party coverage of such policies means that the insurer is potentially liable
for claims brought against the insured. Obviously, under this type of policy
the insurer does not compensate the insured for injuries received in the
accident, but instead offers coverage only to the extent of the insured's
liability to a third party. In such instances, it is clear that proof of loss of an
insured's injuries is unnecessary in the assessment of liability to a third
person. Proof of loss provisions therefore are not included in standard
automobile liability insurance policies. Thus, if standard PIP-type proof
provisions are superfluous in standard liability insurance policies, then
section 482 arguably was not intended to apply to a proof of loss condition, a
type of provision that is in fact foreign to liability policies. 38
This interpretation is further bolstered by a consideration of the term
"prejudice" in section 482. By conditioning its policy obligations on receipt
36. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Mandel Re-election Comm., 280 Md.
575, 578-79, 374 A.2d 1130, 1132 (1977); Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399,
406, 354 A.2d 817, 821 (1976); Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 273 Md.
58, 65, 327 A.2d 483, 487 (1974); Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 269
Md. 390, 393, 306 A.2d 534, 537 (1973).
37. Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977); State v. Fabritz, 276
Md. 416, 421, 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976).
38. But see notes 68 to 70 and accompanying text infra.
1978]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
of timely notice, insurance companies expect to avoid the prejudice that
arises from investigation of stale facts. 39 Untimely investigations may lead
to serious prejudice by hindering opportunities to secure favorable settle-
ments. Preparations for an adequate defense at trial may also be adversely
affected. The ultimate form of section 482 prejudice would be liability for an
adverse judgment as a consequence of late notice. The above concepts of
prejudice appear to apply only in the context of liability insurance coverage.
In contrast is the type of prejudice that may arise as a result of an insured's
failure to submit timely proof of loss under a PIP policy. The possibilities of
prejudice in the form of failed settlements, inadequate trial defenses, and
adverse judgments do not arise in the PIP context. The first party coverage
of a PIP policy means that the insurer is automatically liable to the insured
upon the occurrence of damage covered by the policy (if policy conditions are
complied with). With respect to claims filed under a PIP policy, possible
prejudice to the insurer seems to be limited to administrative uncertainty
and inefficiency in determining its liability to the insured. 40 Recognition of
the different conception of prejudice in PIP and liability insurance contexts
lends support to the Harvey conclusion that section 482 is inapplicable to
proof of loss. In short, if the concept of section 482 prejudice is limited to the
type of prejudice peculiar to liability insurance policies, it is arguable that
section 482 is inapplicable to PIP insurance coverage.4'
The historical context within which section 482 was enacted provides
additional support for the court's conclusion that "requisite notice" does not
include proof of loss.42 According to this view, section 482 was a legislative
response to a specific problem that had arisen in a specific Court of Appeals
case, Watson v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,43 in which the
court construed a standard notice clause in an automobile liability insurance
contract.4 4 If at the time the legislature responded to Watson, a proof of loss
provision was similarly considered to be a standard provision in automobile
insurance policies, but of a nature entirely different from a notice clause,
then it is arguable that the legislative response to Watson intended that the
term "notice" in section 482 would mean something different from "proof."
39. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 583, 219 A.2d
820, 825 (1966); Lennon v. American Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 208 Md. 424, 430, 118 A.2d
500, 502-03 (1955); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 74-75, 371 A.2d 193, 197
(1977).
40. See note 99 and accompanying text infra.
41. But see note 99 and accompanying text infra.
42. Upon encountering ambiguous language, insight into the legislature's
intention may be obtained by examining the historical background and the particular
evil that the statute was designed to correct. See, e.g., Mackie v. Mayor of Elkton, 265
Md. 410, 415, 290 A.2d 500, 503 (1972); Department of Tidewater Fisheries v. Sollers,
201 Md. 603, 611, 95 A.2d 306, 309 (1953); Barnes v. State, 186 Md. 287, 291, 47 A.2d 50,
52, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 754 (1946).
43. 231 Md. 266, 189 A.2d 625 (1963).
44. See notes 21 & 22 supra.
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A few jurisdictions have in fact explicitly decided that notice and proof
clauses in automobile insurance policies are different provisions that
embody distinct concepts. 45 Although there is no Maryland authority to
support this view, it is nevertheless plausible to conclude that "notice," as
used in section 482, was intended as a term of art applicable only to the type
of notice provision that was at issue in Watson.
A further aid in establishing the legislative intent is found in the rule of
statutory construction which provides that legislative acts in derogation of
the common law should be strictly construed. 46 Under the common law
approach, an insured's breach of a condition precedent would allow an
insurer to disclaim liability whether or not the insurer suffered prejudice.
Because section 482's proof of prejudice requirement is in fact in derogation
of the common law rule, strict construction of this section dictates the
exclusion of any implication that the General Assembly was concerned with
more than the specific problems of "notice" and "noncooperation" in
automobile liability insurance policies. Although this canon mandates strict
statutory construction, it is effectively nullified by an equally relevant
opposing maxim that remedial statutes are to be broadly construed.47 Upon
viewing the circumstances prior to the enactment of section 482 it becomes
clear that this measure was enacted as a remedial device to correct the
harshness and inequity resulting from disclaimers of insurance liability
even when insurers had not been prejudiced by the insured's breach of a
condition precedent. 48 Given the purpose of section 482, a broad construction
of this section could encompass proof of loss. However, in view of the
conflict in reading section 482 as both a remedial statute and as a statute in
derogation of the common law the inquiry into legislative intent must
proceed by examining other more fruitful indicators of intent.
45. 8 D. BLASHFIELD, supra note 16, § 331.1 (in automobile insurance policies,
notice and proof of loss are distinct concepts serving different purposes and
functions). See Martinson v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 14, 216 N.W.2d 34
(1974). See also 13 G. COUCH, supra note 11, § 49:95. Notice of accident is a term of art
provision that is often expressed in identical language. Brakeman v. Potomac Ins.
Co., 472 Pa. 66, 73, 371 A.2d 193, 196 (1977).
46. E.g., MacBride v. Gulbro, 247 Md. 727, 729-30, 234 A.2d 586, 588 (1967);
Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 277, 201 A.2d 353, 356 (1964); McKeon v. State ex rel.
Conrad, 211 Md. 437, 443, 127 A.2d 635, 638 (1957) ("strict construction" mandates the
exclusion of mere implications).
47. See Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 494, 331 A.2d 55, 61
(1975); State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737, 745 (1974); Fisher v. Bethesda
Discount Corp., 221 Md. 271, 275-76, 157 A.2d 265, 268 (1960).
The conflict between these canons of statutory construction demonstrates the
inherent limitations on reliance upon such rules to arrive at legislative intent. When
two such relevant maxims can be applied in a given situation, the interpreter is faced
with two alternatives: (1) relying on one rule and dishonestly ignoring the other; or (2)
recognizing that such maxims may offer directly conflicting guidance in ascertaining
legislative intent and that in such situations the only rational course of action is to
conclude that one maxim nullifies the other. The two canons cited in the text offer an
example of when the second alternative should be adopted.
48. See notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text infra.
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Legislative activity subsequent to the Harvey decision may be examined
for possible hindsight support of the court's interpretation of sections 482
and 544. According to the amendments adopted in the legislative session
following Harvey, an insurer may now prescribe a period of not less than
twelve months within which the claim for benefits must be presented. 49 Also,
as a result of a second amendment, an insurer now has the duty to notify
insureds of the latest date within which a claim may be filed.50 If the judicial
interpretation in Harvey had conflicted with the legislative purpose
underlying enactment of section 482, it is reasonable to postulate that the
amendments passed by the General Assembly in the legislative session
following Harvey would have either: (1) modified section 482 to cover
explicitly "proof of loss," or (2) altered section 544 to require a showing of
prejudice prior to disclaimer of liability. Because the legislature's amend-
ments did not include provisions requiring insurers to prove prejudice prior
to disclaimers, it would appear by implication that the Harvey court
correctly interpreted section 482. A subsequent legislative enactment,
however, does not necessarily provide a clue as to the purpose or meaning of
an earlier legislative act. The failure of the legislature to make amendments
requiring insurers to establish prejudice prior to disclaimers for late proof of
loss is not a clear indication of the original legislative purpose in enacting
section 482. Nonaction by a legislative body must be recognized as providing
an uncertain basis for drawing positive inferences.51 Instead of viewing the
amendments of section 544 as a legislative acquiescence5 2 in the Harvey
interpretation of section 482, it is more reasonable to regard the amend-
ments as a limited response to mitigate the harshness of the Harvey result.
5 3
In summary, the application of the five preceding rules of statutory
construction is inconclusive. First, an examination of the statutory language
indicates that section 482 is arguably inapplicable to PIP proof provisions.
Next, it will be recalled that insofar as automobile insurance policies
49. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 544(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The original version of
this section is quoted at the text accompanying note 8 supra.
50. Id. § 544(c).
51. United States v. Price, 351 U.S. 304,310-11 (1960); Jones v. Liberty Glass Co.,
332 U.S. 524, 533-34 (1947).
52. When the legislature has in effect acquiesced in a Court of Appeals
construction of a statute there is a strong presumption that the statute has been
correctly interpreted. Stewart v. State, 275 Md. 258, 270-71, 340 A.2d 290, 297 (1975);
Shriner v. Mullhausen, 210 Md. 104, 115, 122 A.2d 570, 575 (1956). Cf. Hearst Corp. v.
State Dep't of Assess. and Tax., 269 Md. 625, 644-45, 308 A.2d 679, 689-90 (1973) (the
notion of legislative acquiescence is relevant, if at all, to a "judicial interpretation
which runs contrary to legislative purpose").
53. It is interesting to note that the 1977 amendment of § 544(a)(1) substituted the
words "proof of loss" for the phrase "claim for benefits." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 544(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The change in language here does not seem to alter the
respective rights between insurers and insureds. In other words, if an insured submits
his claim for benefits 12 months after the date of the accident, the insurer, under the
Harvey analysis, will be able to disclaim liability without establishing prejudice.
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historically have classified information into separate notice and proof of
loss clauses, legislative knowledge of this practice would indicate that the
legislature restricted the meaning of "requisite notice" to the type of
provision found in the Watson case. This interpretation, however, was
neither supported nor weakened by the application of three other relevant
canons. The rule of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the
common law is effectively nullified by the equally applicable canon which
mandates that remedial statutes should be broadly construed. Finally,
although the legislative enactments following Harvey may by implication
provide a measure of support for the court's conclusion, this method of
discerning legislative intent must be viewed as too speculative.
Although the foregoing analysis does not conclusively determine the
appropriate construction of section 482, a distillation of the preceding
arguments might plausibly permit the conclusion that the Harvey court
reached a defensible result. This conclusion, however, is not supported by an
analysis of the fundamental purposes behind enactment of section 482. It is
submitted that once section 482 is properly analyzed in terms of its original
legislative purpose, it will be seen that "requisite notice" may reasonably be
construed to cover proof of loss.
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
If section 482 is to make sense, it must be read in light of some assumed
purpose.5 4 In other words, 4scertainment of the legislative intent requires an
examination of the purpose to be attained55 and the evil sought to be
remedied.56 As noted by the Harvey court, the legislature enacted section 482
in response to the Watson rule,5 7 which permitted the insurer to disclaim
liability regardless of whether the insurer had suffered prejudice58 whenever
an insured breached a policy condition precedent. It is clear that the
legislature understood the Watson decision to foster undesirable social
consequences. Insight into the purposes behind enactment of section 482 can
be gained by hypothesizing why the Watson rule represented unsatisfactory
social policy. First, an aura of unfairness emanates from a situation in
which an insurance company is permitted to disclaim liability when it is not
prejudiced by the insured's breach of a condition precedent. In such a
54. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
55. E.g., Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 495, 331 A.2d 55, 62
(1975); Mass Transit Admin. v. Baltimore County Revenue Auth., 267 Md. 687, 695,
298 A.2d 413, 418 (1973). See Truitt v. Board of Pub. Works, 243 Md. 375, 394-95, 221
A.2d 370, 382 (1966).
56. E.g., State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 942 (1976); Mackie v. Mayor of Elkton, 265 Md. 410, 415, 290 A.2d 500, 503
(1972); Department of Tidewater Fisheries v. Sollers, 201 Md. 603, 611, 95 A.2d 306,
309 (1953).
57. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 278 Md. at 552, 366 A.2d at 16.
58. 231 Md. 266, 189 A.2d 625 (1963).
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situation, the insurer receives an unjustifiable windfall. Second, the Watson
rule allows an unreasonable forfeiture by permitting the insurer's assertion
of a technical irregularity to deny protection for which the insured has paid.
Finally, allowing an insurer to disclaim liability has the undesirable effect
of leaving victims of automobile accidents uncompensated by their paid-for
insurance coverage. Although these three factors illuminate the purposes
underlying section 482, a consideration of these broad concerns without
other indicia of legislative intent provides insufficient guidance to interpret
this section correctly. In order to clarify the situation that the legislature
intended to remedy, the inquiry must include an examination of the Watson
notice clause.59
The objective in comparing the information requested in the Watson
notice condition clause with the information requested in the Harvey proof
condition is to establish that the character of the information requested by
the two provisions is so similar that GEICO's proof clause must be placed
within the ambit of the purposes of section 482. The condition in Watson's
insurance policy requested the following information:
In the event of an accident, occurrence, or loss, written notice containing
particulars sufficient to identify the Insured and also reasonably
obtainable information with respect to the time, place and circumstan-
ces thereof, and the names and addresses of the insured and of available
witnesses, shall be given by or for the Insured to the Company... as
soon as practicable. 60
In comparison, the GEICO proof of loss condition requested from the
insured "full particulars of the nature and extent of the injuries and
treatment received and contemplated and such other information as may
assist the Company in determining the amount due and payable. '6 1
At first impression it appears that the two clauses differ in that one
requires names, addresses, and circumstances, and the other requires full
particulars of injuries and treatment. More fundamentally, however, it is
apparent that these clauses neither request information so basically
different in nature, nor entail a different type of obligation on behalf of the
insured, so as logically to subject one but not the other to automatic
disclaimer. The Harvey court found that the main purpose of a proof of loss
provision is to "acquaint the insurance company with certain facts and
circumstances relative to the loss, forming a basis for further steps to be
59. It is presumed that the legislature acted with full knowledge of prior decisions.
E.g., Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399, 406-07, 354 A.2d 817, 821 (1976);
Gibson v. State, 204 Md. 423, 432, 104 A.2d 800, 805 (1954); Cline v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 13 Md. App. 337, 343-44, 283 A.2d 188, 192 (1971), affl'd, 266 Md. 42, 291
A.2d 464 (1972).
60. 231 Md. at 269 n.1, 189 A.2d at 626 n.1.
61. Brief for Appellant, Record at E-4, Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Harvey, 278 Md. 548, 366 A.2d 13 (1976).
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taken by the company,"62 a rationale widely recognized as applicable to
notice clauses in insurance policies as well. 63 Notice and proof clauses are
included in insurance contracts for the same basic purpose. Only one
significant difference between the provisions exists. Under the notice clause
all of the information is supplied by the insured;64 the proof clause, however,
requires information that must initially be supplied by third parties outside
the insured's direct control. Therefore, notwithstanding the basic similari-
ties of the notice and proof provisions, it is clear that some of the
information requested in the Harvey proof condition had to be corroborated
by a third party and is different in this respect from that which is generally
considered notice information. 65 This distinction, however, must be quali-
fied. The GEICO proof of loss condition contained three basic components:
an Application for Benefits Form, a Wage Verification Statement, and a
Medical Report. 66 Significantly, the Application for Benefits Form, in
contrast to the other two forms, does not require information provided by
third parties and in fact constitutes the "basic and original proof of claim"
specified in the policy.6 7 Although, unlike the notice requirement, a certain
portion of proof information required information that must be supplied by
third parties, this distinction is immaterial in that notice and proof of loss
clauses request the same basic type of information for the same basic
purpose. The legislative intent behind section 482 is certainly not given
effect if the protection an insured receives depends upon the mere label an
insurance company places upon a particular item of information.
If a proof of loss provision is within the ambit of the purposes
underlying the enactment of section 482, one may question the legislature's
failure to include proof clauses within that section's prejudice requirement in
addition to notice and cooperation provisions. Insight into this issue is
provided by the legislative history of section 482 and PIP. Section 482 was
enacted in response to a clause within a traditional automobile liability
insurance policy. 68 Such a policy, it will be recalled, provided the insured in
Watson with third party coverage. Upon involvement in an accident,
Watson had to notify his insurer so that they could settle or defend against a
62. 278 Md. at 553, 366 A.2d at 17.
63. See note 32 supra.
64. GEICO provided insurance coverage on the condition that:
In the event of an accident, written notice containing details sufficient to
identify the injured persons, and also reasonably obtainable information
respecting the time, place, and circumstances of the accident shall be given by
or on behalf of each injured person to the Company or any of its authorized
agents as soon as practicable.
Brief for Appellant at 5, Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 278 Md. 548, 366
A.2d 13 (1976) (emphasis omitted).
65. Notice requirements are fulfilled by the acts of first parties. See note 43 and
accompanying text supra.
66. 278 Md. at 554, 366 A.2d at 18.
67. Id.
68. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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claim brought against him. Under third party coverage, Watson's insurer
was potentially obligated to pay the person with whom Watson was
involved in an accident. Thus, proof of loss of Watson's own injuries was not
requested by his insurer. With the advent of the first party coverage of no-
fault insurance eight years after enactment of section 482, however, proof of
claim conditions became standard clauses in automobile liability insurance
policies. Simply because an express provision relating to a proof of claim is
not included in section 482 does not mean that an insurer should
automatically be able to disclaim liability when an insured submits late
proof of claim. The absence of such language is irrelevant, for it would
merely refer to a form of notice not explicitly considered when the statute
was passed. As Professor Llewellyn points out, it may be necessary to
interpret statutory language in light of circumstances that were unforeseen
at the time of passage.69 According to Llewellyn, the goal of statutory
construction is to uncover the sense which can be "quarried" out of the
statutory language in light of a new situation, because "[b]road purposes
can indeed reach far beyond details known or knowable at the time of
drafting." 0 Thus, given the broad purposes behind enactment of section 482,
the ambiguity of the term "notice" in section 482, and the fact that the
"notice" and "proof' conditions in GEICO's policy requested similar
information for the same basic purpose, it can be forcefully argued that
section 482 should be construed to cover "proof of loss" disclaimers.
Even if section 482's language is considered incapable of bearing a
meaning encompassing proof of loss provisions, the court might have used
section 482 to determine Maryland's public policy respecting analogous
contract provisions and, having done so, incorporated that policy into the
state's common law.7" Section 482 is designed to prevent forfeitures under
insurance policies whenever notice of claim is late but prejudice to the
insurance company has not been shown.72 In other words, the fault of the
insured is excused as long as it does not harm the insurance company. As
noted above, the basic purposes of notice and proof of loss provisions are
identical, and the primary distinction between the provisions is the fact that
proof of loss ordinarily requires information supplied to the insurer by a
69. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 400 (1950).
70. Id.
71. Chief Justice Stone argued that there is no adequate reason for the failure to
treat statutes much more like judicial decisions, as "both a declaration and a source of
law, and as a premise for legal reasoning." Stone, The Common Law in the United
States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 13 (1936). For a discussion of the technique of reasoning by
analogy from statutes, see the sources cited in Note, The Supreme Court's Use of
Statutory Interpretation: Morris v. Gressette, APA Nonreviewability, and the Idea of
a Legislative Scheme, 87 YALE L.J. 1636, 1641 n.36 (1978). But see Coleman v. State,
281 Md. 538, 547, 380 A.2d 49, 55 (1977); Amalgamated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Helms, 239 Md.
529, 536, 212 A.2d 311, 316 (1965).
72. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
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third person.7 3 If information must be acquired from a third person,
however, a greater possibility exists that the delay was not due to the fault
of the insured. Actions of a third party may be beyond the insured's control.
Thus, the distinction between proof of loss and notice of claim provisions, if
relevant at all, militates strongly in favor of protecting those affected by the
type of provision that the court concludes is not covered by section 482. If
section 482 evidences disapproval of the result in Watson, the court certainly
should not extend Watson's result to a class of provisions to which the
legislature's purpose seems equally applicable.
Even if the underlying policy suggests that section 482 should be
applied to proof of loss disclaimers, the question arises whether section 544
precludes application of section 482 to proof of loss disclaimers respecting
PIP coverage. Section 544(a)(1) presently provides that PIP coverages "may
prescribe a period of not less than twelve months after the date of accident
within which the original claim for benefits must be presented to the
insurer. ' ' 74 This language clearly permits the insurer to incorporate a
provision in the policy stating the time within which the original claim for
benefits must be made. The section does not, however, describe the effect
resulting from a failure to comply with that time period. Under one possible
construction, a failure to comply would be a breach of a condition precedent,
and the breach of a condition precedent ordinarily precludes recovery on a
policy. Thus, section 544 can be construed, as the Harvey court construed it,
as an express legislative authorization of a time limit for submission of
proof and an accompanying right to disclaim liability if proof is not
submitted within twelve months of the accident without regard to .preju-
dice.7 5
Such an implied right to disclaim, however, must be reconciled with the
requirements of section 482. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that
seemingly inconsistent statutory provisions should, if possible, be recon-
ciled. 76 Superficially, reconciliation would seem impossible: if proof of loss is
filed late and an insurer is nevertheless prevented from disclaiming liability
(absent prejudice), it is nonsense to say that an insured "must" submit proof
within a twelve month deadline. Thus, if section 482 is given full effect,
section 544(a)(1) would arguably be reduced to surplusage. This ostensible
inconsistency disappears if section 482's requirement that an insurer must
prove prejudice is read as a qualification of an insurer's right to disclaim
liability under section 544(a)(1). Section 544 does not describe the mecha-
nism of, or the limits on, disclaimer - such description is clearly
unnecessary because such matters have already been set out in section 482.
Section 544 provides that the minimum time limit for proof of claim in PIP
73. See notes 62 to 65 and accompanying text supra.
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §544(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
75. See 278 Md. at 554, 366 A.2d at 17.
76. E.g., Prince George's County v. White, 275 Md. 314, 319, 340 A.2d 236, 240
(1975); Mayor of Baltimore v. Clerk of the Superior Court, 270 Md. 316, 319, 311 A.2d
261, 263 (1973).
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policies is twelve months. This restriction does not, however, affect in any
way section 482's qualifications on the time conditions that are permitted.
Although the insurer's ability to disclaim liability is conditioned by the
necessity of proving prejudice, this does not mean that the condition poses
no incentive for the insured to comply and no protection to the insurer.
Under a PIP policy an insured must submit proof within twelve months or
he will risk losing benefits if the insurer can show prejudice. In conclusion,
section 544 can be interpreted as an express legislative authorization of
disclaimer regardless of prejudice only if proof of claim is not within the
ambit of section 482. But if proof of claim is within the scope of section 482 it
is clear that section 482 does not conflict with section 544, and in fact acts as
a pre-established qualification to any rights of disclaimer.
THE LAW AS IT STANDS TODAY
Regardless of how sections 482 and 544 should have been construed, the
Harvey decision serves to clarify the rights and responsibilities of insurers
and insureds. After Harvey and the legislative amendments that followed,
an insurer of PIP coverage may deny its liability irrespective of prejudice
whenever a claim for benefits is received more than twelve months after the
accident. An issue not specifically addressed by the court, but which has
been answered by implication, is the consequence of notifying an insurer
(without submitting proof at that time) twelve months after the accident.
Obviously, in this situation the PIP insurer can disclaim liability on the
basis that a claim for benefits has not been timely submitted. Thus, it is
clear that the insurer can effectively limit the effect of section 482 to a twelve
month period by incorporating a section 544 clause into the policy. Thus, the
effect of Harvey is to provide a means through which insurance companies
can avoid the effects of a more expansive construction of section 482.
EMERGING TRENDS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The present status of Maryland case law is not, of course, frozen. 77 In
view of an emerging trend in other jurisdictions, and in light of the General
Assembly's approval of remedial action in the area of notice and cooperation
clauses, either the legislature or the Court of Appeals should overrule past
precedent and require insurers to establish prejudice prior to disclaiming
liability due to late proof. Because of the peculiar conditions that underlie
the relationship between insureds and insurers in automobile liability
insurance contracts, a number of jurisdictions have recently recognized that
a strict application of traditional contract principles is inapposite, and
77. As aptly phrased by Judge Levine: "The common law ... is not a static body
of absolute and unyielding principles .... [The genius of the common law lies in its
capacity to respond to the ever-changing needs and conditions of human society."
State v. Williamson, 282 Md. 100, 114-15, 382 A.2d 588, 596 (1978) (Levine, J.,
concurring).
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required an insurer to establish prejudice in order to disclaim coverage due
to an insured's breach of a policy condition.78
The classical contract analysis of an insurance policy would result in the
enforcement of the terms of the contract as written.7 9 Under the traditional
approach, if an insurer alleges a breach of a policy condition, the question is
simply whether the insured did in fact fulfill the particular condition.80 The
fundamental notion of freedom of contract requires a court to protect the
reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.81 Traditionally, the law
will not make a better contract for the parties than that which they
bargained for themselves. Under this approach, a court will not redraft an
insurance policy when the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and
unambiguous terms. An essential, underlying assumption of traditional
contract law is the notion that a contract is a voluntary association entered
into by parties of roughly equal bargaining power. 82 To the extent that this
assumption does not hold true, blind adherence to traditional contract
analysis is mistaken and unjust.
The rationale of the traditional approach is unpersuasive in view of the
actual nature of the relationship between insureds and insurers in liability
and no-fault automobile insurance policies. Because the policy conditions
are largely dictated by the insurer to the insured, such contracts are not
negotiated agreements in any meaningful sense. 3 In reality, the extent of
coverage is the only provision in the contract over which the insured can
bargain with the insurance company. 84 Furthermore, insureds are not able
to choose between insurance policies that are significantly different with
respect to the standard conditions written into them.85 Policies issued by
different companies often express the same conditions in identical
language.86 Oppressive bargains cannot be avoided by careful shopping.
78. LaPlace v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 764, 767 (D.V.I. 1969); State Farm
Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345, 347 (Del. 1974); Cooper v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 93-94, 237 A.2d 870, 873-74 (1968); Brakeman v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 71-77, 371 A.2d 193, 195-98 (1977). See generally
Comment, The Materiality of Prejudice to the Insurer as a Result of the Insured's
Failure to Give Timely Notice, 74 DICK. L. REV. 260 (1970).
79. See Whittle v. Associated Indem. Corp., 130 N.J. 576, 581, 33 A.2d 866, 869
(1943); Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576, 578-81 (1969).
80. Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 93, 237 A.2d 870, 873
(1968).
81. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629 (1943).
82. Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576, 579 (1968).
83. LaPlace v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 764, 767 (D.V.I. 1969); State Farm
Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345, 347 (Del. 1974); Cooper v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 93, 237 A.2d 870, 873 (1968); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins.
Co., 472 Pa. 66, 72, 371 A.2d 193, 196 (1977). See also Gladstone v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 546 F.2d 1403, 1407 (2d Cir. 1976).
84. Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 72, 371 A.2d 193, 196 (1977).
85. Id. at 73, 371 A.2d at 196.
86. Id..
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The assumption of voluntary association is further eroded by the fact that
Maryland citizens are required by law to have both liability and PIP
coverage.8 7 Because such policies are required by state law, it can be
persuasively argued that insurance companies, in issuing such policies, act
as "agents" of the state, and that such state-required insurance policies are
not purely private contracts between insurers and insureds.88 Finally, these
contractual relationships are necessarily influenced by the strong public
interest in ensuring that victims of auto accidents are compensated.8 9
A classical contract approach is inappropriate for the additional reason
that an insurer's disclaimer results in a forfeiture.90 In the situation
examined in Harvey, the insurance company accepts the insured's
premiums in return for insurance coverage, and upon receipt of late proof of
claim, seeks to deny the very coverage for which the insured paid. Although
a proof of claim condition is not of trivial importance to insurers,91 it is
necessary to place this provision in perspective. To find a forefeiture when
the insurer has not suffered prejudice as a result of the breach is simply
unfair to the insureds and contrary to public interest. If the breach of
condition did not contribute to or increase the risk of loss, and if the insurer
is not prejudiced, there should be no forfeiture of coverage. 92 The purpose
underlying notice and proof of claim provisions is to provide insurers the
opportunity to acquire information in order to handle efficiently the
settlement or defense of a claim. 93 When the insurer is not prejudiced by
receipt of late notice or proof of claim, even absent a reasonable excuse on
behalf of the insured, the purpose of the condition precedent has been
fulfilled. 94 The function of notice and proof requirements is neither to
provide the insurer with a technical escape hatch through which liability
can be avoided when no prejudice is suffered, nor to evade the basic purpose
of the insurance contract to assure that claims will be paid up to the extent
to which premiums were collected. 95 In the absence of prejudice, such escape
hatch provisions do not serve any legitimate purpose and offend basic
notions of equity. Accordingly, they should not be given effect.
If prejudice to the insurer is to be the determining factor in deciding
whether an insurer can disclaim liability, the question arises whether the
insurer or insured should bear the burden of establishing the presence or
87. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§539, 541 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
88. See Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 72 n.6, 371 A.2d 193, 196 n.6
(1977).
89. Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 94, 237 A.2d 870, 874
(1968); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 76 n.8, 371 A.2d 193, 198 n.8 (1977).
90. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345, 347 (Del. 1974);
Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 93-94, 237 A.2d 870, 873-74
(1968); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 73-74, 371 A.2d 193, 196-97 (1977).
91. See text accompanying note 99 infra.
92. See 6 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 16, § 4146.
93. See R. KEETON, BASic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw § 6.8(a) (1971).
94. Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 75, 371 A.2d 193, 197 (1977).
95. Miller v. Marcantel, 221 So. 2d 557, 559 (La. 1969).
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absence of prejudice. 96 Proving prejudice is recognized as a difficult task in
instances when notice is received late.97 Because in many cases it is
impossible for the insurer to know what witnesses or facts it would have
discovered if timely notice had been filed, this task in some respects
resembles the burden of proving a negative. In cases of delinquent notice,
assuming that the insured was not rendered unconscious or seriously
disabled by the accident, it is reasonable to postulate that the insured may
have more relevant facts within his knowledge concerning the accident.
Thus the insured may arguably be in a better position to establish the fact
that late notice did not prejudice the insurer.98 This on-the-scene advantage,
however, is largely counterbalanced by the fact that insurance companies
have at their disposal investigators trained to uncover pertinent accident
data. As indicated by the enactment of section 482, the public policy in
Maryland with respect to this issue is to place the burden of establishing
prejudice on the insurer.
Establishing prejudice resulting from the late receipt of proof of loss
presents a more subtle problem. Insurance companies are, of course, in the
business of attempting to predict and control risks assumed under a policy.
Provisions designed to secure timely presentment of claims are advantage-
ous to both the insurer and the insured in that they tend to keep down the
cost of coverage by reducing the burden of maintaining reserves for
undetermined claims.99 But, when the insurer has been timely notified, it
appears that the prejudice arising from the uncertainty that forces insurers
to maintain a certain level of reserves is mitigated. If prejudice is suffered as
a result of an inability to fine-tune reserves due to late proof of claim, it is
96. Some courts place this burden on the insured. See, e.g., Dairyland Ins. Co. v.
Cunningham, 360 F. Supp. 139, 141 (D. Colo. 1973); Tiedtke v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 222
So. 2d 206, 209 (Fla. 1969); Henderson v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 252 Iowa 97,
106-07, 106 N.W.2d 86, 91-92 (1960). This position has been referred to as the majority
view. 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 16, § 4732. Other jurisdictions require the insurer to
establish prejudice. See, e.g., Powell v. Home Indem. Co., 343 F.2d 856, 860 (8th Cir.
1965); LaPlace v. Sun Ins. Office Lts., 298 F. Supp. 764, 767 (D.V.I. 1969); Lindus v.
Northern Ins. Co. of New York, 103 Ariz. 160, 164, 438 P.2d 311, 315 (1968); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345, 347 (Del. 1974); Miller v. Marcantel, 221
So. 2d 557, 560 (La. 1969); Bibb v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 44 Mich. App. 440, 445, 205
N.W.2d 495, 498 (1973); Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 94, 237
A.2d 870, 874 (1968); Lusch v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 Or. 593, 601, 538 P.2d 902,
905 (1975); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 71-77, 371 A.2d 193, 195-98
(1977); Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I. 143, 160, 282 A.2d 584,
592-93 (1971); Factory Mut. IAab. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 256 S.C. 376, 381, 182 S.E.2d
727, 729-30 (1971); Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 85 Wash. 2d 372, 377, 535 P.2d
816, 819 (1975).
97. Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 77, 371 A.2d 193, 198 (1977).
98. Id. at 94, 371 A.2d at 206 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note
16, § 4732.
99. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw § 6.8(a) (1971).
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certainly more reasonable to place the burden on the insurance company,
due to its access and familiarity with its own records and calculatiohs. In
view of the public policy in Maryland as evidenced in section 482, the burden
of establishing prejudice should be placed on the insurer in the case of late
proof as well as for late notice. Thus, upon an insured's breach of a notice,
proof, or other condition precedent, the insurer should not only be forbidden
from automatically disclaiming liability under the policy; the insurer should
also be required to come forward and affirmatively establish that such
breach caused it actual prejudice.
-CONCLUSION
In GEICO v. Harvey the Maryland Court of Appeals arguably
misconstrued section 482 of article 48A. The result in Harvey, however, is
not the only questionable aspect of the opinion. The analytical approach
adopted by the court to arrive at its decision is also subject to criticism, as
the court failed to deal sufficiently with the difficult problems of statutory
construction which the case presented. The broad legislative purposes
underlying enactment of section 482 were in fact largely ignored. Beyond the
issue of statutory construction, however, the Court of Appeals and the
General Assembly should recognize that the relationship between insureds
and insurers in no-fault and liability automobile insurance policies bears
little relationship to the assumptions of classical contract law.
In view of Harvey, and the piecemeal legislative amendments that
followed, it appears that the legislature should now take up the task of fully
protecting insureds from disclaimers in instances when insurers are not
prejudiced by breach of a policy condition. In this regard, it is suggested
that, in order to effectuate the original purpose of section 482, section 544 of
article 48A be amended to provide as follows:
Subject to the prescriptions in section 545, if for any reason an insurer
seeks to disclaim liability on the coverage described in section 539, the
insurer notwithstanding any provisions of the insurance policy to the
contrary, shall not be relieved of liability under the insurance policy,
unless the insurer can establish by a preponderance of evidence that it
has been prejudiced.
To the extent that Harvey was based on a misconstruction of section 482,
changes in section 544 will not solve all the problems with respect to an
insurance company's ability to disclaim liability absent prejudice, but
instead will affect only disputes arising under PIP policies. Therefore,
section 482 should also be amended to provide:
Notwithstanding any provision of the insurance policy to the contrary,
any insurer seeking to disclaim coverage on any policy of insurance
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issued by it on the ground that the insured, or any one claiming the
benefits of the policy through the insured, has breached the policy, shall
not be relieved of liability under the insurance policy unless the insurer
can establish by a preponderance of evidence that it has been
prejudiced.
THE LAY STANDARD OF INFORMED CONSENT:
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
WITH MARYLAND'S NEW CAUSE OF
ACTION - SARD v. HARDY
Over the past twenty years, the doctrine of informed consent has
fostered a continuing academic and judicial struggle to delineate the scope
of a physician's duty to inform a patient about the nature of a proposed
course of treatment., The struggle has attempted to promote an intelligent
exercise of a patient's right to approve his course of treatment, without
interfering with a physician's ability to practice responsible and progressive
medicine free from fear of frequent litigation, by imposing a duty upon the
physician to disclose information about the nature, purposes, and inherent
risks of each treatment necessary to an informed decision. In Sard v.
Hardy,2 the Court of Appeals of Maryland balanced the competing interests
of patient and physician and unanimously adopted a definition of the scope
of a physician's duty to disclose information to his patient.
While treating Mrs. Sard during her third pregnancy, Dr. Hardy, a
physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology, discussed the possibil-
ity of a tubal-ligation sterilization procedure. 3 Mrs. Sard agreed to the
1. For a listing of the many articles on this subject as of 1970, see Waltz &
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 628 n.1 (1970). For
commentaries after 1970 not otherwise cited in this Comment, see Cantor, A Patient's
Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the
Preservation Of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973); Capron, Informed Consent in
Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340 (1974); Fraser
& Chadsey, Informed Consent in Malpractice Cases, 6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 183 (1970);
Kessenick & Mankin, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Be Informed, 8 U.S.F.L.
REV. 261 (1973); Knapp, Problems of Consent in Medical Treatment, 62 MIL. L. REV.
105 (1973); Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation of
Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 124; Skegg, Consent to Medical
Procedures on Minors, 36 MOD. L. REV. 370 (1973); Zaslow, Informed Consent in
Medical Practice, 22 PRAc. LAw. 13 (1976); Comment, Informed Consent For the
Terminal Patient, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 111 (1975); Note, Who's Afraid of Informed
Consent? An Affirmative Approach to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 44 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 241 (1978); Comment, Informed Consent to 'Immunization: The Risks and
Benefits of Individual Autonomy, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1286 (1977); Comment, Patients'
Rights and Informed Consent: An Emergency Case for Hospitals?, 12 CAL. W.L. REV.
406 (1976); Comment, Informed Consent: A Malpractice Headache, 47 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 242 (1970); Comment, Informed Consent: The Illusion of Patient Choice, 23
EMORY L.J. 503 (1974); Note, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 12
GA. L. REV. 581 (1978); Comment, New Trends in Informed Consent?, 54 NEB. L. REV.
66 (1975); Note, Advise and Consent in Medicine: A Look at the Doctrine of Informed
Consent, 16 N.Y.L.F. 863 (1970); Comment, Informed Consent and the Mental Patient:
California Recognizes a Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Psychosurgery and Shock
Treatment, 15 SANTA CLARA LAw. 725 (1975); Comment, Informed Consent: A New
Standard for Texas, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 499 (1976); Comment, Informed Consent:
Alternatives for Illinois, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 739; Comment, Informed Consent As a
Theory of Medical Liability. 1970 Wis. L. REV. 879.
2. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
3. See note 5 infra.
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operation, and it was subsequently performed at the same time that Dr.
Hardy delivered her child by Caesarean section. Approximately two years
later, Mrs. Sard again became pregnant and gave birth to a healthy child by
a routine Caesarean delivery.
In a suit filed in the Circuit Court of Talbot County, Mr. and Mrs. Sard
alleged that Dr. Hardy's negligent failure to advise Mrs. Sard that the
sterilization procedure might not succeed in preventing future pregnancies
and that alternative methods of sterilization were available precluded the
Sards from giving their informed consent. In addition, they alleged that Dr.
Hardy breached an express warranty of therapeutic result.4 At trial, Mrs.
Sard testified that Dr. Hardy advised that she was about to undergo her
third Caesarean delivery and that people do not usually have more than
three. Because Mrs. Sard had experienced complications 5 in an earlier
pregnancy, Dr. Hardy had suggested three options to avoid future
pregnancy: sterilization, oral contraception, or use of an intrauterine device.
Mrs. Sard stated that because she had lost a lot of blood and could not afford
to raise an additional child, she specifically informed Dr. Hardy that she did
not want any more children. She testified that in spite of this statement Dr.
Hardy had not only failed to inform her that the sterilization would not
completely eliminate the possibility of a future pregnancy, but that he had
also affirmatively assured her that she would not have any more children.
6
Called as an adverse witness, Dr. Hardy testified that six different
techniques were available to perform a tubal-ligation sterilization. The
Madlener technique, which he had used on Mrs. Sard, was the simplest to
accomplish but had a two-percent risk of failure when performed at the same
time as a Caesarean section. Under similar circumstances, however, the
Uchida and Irving methods had failure rates of less than one-tenth of one
percent. Dr. Hardy acknowledged that he had never discussed the various
4. 281 Md. at 435, 379 A.2d at 1017. The Sards raised additional claims alleging
negligence in the actual performance of the operation and during the post-operative
period. Id. at 435 n.1, 379 A.2d at 1017 n.l. Insufficient evidence was introduced at trial
to support either of these allegations and no issue relating to these claims was raised
on appeal. Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 221, 367 A.2d 525, 528 (1976), rev'd, 281
Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
5. During her first pregnancy in 1965, Mrs. Sard developed eclampsia, which
caused a series of severe convulsions necessitating a premature delivery by Caesarean
section to save the lives of mother and child. The baby was dead at birth. Eclampsia
is the occurrence of one or more convulsions caused by hypertension due to
pregnancy. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 435 n.2, 379 A.2d at 1018 n.2. Although he
did not treat Mrs. Sard during her first pregnancy, Dr. Hardy was aware of this
earlier complication. Dr. Hardy denied advising Mrs. Sard that future pregnancies
would endanger her health. He admitted, however, that he signed a consultant's
report stating that he felt future pregnancies would endanger Mrs. Sard's life. Id. at
436, 379 A.2d at 1018.
6. Id. In addition, Mr. Sard testified that Dr. Hardy never mentioned the
alternative possibility of a vasectomy. Although unable to recall whether he had in
fact advised Mr. Sard of this alternative, Dr. Hardy testified that generally it was his
practice to do so. Id.
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methods or their respective failure rates with the Sards prior to the
operation.7 In addition, he acknowledged that he had not informed Mrs.
Sard that the failure rates for all of the available techniques dramatically
diminished when performed at a time other than during a Caesarean
delivery.
On appeal from the affirmance by the Court of Special Appeals of a
directed verdict for Dr. Hardy, 8 the primary issue was whether sufficient
evidence had been presented to permit the jury to decide that Dr. Hardy
negligently failed to disclose that the procedure was not always successful
and that alternative methods were available. Defining the applicable
standards for the first time, the Court of Appeals held that
the doctrine of informed consent imposes on a physician before he
subjects his patient to medical treatment, the duty to explain the
procedure to the patient and to warn him of any material .risks or
dangers inherent in or collateral to the therapy, so as to enable the
patient to make an intelligent and informed choice about whether or not
to undergo such treatment. 9
The court defined a material risk as one which a "physician knows or ought
to know would be significant to a reasonable person in the patient's position
in deciding whether or not to submit to a particular medical treatment or
7. Id. at 436-37, 379 A.2d at 1018. Dr. Hardy testified that it was good medical
practice merely to inform the patient that a tubal-ligation would be performed without
discussing the details of the surgical procedure. The physician would choose the
technique to be used during the operation after there had been an opportunity to
inspect the condition of the uterus. Id.
8. At the close of the Sards' case in chief, the trial court directed a verdict in
favor of Dr. Hardy. Because the Sards had signed a consent form containing
information that the sterilization procedure was not effective in all cases, the trial
court ruled that the informed consent issue was conclusively settled against them. The
consent form provided in pertinent part that the patient understood "'that an
operation intended to effect sterilization is not effective in all cases.'" Id. at 438, 379
A.2d at 1019. Mr. Sard was functionally illiterate. Mrs. Sard was given the form 15
minutes before being taken to the delivery room and signed without reading it. Id. at
437, 379 A.2d at 1019.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the general principles that govern a
claim under the informed consent doctrine also determine the effect to be given to a
standardized consent form. Although the form could be offered as evidence of the
amount of information disclosed, oral or written consent would be ineffectual unless
the patient had been adequately advised prior to the consent. Id. at 438 n.3, 379 A.2d
at 1019 n.3. See Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
(1974); Pegram v. Sisco, 406 F. Supp. 776, 779 (W.D. Ark.), affl'd, 547 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir.
1976). For a similar analysis, reasoning that principles applicable to arm's-length
bargaining are inapplicable to the fiduciary relationship existing between a patient
and his physician, see Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 243-50, 367 A.2d 525, 539-47
(1976) (Davidson, J., dissenting), rev'd, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977). See
generally D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 2.2 (1973).
9. 281 Md. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1020.
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procedure." 10 It further held that the plaintiff was not required to present
expert testimony to establish either the breach or the scope of the
physician's duty to inform." Finally, the court held that the causal nexus
between the physician's failure to disclose a material risk and the plaintiff's
injury would be determined by an objective standard: "whether a reasonable
person in the patient's position would have withheld consent to the surgery
or therapy had all material risks been disclosed."' 12 Unless the plaintiff can
establish that a reasonable person would have refused to consent if the risk
had been disclosed, recovery will not be allowed. Applying these principles
to the facts before it, the court reversed the Court of Special Appeals and
remanded the case for a new trial, 3 holding that the evidence was sufficient
to warrant submission to the jury the questions whether Dr. Hardy had
withheld material information and whether a reasonable person would not
have consented if an adequate disclosure had been made. 14
The court then addressed the claim that Dr. Hardy had made and
breached an express warranty to achieve a specific therapeutic result.'5
Although some courts hold that an express warranty is unenforceable unless
supported by a separate consideration,' 6 the Sard court believed the better
10. Id. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022.
11. Id. at 447, 379 A.2d at 1024.
12. Id. at 450, 379 A.2d at 1025.
13. Id. at 454, 379 A.2d at 1027.
14. Id. at 445-46, 450-51, 379 A.2d at 1023, 1025-27. Although employing the
same informed consent standards adopted by the Court of Appeals, the Court of
Special Appeals had held as a matter of law that a two-percent risk of failure would
not be material to a reasonable patient's decision. 34 Md. App. at 235, 367 A.2d at 535.
15. The court apparently, although not expressly, agreed with the traditional rule
that a physician is not contractually liable for the failure to effect a cure or achieve a
specific result absent an express warranty to that effect. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F.
Supp. 460, 463 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 1975);
Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1230-31 (1972). The physician is not an insurer of the
success of his treatment. Absent an express agreement to effect a specific cure, he
contracts only that he possesses and will apply that degree of professional skill and
learning ordinarily possessed by the average member of the profession. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 1975); Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d 609, 615
(Iowa 1973); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1225 (1972). Two arguments have been
advanced against imposing any contractual liability. Due to the unpredictability of
medical results and the individual differences among patients, it is unlikely that
honest physicians could bsyvould promise a particular result. Further, some patients
may subjectively transform a physician's expression of opinion about the expected
outcome into a specific promise. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 452, 379 A.2d at 1026.
In response, it is argued that a failure to permit any contractual liability when a
physician actually promised to effect a specific result would immunize the dishonest
physician from any liability. See id. See also Tierney, Contractual Aspects of
Malpractice, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1457 (1973); Note, Express Contracts to Cure: The
Nature of Contractual Malpractice, 50 IND. L.J. 361 (1975).
16. See Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 1975); Rogala v. Silva, 16 Ill.
App. 3d 63, 65, 305 N.E.2d 571, 573 (1973); Gault v. Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 106-07,
191 N.E.2d 436, 141-42 (1963).
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rule was that proof of a separate consideration should be required only when
the warranty was made post-operatively. 17 Therefore, the court concluded
that an express warranty would be enforceable if it were made prior to
treatment or supported by a separate consideration.' 8
The court, however, was fearful that a patient, especially if embittered
by an undesirable result, may mistake or transform a physician's
"therapeutic reassurance, hopeful expression of opinion, or mere prediction
of an expected outcome"'19 into an express warranty. To protect both the
public and the physician, it declared that the plaintiff must prove by "clear
and convincing evidence that the physician did, in fact, make the alleged
[pre-operative) warranty.' ' 2° The only evidence tending to establish that Dr.
Hardy had expressly warranted that Mrs. Sard would be sterile was the
alleged affirmative assurance that Mrs. Sard would not have any more
children, and the court concluded that this evidence was insufficient to
establish an express warranty by clear and convincing evidence.21
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The doctrine of informed consent is an outgrowth of the well-recognized
doctrine that a physician treating a mentally competent adult in nonemer-
gency situations may not perform an operation or treatment without
securing the prior consent of the patient.2 2 Based on the premise that every
17. 281 Md. at 452, 379 A.2d at 1026-27; see, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.
2d 303, 315-16, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 471 (1967); Herrera v. Roessing, 533 P.2d 60, 61-62
(Colo. App. 1975); Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 67 n.1, 188 N.W.2d 601, 605 n.1
(1971).
18. 281 Md. at 451, 379 A.2d at 1026-27.
19. Id. at 453, 379 A.2d at 1027.
20. Id.; see Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973), noted in 24
DE PAUL L. REV. 212 (1974).
21. 281 Md. at 453-54, 379 A.2d at 1027. As illustrated by Sard itself, the court's
requirement that a warranty be proved by clear and convincing evidence confronts
plaintiffs with an almost insurmountable challenge in establishing a cause of action
based on warranty. Although it may be argued that the physician would be
adequately protected by a standard of proof focusing on whether a reasonable person
would conclude that under all the circumstances an express warranty had been made,
other courts have adopted standards similar to the clear and convincing requirement.
See Gault v. Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 110, 191 N.E.2d 436, 443 (1963) (dicta) (clear
and specific); Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973) (clear proof);
Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 70, 188 N.W.2d 601, 607 (1971) (specific, clear, and
express). For an analysis of physicians' statements found to be sufficiently clear and
definite to constitute an express warranty, see Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1234-50
(1972).
22. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Schloendorff v. Society of
N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); see McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A.
124 (1930); State ex rel. Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16 A. 382 (1889). For a
discussion of what constitutes an emergency condition or incompetent patient
sufficient to obviate the requirement of obtaining prior consent, see D. HARNEY, supra
note 8, §§2.1(A)-(B) & 2.3; McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized
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adult individual has the "right to determine what shall be done with his own
body, '23 the consent doctrine permits a patient to refuse to submit to a
proposed treatment, even one necessary to save his life, and prohibits a
physician from substituting "his own judgment for that of the patient by
any form of artifice or deception," even if he believes the operation or
treatment is necessary or .desirable.24 A physician must describe the type of
treatment to be employed and secure the patient's consent to that treatment.
By failing to obtain consent or performing a treatment beyond the scope of
that consent,25 a physician is subject to a battery action for an invasion of
the patient's bodily integrity.26 Ironically, because the critical issue is the
Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381, 395-481 (1957); Annots., 25 A.L.R.3d 1439
(1969); 56 A.L.R.2d 695 (1957); 139 A.L.R. 1370 (1942); 76 A.L.R. 562 (1932); 53 A.L.R.
1056 (1928); 26 A.L.R. 1036 (1923).
23. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)
(Cardozo, J.); see Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 264, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (1905) (" 'Under
a free government .... [a] free citizen's first and greatest right, which underlies all
others [is] the right to the inviolability of his person; . . .and this right necessarily
forbids a physician or surgeon ... to violate, without permission, the bodily integrity
of his patient .... ') (quoting Pratt v. Davis, 37 CHI. LEG. NEWS 213 (1905)).
24. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 407, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104, clarified in &
rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). See Smith, Therapeutic Privilege
to Withhold Specific Diagnosis From Patient Sick With Serious or Fatal Illness, 19
TENN. L. REV. 349 (1946).
25. Although having obtained consent to operate on one part of the patient's
body, a physician would exceed the scope of that consent by operating on an
additional part of the body, see Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88
N.W.2d 186 (1958), or by mistakenly operating on a different part of the body, see
McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124 (1930). For an excellent collection and
analysis of the many cases in this area, see McCoid, supra note 22. See generally D.
HARNEY, supra note 8, §§ 2.1 & 2.3; Powell, Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 MD. L.
REV. 189 (1961); Proctor, Consent to Operative Procedures, 22 MD. L. REV. 190 (1962);
37 ALB. L. REV. 591 (1973); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695 (1957).
26. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Schloendorff v.
Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572,
137 P. 96 (1913). Imposing liability was alternatively justified on a contractual theory.
Any performance inconsistent with or outside the scope of the procedure upon which
the patient and physician had agreed would be a breach of contract. See id.; Cooper v.
Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971); Powell, supra note 25.
Professor McCoid strongly criticized using a battery action as the doctrinal
basis of these cases, arguing that even when the physician technically exceeds the
scope of the consent, he usually acts in good faith for the benefit of the patient
without the malice or intent to harm normally associated with battery actions.
McCoid, supra note 22, at 423-24. But see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 31 (4th ed. 1971); Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 U.
ILL. L.F. 580, 594-95; Comment, Informed Consent After Cobbs - Has the Patient
Been Forgotten?, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 913, 919 (1973) (arguing that good faith and
lack of intent to harm confuses motive with intent, and motive is irrelevant in a
battery action). In addition, unauthorized operation cases usually result from a
patient's disappointment when the expected cure does not develop rather than from
the occurrence of a harmful medical result. See McCoid, supra note 22, at 426-27.
Therefore, McCoid has suggested that battery actions should be limited only to those
cases in which the physician intentionally deviated from the scope of the patient's
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absence of consent, the physician can be liable even though the treatment
was not harmful (or was in fact beneficial), and even though it was skillfully
performed within the bounds of good medical practice.27
In some cases, however, the patient was injured by the occurrence of a
collateral risk, inherent in the treatment, of which he had not been
informed.28 In such cases, because the patient had consented to the
treatment actually performed, the consent doctrine generally did not provide
the basis for a claim. 29 In response to this problem, courts developed the
correlative doctrine that an effective consent must be an informed consent:30
True consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a
choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the
consent, or those cases in which an actual medical harm resulted. In the other cases
in which the physician technically deviated from or had not obtained the patient's
consent, but no actual medical harm resulted, the patient's action should be in
malpractice on the basis of a duty imposed by law requiring the physician to make a
reasonable disclosure of all significant facts. Irrespective of the patient's actual
consent, a physician would be liable only if the treatment performed or the
information disclosed failed to comply with the standard of care established by the
customs of the medical profession. Id. at 423-34.
27. See McCoid, supra note 22, at 392.
28. For example, in a thyroidectomy there is an inherent risk of damage to the
recurrent laryngeal nerves possibly resulting in partial or total paralysis of the vocal
chords. Such an injury is not medically preventable nor is it necessarily caused by a
lack of skill or care. See Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579, 581-82 (S.D. Ala. 1962);
Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964).
Within this Comment, the term "risk," rather than meaning a chance or
probability, will most often be a shorthand reference for the specific hazard or harm
inherent in a treatment the occurrence or materialization of which will cause some
harm or injury to the patient.
29. Attempting to surmount this obstacle while conforming to a battery action,
plaintiffs argued that the failure to inform them of the risk vitiated their consent. See
Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio App. 2d 113, 234 N.E.2d 311 (1967); Congrove v. Holmes, 37
Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E.2d 765 (Ct. C.P. 1973); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. Ct.
260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971); Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. App. 1974); W.
PROSSER, supra note 26, at 165-66. For an argument criticizing this approach, see
Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 639-65 (1968).
See generally Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), modified on
other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966).
30. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 438-39, 379 A.2d at 1019-20; Comment,
Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396, 1396 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Informed Consent].
The informed consent doctrine might be more appropriately called the duty to
disclose doctrine. The term "informed consent" suggests that the relevant inquiry is
whether the patient actually possessed and comprehended sufficient information to
make an informed decision. The actual inquiry, however, focuses on the nature and
content of a physician's disclosure. Although an adequate disclosure is necessary to
an informed consent, a physician will fulfill his duty and be free from liability as long
as he discloses all material information, even if the patient fails to comprehend fully
the information disclosed. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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options available and the risks attendant upon each. The average
patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily
has only his physician to whom he can look for enlightenment with
which to reach an intelligent decision. From these almost axiomatic
considerations springs the need, and in turn the requirement, of a
reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make such a decision
possible.:"
To insure that the consent will be intelligently given, the physician must
also inform the patient of the probable outcome of the treatment to be
performed, the existence of alternative treatments and their probability of
success, and the potential of unfortunate consequences and risks inherent in
the treatment.2 Liability for the failure to disclose information necessary to
an informed consent is more properly cast as an action in negligence, rather
than battery, for the failure to adhere to a required standard of conduct. 33
Consistent with the traditional negligence formulation, the patient must
establish that the physician failed to disclose an existing risk or alternative
treatment of which the patient was unaware, and that the patient would not
have consented if he had been properly informed.
31. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972) (footnotes omitted); see Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 241-43, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10,
104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513-14 (1972). See generally Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1;
Informed Consent, supra note 30.
32. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-12, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103-07,
clarified in & rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Sard v. Hardy, 281
Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960),
overruled on other grounds, Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 675 & n.6 (Mo. 1965);
Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 227 N.W.2d 647, 653 (1975).
33. See, e.g., Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1973); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md.
432, 440 n.4, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 n.4 (1977). Several courts have explicitly or implicitly
accepted McCoid's criticisms, see note 26 supra, concluding that the physician's good-
faith attempt to render beneficial treatment and lack of an intent to harm were
inconsistent with the anti-social implications of a battery action. See, e.g., Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 239-41, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511-12 (1972);
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, clarified in & rehearing denied, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 595-600, 207
N.W.2d 297, 311-13 (1973). In addition, a negligence action avoids the theoretical
contradiction that would arise in a battery action if the physician were held liable for
invading the patient's body even though the patient had, in fact, consented to the
invasion. The better view, therefore, is that a physician's liability arises from the
breach of his duty to communicate information necessary to the patient's decision.
See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 240, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512; McCoid,
supra note 22, at 426-27. For an analysis of the doctrinal and theoretical differences
between battery and negligence actions and the practical effect these differences may
have in reference to statutes of limitations, measures of damages, and the need for
expert testimony, see Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 240, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
512; A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw 228-29 (1975); Informed Consent, supra
note 30, at 1400. Compare Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, clarified in
& rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960) with Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz.
App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965)1 modified on other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45
(1966) and Plante, supra note 29, at 648, 653.
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SCOPE OF DISCLOSURE - THE Sard STANDARD
Although most courts agree on the categories ', l of information to be
disclosed, they disagree on the appropriate standard to govern the adequacy
of a physician's disclosure within those categories. 35 Two fundamentally
different standards defining the scope or extent of disclosure have
developed. Most courts define the scope of disclosure according to a
professional standard of care, which in effect leaves the definition to the
medical profession itself. As in a traditional malpractice action, the
professional standard requires that a physician disclose information that
would have been disclosed by a reasonable medical practitioner in the same
or similar circumstances. : 6 In addition, the plaintiff must present expert
34. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
35. The disagreement results from several factors. Initially, it centered on
whether all or only some information should be disclosed. Eventually, it began to
focus on what level or degree of severity of harm was necessary to require disclosure
in order to secure an informed consent and who should decide when disclosure was
necessary. In addition, courts continue to differ on the relevant weight to be given to
certain practical and medical considerations influencing the disclosure decision.
Although often cited for the proposition that a full disclosure is required, the following
portion of the court's opinion in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees,
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957), demonstrates the tensions between these
considerations:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if
he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the physician may
not minimize the known dangers of a procedure or operation in order to induce
his patient's consent. At the same time, the physician must place the welfare
of his patient above all else and this very fact places him in a position in
which he sometimes must choose between two alternative courses of action.
One is to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon any surgical
procedure or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result in
alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who may as a
result refuse to undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal risk; it
may also result in actually increasing the risks by reason of the physiological
results of the apprehension itself. The other is to recognize that each patient
presents a separate problem, that the patient's mental and emotional
condition is important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in
discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be
employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary for an informed
consent.
Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181 (citation omitted).
36. E.g., Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964); Natanson v. Kline, 186
Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, clarified in & rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670
(1960); see Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d 139 (1966) (in accord with
good medical judgment); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963)
(practice customarily followed by profession in the locality); Aiken v. Clary, 396
S.W.2d 668, 675 (Mo. 1965) (reasonable medical practice). See generally 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 768 (1961).
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medical testimony to establish the existence of a duty to disclose and the
physician's deviation from that standard of care.37
In recent years, however, an increasing number of courts have adopted a
general or lay standard independent of medical custom. 38 In joining these
courts, the Court of Appeals in Sard articulated the standards to govern
future informed consent actions in Maryland.39 The fundamental premise of
37. See, e.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 545, 534 P.2d 1052, 1055 (1975);
Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 673-74 (Mo. 1965); Llera v. Wisner, 557 P.2d 805,
810-11 (Mont. 1976); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 650-51, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787-88
(1976).
38. Cases from jurisdictions presently utilizing a lay standard of materiality
include Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Zeleznick v.
Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 A.D.2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1975); Holland v.
Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 270 Or. 129, 522 P.2d 208, opinion withdrawn on other
grounds, 270 Or. 129, 140, 526 P.2d 577 (1974); Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or. 174, 489
P.2d 953 (1971); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Small v. Gifford
Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d 703 (1975); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975). One jurisdiction defines a breach of the
fiduciary duty according to the materiality standard. Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash.
App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
The materiality standard is also used to determine whether a patient's consent has
been vitiated in a battery action. Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E.2d
765 (Ct. C.P. 1973); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971),
noted in 45 TEMP. L.Q. 661 (1972) & 34 U. PITr. L. REV. 500 (1973); Longmire v. Hoey,
512 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. App. 1974). For a strong criticism of the lay standard, see
Plant, The Decline of "Informed Consent," 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91 (1978).
39. Curiously, the court merely articulated the elements of the informed consent
doctrine it would follow without seriously analyzing whether the doctrine should be
adopted at all. It simply declared that the informed consent doctrine follows logically
from the consent doctrine. See 281 Md. at 438-39, 379 A.2d at 1019. This, however,
does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the consent doctrine requires adoption
of an informed consent rule.
The court noted that the fundamental premise underlying the informed
consent requirement is that each patient has the right of self-determination with
respect to his own body, see text accompanying note 40 infra, which also is the
theoretical premise underlying the consent doctrine, see text accompanying note 23
supra. Within the context of the consent doctrine, it is reasonable to posit a right of
self-determination as an idealistic expression or recognition that the patient should
have some right to prevent a physician from operating upon him at will. The right of
self-determination prohibits a physician from performing a treatment to which his
patient has not agreed and prevents a physician from tricking, seducing, or deceiving
the patient into submitting to a treatment. For example, a physician cannot
deceptively say he is going to perform only exploratory surgery and then amputate a
patient's leg or remove part of his stomach while the patient is anesthetized. See
generally McCoid, supra note 22, and cases cited therein. But the right of self-
determination does not necessarily have to be an absolute, legally protected right in
all circumstances, cf. Application of President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., sitting as single judge to hear emergency petition) (right of
hospital to administer life-saving transfusion to patient of Jehovah's Witness religion,
in spite of objection by patient, believed to be incompetent to decide, and her
husband), rehearing en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964);
D. HARNEY, supra note 8, §§ 2.1 & 2.3 (citing cases in which consent was implied even
though patient did not expressly consent to treatment actually performed), especially
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the doctrine is that "'[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.' "" To
protect and promote this right of self-determination adequately, the scope of
when the net result of the treatment is medically beneficial, see generally notes 26 &
27 and accompanying text supra, nor does it compel the conclusion that the consent
must be informed. The consent doctrine adequately protects against an invasion of a
patient's bodily integrity, and there are plausible arguments that informed consent is
simply impractical and unnecessary. See generally Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The
Case for Contract, 1976 AM. BAR FOUN. REs. J. 87, 119-28. Contrary to the premise of
informed consent, a patient may not want to know the inherent risks. Desiring a cure,
but ignorant of medical science, a patient may willingly entrust himself to his
physician's expertise and training. See generally Riskin, supra note 26, at 597 (patient
becomes childlike and trustful). He expects that the physician will suggest the most
appropriate treatment and trusts the soundness of that suggestion. Even if a patient
is informed of the risks, it may be extremely difficult to evaluate that information. For
example, it may be unrealistic to assume that a patient can actually assess the danger
posed by a one-percent risk of paralysis. Furthermore, a patient may naturally
minimize the significance of a risk when the predominant desire in the pre-operative
setting is to secure a cure. Viewed in hindsight, however, once the risk has actually
materialized, the significance of a one-percent risk may be exaggerated.
Even without the doctrine of informed consent as the basis of a cause of
action, the patient may be sufficiently protected if an undisclosed risk actually
materialized by traditional malpractice law, as long as the patient actually consented
to the treatment. Risks are a reality of medical science and the occurrence of some bad
results cannot be prevented even if the best possible skill is exercised. Society may
rationally expect a person to assume some risk in pursuit of a cure. The plaintiff
would be adequately protected by a malpractice suit for a negligent selection of the
treatment. It is implicit that a physician, when deciding which treatment is most
appropriate, will evaluate the risks inherent in a treatment and reject as unwarranted
any treatment that is too dangerous. A physician who chooses a treatment with an
unacceptably high degree of risk, or chooses one treatment over an equally
appropriate but significantly less dangerous treatment, should be liable in malprac-
tice.
The problem, of course, is that a physician may be partially "immunized"
from liability by the requirement that malpractice be proved by expert testimony and
the concomitant problems of the "conspiracy of silence." See generally Comment,
Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 HARV. L. REV. 333, 336-38 (1963). Adoption of
a national standard of conduct for physicians, see generally Shilkret v. Annapolis
Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975), noted in 37 MD. L. REV. 212
(1977), may alleviate this problem.
The considerations discussed above do not compel the conclusion that the
Sard court's adoption of the informed consent doctrine was erroneous. Rather, they
simply suggest that it would have been appropriate to inquire whether adoption of the
doctrine legitimately advances any appropriate interest. The fact that other
jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine does not mean that it was appropriate for
Maryland to do so, and the experience of these courts over the past 20 years offered
the Sard court an opportunity to reexamine the validity and utility of the doctrine.
40. 281 Md. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y.
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.)). See also text
accompanying note 22 supra.
In addition, some courts characterize the physician-patient relationship as
fiduciary and use this characterization either as an additional or alternative
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a physician's duty to disclose must be "governed by the patient's
informational needs. Thus, the appropriate test is not what the physician in
the exercise of his medical judgment thinks a patient should know . . . ;
rather, the focus is on what data the patient requires in order to make an
intelligent decision. ' ' 41 Therefore, the court concluded that the proper scope
of disclosure is that the physician must divulge any information that would
be material to the patient's decision.42 Material information is information
that "a physician knows or ought to know would be significant to a
reasonable person in the patient's position in deciding whether or not to
submit to a particular medical treatment or procedure." 43
Because the patient, not the physician, must decide whether to submit to
a treatment, the purpose of the informed consent doctrine is to provide the
patient with the information necessary to decide. Several criticisms
previously levelled against the professional standard persuasively indicate
that the lay standard better promotes this purpose.44 First, critics question
whether a professional standard even exists. 45 The physician must initially
evaluate the emotional and physical condition of the particular patient to
identify the appropriate treatments and the inherent risks existing in each.46
justification for imposing a duty to disclose. A fiduciary relationship is one of trust
and confidence, rather than arm's-length bargaining, and requires the recognition of
the patient's reliance and dependence on the physician for his informational needs.
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 243-50, 367 A.2d 525, 539-47 (1976) (Davidson,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M.
221, 227-28, 377 P.2d 520, 524-25 (1962); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 282,
522 P.2d 852, 860 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975).
41. 281 Md. at 442, 379 A.2d at 1021 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
785 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Fogal v. Genessee Hosp., 41 A.D.2d
468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972);
Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 85 Wash.
2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1,
11-12, 227 N.W.2d 647, 653 (1975)).
42. 281 Md. at 443, 379 A.2d at 1022.
43. Id. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022. See generally Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1;
Informed Consent, supra note 30.
44. The Sard court summarized these criticisms with apparent approval and then
declared that it would adopt the lay standard. See 281 Md. at 442-44, 379 A.2d at
1021-22. The court can be faulted for merely summarizing these criticisms rather than
analyzing their validity, but if one begins from the premise that it is the patient's
right to determine what may be done to his body, see text accompanying note 40
supra, it is clear that the court correctly determined that the lay standard better
promotes and protects this right than the professional standard.
The arguments for or against either standard have been too extensively
analyzed to be discussed further in this Comment. For the better commentaries in this
area, see McCoid, supra note 22; Plante, supra note 29; Waltz & Scheuneman, supra
note 1; Informed Consent, supra note 30.
45. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 442, 379 A.2d at 1021; Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110
R.I. 606, 623, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (1972); Infarmed Consent, supra note 30, at 1404; 75
HARV. L. REV. 1445 (1962).
46. See Informed Consent, supra note 30, at 1404.
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Because each patient is different, his emotional and physical condition
necessarily presents a unique array of factors and variables that might
affect the appropriateness of a given treatment, the likelihood and potential
damage of the risks, and the patient's physical and emotional reaction to
each. Any disclosure decision would be unique to that patient and
inapplicable to any other. It is extremely unlikely, therefore, that a specific
standard governing disclosure in that situation would exist within the
medical profession;47 and expert testimony analyzing the physician's
conformity to a professional standard would tend to be a subjective,
individual appraisal of what the witness believes he would do in the same
situation.4 Moreover, even if a professional standard does exist, it is likely
to be so vague that it would provide the medical community with a virtually
absolute discretion to determine the scope of the disclosure.
49
Second, the professional standard is potentially inconsistent with the
patient's right to make the ultimate decision. 5° By vesting the medical
profession with the virtually absolute discretion to decide whether disclosure
is necessary and how much should be disclosed, the professional standard
effectively subordinates the patient's informational needs to the very group
upon whom is placed the obligation to inform.5 1 The objectives of the
47. See Comment, A New Standard for Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice
Cases - The Role of the Expert Witness, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 256, 260 (1973); 75 HARV.
L. REv. 1445 (1962).
48. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 623, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (1972); Informed
Consent, supra note 30, at 1405-06. Although there may be some similarities between
patients, it is doubtful that these similarities are sufficient to overcome the unique
features presented by each individual. Each patient differs in terms of prior medical
history and the degree of seriousness of his physical condition, either of which may
affect the probability of the occurrence of the risk or the seriousness of the resulting
harm. Each patient has a different set of personal preferences and circumstances that
make him unique. Unless the physician improperly bases his disclosure decision
solely on clinical data, such as whether the risk itself poses a serious danger or occurs
frequently, he must take into account the particular circumstances presented by the
individual. Moreover, courts adopting the professional standard evaluate disclosures
with reference to the subjective, rather than objective, patient, see note 77 and
accompanying text infra, which by negative inference suggests that they also assume
that the individual presents a unique package of medical facts. This approach is
buttressed by the professionals' demand for the discretionary latitude to judge the
individual's medical condition, see Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965), and
to withhold disclosure when therapeutically required. See generally Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, clarified in & rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 670 (1960); Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968); Watson v.
Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964); McCoid, supra note 22, at 426-34; Plante,
supra note 29, at 651-56. See also note 35 supra.
49. See note 45 supra.
50. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514
(1972); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 442-43, 379 A.2d at 1021.
51. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972). In a particularly caustic commentary, one author essentially argues that
physicians, believing that only they know what is best for the patient, do not have
any need or desire to communicate information to the patient. According to this
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physician and patient do not necessarily coincide, and it is possible that the
professional standard, if it does exist, would exclude information that would
be relevant to the patient's decision.52 Moreover, if motivated by an improper
concern, such as the desire to protect against future liability or to induce
consent to the treatment believed most desirable by the physician, the
profession may develop a standard expressly designed to counterbalance the
patient's right to know.53 Because "the patient must suffer the consequences,
and since he bears all the expense . . . . fundamental fairness requires
that the patient be allowed to know what risks a proposed therapy entails"
54
without having his right to the information depend on the standard of the
professional community. "To the physician, whose training enables a self-
satisfying evaluation, the answer may seem clear, but it is the prerogative of
the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in
which his interests seem to lie."' 55 By focusing on the informational needs of
the patient, the lay standard insures that information relevant to his
decision will be made available.
Finally, deciding which information is to be disclosed is primarily a
nonmedical decision. The physician's medical expertise is employed to
determine which treatments are medically acceptable in the particular
author, doctors generally desire absolute control over all phases of the treatment,
believe that patients are too ignorant to understand a description of risks and
complex scientific procedures, and therefore believe that the patient should not be
informed about risks or alternative treatments. See Note, Restructuring Informed
Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533,
1533-46 (1970). See generally Riskin, supra note 26, at 595-600. For a commentary
arguing that the patient lacks ability to understand and evaluate such information
and favoring the professional standard, see Karchmer, Informed Consent: A
Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice "Wonder Drug," 31 Mo. L. REV. 29, 41-42 (1966).
Assuming that the medical community acts properly, there may in fact be no
significant difference between the professional and lay standards. Unless disclosure
of a risk would itself present a medical danger, see notes 126 to 138 and
accompanying text infra, it is probable that the customs of the profession would, in
fact, declare that a reasonable practitioner should disclose any information
significant to the patient's decision. The danger is that a self-policing entity may not
act with the proper goals in mind and might even establish a standard providing that
no information should be disclosed.
52. In ordinary malpractice cases the objectives of doctor and patient coincide.
Both want a cure if it can be had. In informed consent situations, however, their
objectives may not coincide. In seeking a cure, a physician will normally choose the
method of treatment that is most likely to accomplish the cure. He will weigh the
importance of a risk against the advantages of the method chosen and may be willing
to accept the risk if the method offers the best prospect of a cure. Although the patient
also desires a cure, he may attach more importance to the risk. It is the patient who
will suffer if a risk materializes and its potential consequences may be more than he is
willing to accept, especially when the success of the treatment cannot be guaranteed.
See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAw OF TORTS 60-61 (Supp. 1968).
53. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 447, 379 A.2d at 1024.
54. Id. at 443, 379 A.2d at 1022.
55. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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situation and to identify the risks associated with each.5 6 Once this
information is identified, however, the physician only has to decide which
information to disclose.57 The only criterion relevant to the doctor's
disclosure decision is whether the information would influence the patient's
decision; and whether information will be influential (and hence material)
depends upon the patient's mental processes and must be assessed from that
perspective. The physician does not have a greater ability to weigh the
significance of the information than does the patient, and his expertise is
not, therefore, necessary to this determination. Moreover, once a disclosure
has been made, the patient is as qualified as the physician to weigh the
potential risks against the benefit to be gained in light of the patient's own
subjective fears, hopes, and preferences.58 Therefore, except in certain
specific situations, 59 the disclosure decision is essentially nonmedical and
should not be based on a professional standard of care.60
Consistent with its recognition that the disclosure decision is essentially
nonmedical, the Sard court held that expert testimony is not required to
establish either the scope or breach of a physician's duty to disclose.6 1
Courts employing the professional standard uniformly require that expert
testimony establish the existence of and departure from a duty to disclose.6 2
56. See id. at 791-92.
57. The physician is free, of course, to urge the patient to follow his recommenda-
tion in spite of the risk.
58. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514
(1972); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 443, 379 A.2d at 1021; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW
OF ToRTs 60-61 (Supp. 1968). The essence of this criticism of the professional
standard is nicely stated by Harper and James:
In ordinary malpractice cases the objectives of doctor and patient may be
assumed to coincide. Both want the best results medical science can produce.
Both want a cure if it can be had .... But no such assumption can safely be
made on an issue of informed consent. The very foundation of the doctrine is
every man's right to forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for him
are intolerable consequences or risks, however warped or perverted his sense
of values may be in the eyes of the medical profession or even of the
community, so long as any distortion falls short of what the law regards as
incompetency. Individual freedom here is guaranteed only if people are given
the right to make choices which would generally be regarded as foolish
ones....
Since the patient's right to make his choice in the light of his own
individual value judgments is the very essence of his freedom of choice, it
should not be left entirely to the medical profession to determine what he
should be told. The judgment to be made is not simply a medical judgment
Id. (emphasis in original).
59. See notes 126 to 138 and accompanying text infra.
60. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 624-25, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (1972).
61. 281 Md. at 446-47, 379 A.2d at 1023-24.
62. See, e.g., Riedesser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 545, 534 P.2d 1052, 1055 (1975);
Casey v. Penn, 45 Ill. App. 3d 573, 584, 360 N.E.2d 93, 101 (1977); Aiken v. Clary, 396
S.W.2d 668, 675 (Mo. 1965); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645,650-51, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787-88
(1976).
[VOL. 38
THE LAY STANDARD OF INFORMED CONSENT
The traditional justification for expert testimony is that the average person
does not possess the knowledge and experience necessary to pass judgment
on questions involving medical science or technique.63 When, however, the
establishment of the existence of or deviation from the appropriate standard
of care does not depend on a specialized knowledge, expert testimony should
not be required.6 4 Further, elimination of this requirement also protects the
plaintiff from a possible conspiracy of silence that could thwart his ability to
secure an expert willing to testify65 and frees the patient from "'an
unwarranted abdication of responsibility and of the individual's right to
make an informed choice, to the medical profession.' "66
The Sard court did not totally dispense with the need for expert
testimony in informed consent cases. Expert testimony will still be
necessary to establish those facts beyond the knowledge of the average
person. An expert will be required to establish the nature and frequency of
the occurrence of risks inherent in a particular treatment, the existence of
accepted alternative treatments, and whether disclosure would have been
detrimental to the patient.67 In addition, the defendant is free to introduce
expert testimony in his defense to establish that his disclosure complies with
accepted medical practice. Although this testimony would not be binding on
the jury, it would be evidence of whether the defendant had in fact failed to
disclose a material risk or was justified in his failure to disclose.68
PRACTICAL APPLICATION
As a case of first impression, Sard articulates the basic framework of the
standards governing the scope of the required disclosure. Thus, trial courts,
physicians, and attorneys will encounter theoretical, definitional, and
practical problems when application to divergent factual situations requires
a filling in of the interstices within this framework. In resolving these
issues, it must be remembered that the fundamental purpose of the doctrine
is to provide significant information necessary for the patient to decide what
63. See W. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 164.
64. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785, 791-92 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
65. Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 443, 379 A.2d at 1022; Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa.
Super. Ct. 260, 267, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (1971).
66. 281 Md. at 447, 379 A.2d at 1024 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF
TORTS 60-61 (Supp. 1968)). The Sard court, however, expressly indicated that its
holding would not change the rule in traditional malpractice cases based on a
negligent performance. 281 Md. at 448 n.5, 379 A.2d at 1024 n.5.
67. 281 Md. at 447-48, 379 A.2d at 1024; Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or. 174, 489
P.2d 953 (1971). In the factual situation before the court in Sard, expert testimony
would be required to establish the existence of the alternative methods of sterilization,
that these methods were accepted as proper treatment by the medical profession, and
the failure rates, inherent risks, and frequency of occurrence of each risk for each
alternative method. 281 Md. at 448, 379 A.2d at 1024.
68. See 281 Md. at 445, 448, 379 A.2d at 1023, 1024.
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shall be done with his body,6 9 and any resolution should promote this
purpose.
The Patient as the Reasonable Person
The Sard standard incorporates an objective standard of whether
disclosure of information would be significant to the "reasonable person in
the patient's position," 70 rather than a subjective standard of whether it
would have been significant to the actual patient. The adoption of an
objective standard has been justified on two grounds. First, negligence law
has traditionally been based on objective standards of conduct.7 1 Second, the
objective standard recognizes that it is the physician who must determine
whether the information that he is aware of is sufficiently significant to
require disclosure. 72 Because each patient possesses unique mental pro-
cesses, desires, and idiosyncracies, the physician cannot realistically be
expected to know exactly what information the patient would subjectively
deem significant. 73 To protect the physician, the adequacy of the disclosure
must be determined from the physician's perspective and not from the
hindsight perspective of the patient.74 Therefore, the physician should be
expected to disclose only information that would be significant to the
reasonable person in the patient's position. 75 Because of his medical training
and the experience gained from treating a wide range of patients, the
physician can reasonably be expected to develop a sense of what would be
significant to the average, reasonable patient.76
The objective standard, however, is inconsistent with the premise that
the individual patient has the right to determine his future course. 77 The
individual, not the reasonable person in the patient's position, must make
69. See id. at 439, 442-44, 379 A.2d at 1019, 1021-22.
70. Id. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022.
71. See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); W. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 149-51.
72. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1, at 639-40.
73. See note 72 supra.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See note 40 and accompanying text supra. See generally Seidelson, Medical
Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in "Full-Disclosure" Jurisdictions, 14 DUQ. L.
REV. 309, 319 (1976); Comment, supra note 26, at 424-26. The lay standard's
incorporation of the objective standard of disclosure is to some extent theoretically
inconsistent. It is ironic that courts adopting the lay standard, which criticize the
professional standard for withholdipg relevant information from the patient and
presume that each patient is unique, see notes 44 to 60 and accompanying text supra,
adopt an objective standard that will likely have the effect of withholding information
relevant to the individual patient. It is especially ironic when it is recognized that the
professional standard, which can be expected to be the most protective of the
physician, bases the disclosure on the subjective patient. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline,
186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, clarified in & rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d
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the actual decision and bear the resulting consequences, and it is self-
evident that information that is in fact significant to a particular individual
could be withheld because it probably would not be significant to the
"reasonable person." Therefore, even though some deference must be paid to
the potential hardships imposed on the physician, the abstraction defined
by the phrase "reasonable person in the patient's position" must incorporate
more than the objective facts of the patient's medical condition. For
example, the patient's occupation, hobbies, religious beliefs, and personal
expectations of the benefits to be derived from the treatment are relevant. A
potential risk of injury or disability to one hand probably would be more
significant to a concert pianist or secretary than to a soccer player or
attorney. Because an understanding of such circumstances is necessary to
670 (1960); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153,
159, 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1964); Seidelson, supra at 321.
The basic reason for using the objective test is that a physician cannot be
expected to know the inner quirks of the patient's mental processes. This does not
mean, however, that the physician cannot be expected to have some familiarity with
the individual patient. He may have treated the patient previously and already know
a great deal about the patient's "personality," and he can make inquiries of the
patient at the time he discloses the information. Further, a requirement that the
physician disclose information significant to the individual patient does not mean
that he must disclose everything that a particular patient would find significant,
regardless of how deviant he may be from the norm. As stated in Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), the physician
would be liable only if the disclosure were unreasonably inadequate. The jury can
judge what the physician knew or reasonably should have known would be
significant to the patient, and if the patient's assessment of the significance of the
risk is such that the physician could not reasonably be expected to anticipate it, then
disclosure would not be required.
In addition, the objective standard is usually applied only to the actor whose
conduct causes the injury. Society expects that each person will act with reasonable
caution to prevent harm to others and will not excuse the actor who claims that he
was unaware of the danger because he was less perceptive or intelligent than the
average member of society. See W. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 149-51. The conduct of
the injured party is not considered unless that conduct in some way contributes to his
own harm. In the disclosure environment, the patient is the passive recipient of the
information. His personal ability to evaluate the disclosed information is not called
into question; in fact, such a consideration would be irrelevant. See note 30 supra. By
focusing on whether the hypothetical reasonable patient would deem the information
significant, however, courts employing the objective standard confuse the issue by in
effect inquiring whether the individual patient's evaluation of the significance of the
information was reasonable. The appropriate inquiry is, instead, whether the
physician's disclosure was reasonable. Because the physician in the first instance
determines whether the information should be disclosed, it is only necessary to
inquire whether the physician reasonably knew or should have known that the
information would be significant to the individual patient. Moreover, even if the
physician failed to disclose information, the patient must still establish that he would
not have consented if he had been informed. See notes 139 to 147 and accompanying
text infra. In this instance, the reasonableness of the patient's conduct should be
called into question, and the causation requirement provides adequate protection to
the physician.
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an effective disclosure, the physician should be expected to make an initial
inquiry to elicit such information.78 In addition, the patient may also
respond to the physician's initial disclosure with -questions or statements
implicitly expressing personal whims or preferences. These revelations may
also indicate that information that the reasonable patient would regard as
unimportant is highly significant to the actual patient. Therefore, the
physician's disclosure decision must also incorporate any information about
the patient's circumstances of which he is actually aware. The Sard court
phrased the standard in terms of what the physician "knows or ought to
know."7 9 It is unclear whether this formulation simply repeats traditional
negligence phraseology or, instead, actually anticipates an incorporation of
the physician's inquiry and consideration of the subjective revelations
suggested above. Nevertheless, the standard could and should be so
interpreted in order to effect the purposes of the informed consent doctrine.
The Materiality of the Risk
Under the lay standard, the jury will, of course, ultimately determine
whether information was sufficiently significant to require disclosure. The
physician, however, is most interested in knowing in advance the criteria to
be used in deciding whether the information is significant. Although the
Sard court did not embellish its definition of materiality by discussing these
78. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1, at 639-40. Although it may be argued
that expecting such an inquiry undermines the traditional reliance on objective
standards of conduct, the inquiry could be limited to those characteristics that form
the background status of the patient. These characteristics would also be the same
factors that any patient would be likely to use to decide whether to consent. The
physician may already be aware of these characteristics, and further, precisely
because he has the opportunity to inquire and knows that they will affect the patient's
decision, it may be unreasonable in itself for the physician not to make such a limited
inquiry.
79. 281 Md. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022. It has been suggested that the physician is
not obligated to disclose information that he believes would be significant to the
individual patient but would not be significant to the reasonable patient. See 8 U.
BALT. L. REv. 114, 118 n.21 (1978). This situation could arise when the physician, due
to the existence of a long-term relationship with the patient, actually knows of a
specific concern of his individual patient that is unreasonable and not held by the
reasonable person. See id. The soundness of this suggestion is open to question. The
purpose of employing the objective standard of "significant to the reasonable person
in the patient's position" is to protect the physician from having to identify and
predict accurately the personal, individualized concerns and whims of the actual
patient. See notes 70 to 76 and accompanying text supra. If the physician actually
knows of a personal concern or quirk of the patient, the purpose behind the use of the
objective standard is no longer present, at least with respect to that specific, known
concern, and there is no further reason to apply the objective standard. Thus,
whenever the physician actually knows of an individual, unreasonable concern of the
actual patient, he should be obligated to disclose information that he knows would be
significant to that patient due to that specific concern.
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criteria, some indication may be gained from commentaries and existing
case law."'
First, it must be recognized that although materiality is most often
discussed in terms of a specific risk, a physician's obligation to disclose is
not limited only to risk information. Second, the materiality standard
defines only the scope of the disclosure rather than the subject matter that
must be disclosed. One commentator has suggested the following formula-
tion of subject matter that must be disclosed: the diagnosis; the nature,
duration, and purpose of the treatment; the method and means by which it is
to be administered; alternative forms of therapy; the risks and hazards
involved in the treatment and each alternative, including temporary and
permanent after and side effects; expected beneficial effects; and the
prognosis if the patient forgoes any treatment. 81 Within each subject area,
the physician must disclose any item of information material to the patient's
decision. 2
The Sard standard is not limited to particular types of treatment. The
disclosure requirement is applicable to therapies ranging from office
treatments for a common cold, prescriptions, 3 and injections, to diagnostic
tests8 4 and complex surgical procedures. The critical factor is the materiality
of the information rather than the type of treatment. The physician must
therefore divide each treatment into its separate phase or phases and
disclose any material information for each phase included in the subject
areas previously enumerated.8 5 A similar process will be required for each
alternative treatment.
Although it imposed a duty to disclose alternative methods of treatment,
the Sard court did not discuss whether the physician must disclose only
80. Citation will hereinafter also be made to cases from jurisdictions that have
adopted the professional standard whenever their discussion is relevant and
illuminating in delineating factors that may indicate that information would or would
not be significant. It must be remembered, however, that because the ultimate
decision of whether the information should be disclosed is actually determined
according to the customs of the profession, any discussion by the courts in these cases
of the reasons that a specific item of information should or should not be disclosed is
technically dicta.
81. See Note, Informed Consent - A Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure,
48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 548, 559 (1973) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 130.37 (1972)).
82. See Note, supra note 81, at 559. Although this catalogue of subjects does not
reveal what particular information must be disclosed, it does provide an organiza-
tional checklist of the general areas that the physician should analyze to be relatively
sure he will discover and disclose all significant information.
83. See Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1976) (failure to advise of
dangerous effects of oral contraceptive); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108
(1967) (professional standard; prescription of chloromycetin). It is possible, however,
that such procedures may be considered common procedures in which the risk
involved is relatively remote and commonly known to have a very low incidence and
that no disclosure would be required. See text accompanying note 114 infra.
84. See Zeleznick v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 A.D.2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d
163 (1975) (angiogram).
85. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
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those alternatives that he would personally employ or whether he must also
disclose any recognized method of treatment. In malpractice actions, a
physician's conduct in diagnosing and selecting a method of treatment is
judged according to the principles of the school of medicine to which he
belongs86 As long as the method of treatment is recognized as appropriate
by that school, he will not be held liable even if another school of medicine
believes that the method selected was improper or that a different method
was more appropriate. Although a physician should not be required to
disclose an alternative method unless there is a respected school of opinion
recognizing that method as medically proper, 7 a physician should not be
able to withhold disclosure of any recognized alternative merely because he
does not agree with the school of medicine recognizing that method. 8  A
patient should have the opportunity to consider any recognized treatment or
to consult with a physician willing to perform the type of treatment that the
patient prefers. A physician may refuse to perform a treatment that he
believes to be unsound, but the information comprising the basis for the
patient's consent should not be restricted by the physician's personal beliefs.
Therefore, the physician should be required to disclose any alternative
method of treatment that is recognized as medically acceptable by some
reputable school of medical opinion.
A possible ambiguity of the Sard standard stems from the fact that, in
determining whether a risk is material, the standard might be interpreted as
focusing narrowly on the materiality of a specific, single risk rather than on
the totality of the hazards presented by the prospective treatment. The
standard defines a "material risk [as] one which a physician knows or ought
to know would be significant to a reasonable person in the patient's position
in deciding whether or not to submit to a particular medical treatment or
procedure."' 9 In determining whether a specific risk should be disclosed, the
standard as it is defined could permit a physician to consider only whether
86. See W. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 163.
87. See generally Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 270 Or. 129, 522 P.2d
208, opinion withdrawn on other grounds, 270 Or. 129, 140, 526 P.2d 577 (1974), noted
in 1974 UTAH L. REv. 851; Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971).
88. See generally Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 270 Or. 129, 522 P.2d
208, opinion withdrawn on other grounds 270 Or. 129, 140, 526 P.2d 577 (1974); Archer
v. Galbraith, 18 Wash. App. 369, 567 P.2d 1155 (1977).
As a contemporary example, if laetrile were recognized today by some
respected school within the profession as an acceptable form of treatment, the
physician would be required at least to inform the patient that the treatment existed.
This result would be consistent with the Sard court's rejection of the professional
standard. Under the professional standard, an expert presumably could not testify
that the physician should have disclosed an alternative treatment if the school to
which the physician belonged did not agree it was medically proper. Further, one
reason why the Sard court rejected the professional standard was that the discretion
to withhold information was inconsistent with the right of the patient to make the
final choice. See 281 Md. at 443, 379 A.2d at 1021. See also Note, The Abortion
Alternative and the Patient's Right to Know, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 167.
89. 281 Md. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022 (emphasis added).
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knowledge of the specific risk itself would be significant. If the standard
does permit an isolated and separate consideration of each identifiable risk
or alternative, it clearly does not fully account for the dynamics of the
patient's decision. Considered in isolation, a single risk might not pose a
substantial danger and would thus be insignificant, and a given treatment
may include several inherent risks each of which may be significant or
insignificant when considered by itself. The sum total of all of the hazards
inherent in a treatment, however, may indicate that a substantial degree of
danger may be involved. The incremental increase in danger posed by a
single risk, though insignificant when considered alone, may become
significant when considered in conjunction with the other risks.90 Thus, in
order that each of these factors may be properly considered, the materiality
standard should be modified as follows: a material risk is one that the
physician, knowing what he knows or should know about the circumstances
and condition of the patient, knows or should know would be significant,
either singly or in combination with other risks, to the reasonable person in
the patient's position to decide whether to submit to a particular procedure.
Unfortunately, with respect to any specific item of information, "there is
no bright line separating the significant from the insignificant ....
Nevertheless, the following factors, considered by both professional and lay
standard courts, offer some initial guidance in determining whether a risk is
material and requires disclosure.9 2 One commonly advanced test balances
90. See generally Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1, at 639-40.
91. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
92. For collections of cases describing risks which do or do not have to be
disclosed, see D. HARNEY, supra note 8, § 2.4; D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 22.05 to .06 (1977). The cases, however, are organized by the type of
risk and the authors do not distinguish between disclosures compelled by the
professional and those compelled by the materiality standard. The following courts
applying the materiality standard have held that the following risks presented jury
issues of materiality: Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.) (one-percent
chance of paralysis from laminectomy), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (five-percent chance of injury
to spleen, requiring its removal, in surgery for duodenal ulcer; additional risk of
gastric ulcer); Zeleznick v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 A.D.2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d
163 (1975) (circulation loss from angiogram resulting in amputation of two fingers
and debilitated and deformed hand); Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 270 Or.
129, 522 P.2d 208 (excessive radiation), opinion withdrawn on other grounds, 270 Or.
129, 140, 526 P.2d 577 (1974); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972)
(excessive radiation); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d 703
(1975) (hepatitis from anesthesia); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852
(1974) (loss of kidney from kidney biopsy), aff'd per curiam, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d
334 (1975); Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162 (1971) (50% chance of
increasing dark skin pigmentation from dermabrasion), aff'd, 81 Wash. 2d 465, 502
P.2d 1194 (1972); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d
647 (1975) (risk of paralysis from aortogram). Compare Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa.
Super. Ct. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971) (1/250 chance of stomach perforation during
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the seriousness of the risk against the frequency of its occurrence. 93 Thus, a
low probability of death or serious disablement or a high probability of
minor harm might be material.94 Similarly a very high probability of a very
minor risk 95 or an extremely low probability of a very serious risk might be
immaterial. 96 In general, the most important factor should probably be the
seriousness of the risk.97 For example, unless the probability of its
occurrence is extremely remote, any risk involving death, the loss of an
organ or limb, or serious disablement should per se require disclosure. The
nature of these risks is so severe that the patient, not the physician, should
gastroscopic examination is material) with Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn.
App. 1974) (one-percent chance of perforation of ureter during hysterectomy is
immaterial).
93. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); cf. Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or. 174, 180, 489 P.2d 953, 956 (1971)
(disclosure required for results that might well occur and not those that are extremely
remote; risks that are of serious consequence but not those that are unexpected and of
little consequence).
94. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F,2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 625, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972). Compare
Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1963) (professional standard; disclosure
required for three-percent chance of death, paralysis, or other serious injury) and Scott
v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (disclosure required for one-percent
chance of loss of hearing), aff'd, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967) with Ross v. Hodge, 234
So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1970) (professional standard; paralysis but no disclosure required on
theory that all reasonable people must understand surgery involves some risk) and
Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964), on rehearing, 194 Kan. 675, 401
P.2d 659 (1965) (professional standard; 1.5% chance of loss of eye does not require
disclosure). See generally Beloud, The Growing 'Importance of Informed Consent, 8
LINCOLN L. REV. 115, 118 (1973).
95. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.) (disclosure of risk of
infection not required), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich.
133, 119 N.W.2d 677 (1963) (disclosure of risk of infection not required).
The courts are divided when the risk involved is a moderately serious injury
which is reparable by a second operation. Compare Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502
P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (risk in operation for duodenal ulcer possibly causing
injury to spleen and development of gastric ulcer is material) and Cooper v. Roberts,
220 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971) (1/250 risk of perforation of stomach is
material) with Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968) (professional
standard; no disclosure for 1/250 to 1/500 chance of perforation of esophagus) and
Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. App. 1974) (no disclosure of one-percent
chance of perforation of ureter).
96. Cf. Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C.), new trial denied, 215 F.
Supp. 266 (1963) (no duty of drug company to warn of 1 in 800,000 chance of aplastic
anemia from drug when drug available only by prescription).
97. See Longmire v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tenn. App. 1974). Some courts
employing the professional standard have indicated that they might require
disclosure as a matter of law and without expert testimony to establish a duty to
disclose when the risk is extremely serious or the treatment is novel or extremely
hazardous. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, clarified in &
rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 155
S.E.2d 108 (1967).
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decide whether the potential disability outweighs the potential benefit to be
gained, and disclosure is a prerequisite to this decision.
The seriousness of the condition for which the patient is seeking
treatment may be an additional factor to be considered. If the condition is
relatively minor or may be left untreated without serious medical consequen-
ces, even relatively minor risks may be material.98 Because the relative
benefit to be gained may not outweigh the risk, the patient would want to
consider the risk before undergoing the treatment. Conversely, however, the
fact that some treatment is medically necessary to save the patient's life
should not be permitted to lessen the disclosure requirements. The nature of
the risk may be such that the patient would rather face certain death than
endure the balance of his life with a seriously disabling injury; or he may
prefer to choose an alternative that offers a decreased possibility of success
but also offers a diminished possibility of risk.99 Another factor is the
availability of alternative methods. °° If only one acceptable method exists
to provide a cure, relatively minor or moderate risks may not be material. It
would be unlikely that a patient with a serious or moderately serious
condition would find such a risk significant when only one method of
treatment is available. If the condition to be cured is relatively minor,
however, these risks may nevertheless be material. Because the benefit to be
gained by a cure is small, less significant risks would increase in
significance.101 When other methods are available, however, an otherwise
immaterial risk may be material, whether the condition is serious or minor
and especially if the alternative does not include that particular risk.
Alternative methods may offer a different package of risks and consequen-
ces necessitating a more detailed disclosure to permit the patient to evaluate
the various types and combinations of risks.
Although these factors should be considered, any decision to disclose
must also recognize that it is the patient who ultimately weighs the risks
against the benefits. A close decision should therefore be resolved in favor of
98. For cases possibly providing examples of this proposition, see Zeleznick v.
Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 A.D.2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1975) (risk of
circulation loss causing amputation of two fingers, deformed and debilitated right
hand as a result of diagnostic test to find reason for neurological deficit on left side of
body; plaintiff testified that condition was not serious enough for him to have taken
risk); Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162 (1971) (risk of increasing
spotted skin condition from dermabrasion treatment), aff'd, 81 Wash. 2d 465, 502 P.2d
1194 (1972). Significantly, the professional standard fails to recognize that the risks
may outweigh any expected benefit to be gained from essentially elective surgery. For
a case providing a possible example of this proposition, see Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C.
App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975) (risk of infection in plastic surgery resulting in similar
condition for which cure originally sought).
99. See Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 270 Or. 129, 522 P.2d 208,
opinion withdrawn on other grounds, 270 Or. 129, 140, 526 P.2d 577 (1974); ZeBarth v.
Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 31, 499 P.2d 1, 12 (1972), noted in 48
WASH. L. REv. 697 (1973).
100. See generally note 99 supra.
101. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
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disclosure. Such a resolution will best promote and protect the patient's right
of self-determination. This principle is implicit in Sard's ruling that a two-
percent risk of failure was sufficient to permit the jury to determine whether
it would be material to a patient desiring to prevent future pregnancies due
to her financial condition and the possibility of damage to her health. 10 2
Similarly, the failure to advise Mrs. Sard that the sterilization could be
performed at a time other than during the Caesarean delivery, and with a
decreased chance of failure, was sufficient to permit the jury to decide
whether the physician withheld material information about alternative
treatments.103
Limitations on Disclosure
Proponents of the professional standard contend that whether informa-
tion should be disclosed is a matter of professional judgment and a
physician must be permitted the discretion to withhold disclosure when he
determines that it would be in the best medical interests of the patient. 104
They argue that the physician must consider the state of the patient's
physical and mental health and whether the inherent risks materialize
frequently or infrequently. 10 5 The principal contention is that a physician's
primary duty is to do what is best for the patient and that this must
outweigh the duty to disclose. 06 Therefore, according to the proponents of
102. 281 Md. at 445-46, 379 A.2d at 1023. Interestingly, in discussing the warranty
claim, the court noted that Dr. Hardy's affirmative assurance that Mrs. Sard would
not have more children, although not rising above the level of a therapeutic
assurance, was relevant to the informed consent claim. See id. at 453-54, 379 A.2d at
1027. Apparently, the court meant that this assurance, combined with the failure to
disclose that the operation might not be successful, falsely exaggerated the
probability of success and may have induced her consent. This suggests the
possibility that physicians might employ therapeutic assurances to mitigate the
potential apprehension that patients may develop as a result of the disclosure that the
physician is now obligated to make. Therefore, the next issue that may arise in
informed consent cases is whether, although the physician disclosed the risk, his tone
of voice or use of therapeutic reassurances misled the patient by implying that the
risk was really minimal or insignificant.
103. Id. at 446, 379 A.2d at 1023.
104. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103, clarified in
& rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386,
393, 158 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1968). See generally Lund, The Doctor, The Patient, and the
Truth, 19 TENN. L. REV. 344 (1946); Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical
Treatment, 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 249, 251 (1962) (disclosure may discourage patient
from consenting to needed treatment that has minimal risk). See also Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957), quoted in
note 35 supra.
105. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685, 140 N.W.2d 139 (1966); Aiken v.
Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965).
106. See Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 393, 158 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1968); Watson v.
Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 159, 136 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1964); 109 U. PA. L. REv. 768, 772-73
(1961). The Watson court rather glibly placed the burden on the patient to inform
herself when it noted that the patient could have withdrawn her consent and then
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the professional standard, the physician must have the flexibility to
withhold disclosure of risks, without the fear of a lawsuit, whenever the
disclosure would increase the patient's fear and apprehension and thereby
decrease the probability of a successful treatment, as well as when the
disclosure would itself cause psychological and physical harm. ° 7 It is also
argued that the lay standard may demand too much of the physician's time
and may lead to a proliferation of malpractice actions, possibly inducing the
physician to practice defensive medicine.'10
made a simple request to the surgeon to disclose the possible adverse consequences.
The physician informed her only that the thyroidectomy was serious and not done
without risk, but did not inform her that one of the risks was partial or total paralysis
of the vocal chords. 262 N.C. at 159, 136 S.E.2d at 621.
107. See, e.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965); Butler v. Berkeley, 25
N.C. App. 325, 342-43, 213 S.E.2d 571, 581-82 (1975). As stated in Roberts v. Wood,
206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962),
[d]octors frequently tailor the extent of their pre-operative warnings to the
particular patient, and with this I can find no fault. Not only is much of the
risk of a technical nature beyond the patient's understanding, but the anxiety,
apprehension, and fear generated by a full disclosure thereof may have a very
detrimental effect on some patients.
See also Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 338, 213 S.E.2d 571, 579 (1975)
(physician stated that he couldn't explain everything because he would never get
work done); Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 902, 484 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1971)
(physician stated that the patient would walk right out of the office if told there was
any danger), aff'd, 81 Wash. 2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1972).
108. See Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 342-43, 213 S.E.2d 571, 581-82
(1975); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 650, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1976). See also Karchmer,
supra note 51, at 41-42. For a definition of defensive medicine, see ZeBarth v. Swedish
Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972) (physician interested in
protecting himself from an overburden of law suits and attendant costs on time and
purse might follow the most conservative therapy - which while of doubtful benefit
to the patient, exposes the patient to no affirmative medical hazards and the doctor to
no risk of litigation); Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive
Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939.
Although it is uncertain that the lay standard will result in a greater number
of malpractice claims, or recoveries thereon, than a professional standard of
disclosure, even an unfounded perception by physicians that this might occur could
result in the practice of defensive medicine. Nevertheless, physicians should not
necessarily believe that malpractice claims would increase. Most suits raising
informed consent claims, even in jurisdictions employing a professional standard of
disclosure, also allege, as in Sard, see note 4 supra, that the injury was caused by a
negligently performed treatment. See, e.g., Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119
N.W.2d 627 (1963); Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968). This may
suggest that a suit of some type will be brought whenever the patient believes that the
injury is attributable to some wrong committed by the physician and that an
informed consent claim will only be an alternative cause of action. Thus, whether an
informed consent claim is brought at all may not be related to the standard of
disclosure. Although the lay standard may offer a greater potential for a successful
recovery than the professional standard, it can do so only when the lay standard
requires a different disclosure than the professional standard. Whether instances of
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Implicitly responding to these claims, the Sard court, in dicta, amplified
its definition of the scope of disclosure by stating several important
qualifications and limitations. The court reemphasized that not all risks
were to be divulged - only those that are material to the intelligent decision
of a reasonably prudent patient 0 9 - and then enuniciated several specific
limitations on the disclosure requirement. First, the physician does not have
to disclose material information when the patient has specifically requested
that he not be informed. 110 Second, a polysyllabic, mini-course in medical
science is not required."' A highly technical description of the procedure
rivalling a classroom lecture in medical science is unnecessary to inform the
decision. All that is required is a lay description of the possible treatments,
the benefits and consequences of each, the potential risks of death or bodily
harm, the frequency of occurrence, and the expected effect should a risk
materialize. Third, a physician is not liable for failing to disclose a risk of
which he is unaware and should not have been aware.11 2
The Sard court did not expressly describe the procedural effect to be
given any of the limitations it listed. It is traditional law that the plaintiff
different disclosure requirements will actually be sufficiently numerous to produce a
significant increase cannot be determined.
Physicians should also recognize that the potentially broader disclosure
mandated by the lay standard might lead to a reduction in malpractice suits. Some
commentators have suggested that informed consent suits may be brought partially
in anger, to retaliate for the surprise occurrence of an undisclosed and unanticipated
collateral result. See, e.g., McCoid, supra note 22, at 426-27; Informed Consent, supra
note 30, at 1418. A case in which the physician explained that there was a "certain per
cent" of risk that a diagnostic angiogram would worsen the numbness the patient felt
on his left side may be illustrative. The patient alleged that no disclosure of any other
risk of injury was made. Although competently performed, the patient suffered a
serious debilitation and amputation of two fingers of his right hand after twenty-three
subsequent operations failed to correct the circulatory loss induced by the angiogram.
The condition originally being treated healed without further treatment. Zeleznick v.
Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 A.D.2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1975). Because the
lay standard forces the physician to make some initial disclosure and should promote
a fuller disclosure of risk information, the trust and confidence of the patient in the
physician may be strengthened. The patient will anticipate the result if it occurs and
should understand that the result is not attributable to the physician's conduct. An
increased dialogue, therefore, may decrease the likelihood of suits.
109. 281 Md. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022.
110. Id. at 445, 379 A.2d at 1022.
111. Id. (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
515 (1972)). Most commentators, even those agreeing with the professional standard,
believe that sufficient information may be disclosed by speaking plainly and simply
in a layman's language. See Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093,
1106, clarified in rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); McCoid, supra
note 22, at 426-27; Plante, supra note 29, at 651.
112. 281 Md. at 445, 379 A.2d at 1022-23; see Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571,
550 P.2d 1158 (1976); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973). In
such a situation, the issue is whether the physician negligently failed to exercise the
standard of care of his profession to know of the risk. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra
note 1, at 631. See generally Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1976).
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has the burden of going forward with evidence tending to establish the
essential elements of his cause of action as well as the ultimate burden of
proof and persuasion. 1 3 Each of the above limitations in effect classifies a
specific type of information as immaterial, and establishing the materiality
of the information is an essential element of the patient's case. Therefore, it
appears that the plaintiff should have the burden of proving that the alleged
undisclosed risk does not fall within these limitations.
Fourth, the Sard court also declared that disclosure is not required when
the risk is either known to the patient or is so obvious as to justify a
presumption of such knowledge, and fifth, the physician is not obligated to
disclose relatively remote risks inherent in common procedures when it is
common knowledge that those risks have a very low incidence. 1 4 Because
the significance of the information is assessed in reference to a reasonable
person," 5 the individual patient is, in effect, charged with the knowledge
and awareness possessed by the average member of the community. Thus,
the physician should not have to disclose information that is generally
known within the community or obvious to a person of average intelligence.
Similarly, there are many procedures - for example, treatment for a
common cold - that are commonly encountered by the average member of
the community. Risks of very low incidence may be inherent in these
procedures, but because these infrequent risks are encountered often by the
average member of the community, the average person would know that the
risk occurs infrequently. Therefore, there is little reason to place a
potentially onerous burden on the physician to disclose these risks every
time he undertakes such a common procedure. These two limitations affect
the causation element of the patient's case. If the average patient knew or
should have known of the risk, he surely cannot allege that the physician's
nondisclosure induced him to consent or that he would not have consented if
he had been informed. Thus, as stated above, because each limitation affects
an element of the patient's cause of action, the patient should have the
113. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2485 (3d ed. 1940).
114. 281 Md. at 445, 379 A.2d at 1022; see Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627, 295
A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
115. See note 43 and accompanying text supra. For a more complete discussion of.
the reasons that the "reasonable person" standard is used, see notes 70 to 79 and
accompanying text supra.
These two limitations may have also indirectly imported contributory
negligence concepts into the informed consent doctrine. Without expressly inquiring
whether the patient contributed to his own injury by failing to be aware of a risk
commonly known by the average member of the community, or by choosing to
undergo a treatment that included a risk of which he should have been aware, the
limitations, by removing any obligation to disclose risks that should be known to the
average person, in effect make the patient's conduct an issue. Once the jury finds that
a risk is one that should be known by the average member of the community, it has
effectively found that the patient's conduct failed to conform to the standard required
for his own protection.
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burden to prove that the undisclosed risk does not fall within either of these
limitations.11
6
The general purpose of the fourth and fifth limitations is to permit the
physician to assume, rather than be forced to guess, that the actual patient
in fact possesses the awareness of the average member of the community.
Although laudable in purpose, adoption of these limitations poses the
danger that courts may too readily make an agnostic assumption that a
particular risk is so obvious or commonly known that disclosure is not
required as a matter of law. 117 Under similarly formulated limitations, some
courts have declared that the risk of infection,"" an allergic reaction to
antibiotics,' 9 and risks inherent in taking a blood sample' 2° do not require
116. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Informed Consent, supra note 30, at 1407 n.69. But see Hunter v. Brown, 4
Wash. App. 899, 905, 484 P.2d 1162, 1166-67 (1971), affl'd, 81 Wash. 2d 465, 502 P.2d
1194 (1972).
Alternatively, it could be argued that because the disclosure decision rests in
the first instance with the physician, it is he who will act on the belief that the risk is
commonly known to the average person. Therefore, the physician withholding
disclosure should have the burden of proof that the risk was in fact generally known.
The problem with this argument is that, because the limitation affects elements of the
plaintiffs case, see note 113 and accompanying text supra, it would reverse the
traditional burdens of proof placed on litigants. Moreover, if it is accepted that the
burden should be placed on the physician merely because he must make the disclosure
decision, then the same reasoning would indicate that the patient would only have to
prove that the risk was not disclosed, and the physician would have the burden of
proving that the risk was immaterial.
117. For cases that may provide examples of courts too readily assuming that the
patient should have been aware of the risk, see Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358,
409 P.2d 74 (1965), modified on other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966)
(professional standard; five-percent risk of hemorrhaging in operation to remove
cataract resulting in reduced vision in one eye; all reasonable people must understand
that there is some risk inherent in surgery); Ross v. Hodge, 234 So. 2d 905, 909 (Miss.
1970) (professional standard; paralysis from removal of scalp tumor; all people must
understand there is some risk in surgery); Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213
S.E.2d 571 (1975) (professional standard; infection resulting in death of bones forming
eye socket; risk of infection is known to any person of ordinary sophistication). In
Butler, the court relied on the fact that the plaintiff had attended college and that his
father was an attorney in determining that the plaintiff should have been aware of
the risk of infection. Id. at 342, 213 S.E.2d at 582. The error of these decisions is that
even if the patient had known that there was some risk involved in any surgery, he
would not necessarily have known the particular risk or its particular consequences,
and therefore could not intelligently decide whether to consent. These cases implicitly
suggest that the patient has the burden of uncovering the information he considers
necessary. Such a result was in fact suggested in Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 160,
136 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1964).
118. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Informed Consent, supra note 30, at 1407 n.69. See also Roberts v.
Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963).
119. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515
(1972). The Cobbs court stated that the physician must only make inquiries sufficient
to determine whether the treatment is contraindicated by prior allergic reactions. Id.
120. Id. at 245 n.2, 502 P.2d at 11 n.2, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515 n.2. For examples of
other risks within this limitation, see Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 18 (Mo.
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disclosure. Although most people may be, or should be, aware of the risks of
infection and allergic reaction to antibiotics, it is doubtful that they are
aware of other complications that may result from such risks. It is even
more doubtful that the average person would know that the risks inherent in
taking a blood sample include hematoma, dermatitis, septicimea, endocardi-
tis, thrombophlebitis, pulmonary embolism, and death. 121 Unless a court is
willing to declare that such risks, even if otherwise material, do not require
disclosure as a matter of law, a very narrow scope must be given to the
limitation if the purpose of the doctrine is to be accomplished. Two
qualifications are necessary. First, no risk that is otherwise material should
be excluded from disclosure by these limitations. Although undercutting the
rationale of the limitations to some degree, this suggested qualification
would guard against any tendency to assume that the averageknowledge of
the community is greater than it actually is. Information that would
normally be considered significant should be disclosed as a matter of course,
even if it is believed that the average patient is already aware of it.
Qualifying the limitations in this manner, however, would not endanger the
physician who failed to disclose. He would still be protected by the causation
requirement - the patient would still have to prove that the reasonable
person would not have consented if the information had been disclosed,
which would be difficult if the information was in fact known to the average
member of the community.122 Moreover, this qualification further protects
against the inconsistency between the objective standard and the fact that it
is the individual patient who must actually decide whether to undergo a
proposed treatment. 2 3 Second, the exemption provided by the limitations
should be restricted to the specific risk believed to be commonly known.
Disclosure should still be required if materialization of the risk could have
an additional adverse consequence that would be material. 124 Even if the
patient knew of the initial risk, he may not have known or be expected to
1960) (hazards attendant to simple operations such as danger of tetanus, infection, or
death under anesthesia), overruled on other grounds, Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668,
675 & n.6 (Mo. 1965); Platta v. Flatley, 68 Wis. 2d 47, 227 N.W.2d 898 (1975) (average
patient should be aware of risks that he might need painkillers after foot surgery and
be unable to continue in occupation requiring walking); Note, supra note 81, at 551
(risk of death after heart transplant). But see note 83 and accompanying text supra.
121. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245 n.2, 502 P.2d 1, 11 n.2, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505, 515 n.2 (1972).
122. See text accompanying notes 115 & 116 supra.
123. For a more detailed discussion of this inconsistency, see note 77 and
accompanying text supra.
124. For example, most people aware of the risk of infection might reasonably
assume any harm would be limited to inflamation, fever, and some moderate
discomfort. Although nondisclosure of these minor results would be reasonable, the
physician should not also be permitted to withhold disclosure of the fact that an
infection can also cause other serious injuries. See, e.g., Butler v. Berkely, 25 N.C.
App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975) (infection caused the death of bones forming the eye
socket resulting in a pulling down of the eyelid). See also text accompanying note 90
supra.
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have known of the additional risks. This qualification would protect against
the possibility that the physician would not disclose additional risks simply
because they are caused by a risk that he assumes the patient should have
known. That these limitations should be narrowly applied is suggested by
the Sard opinion. The average person should be aware that there is an
inherent risk of failure in any treatment. The Sard court held in part,
however, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the
projected possibility of failure in a tubal-ligation was a material risk that
should have been disclosed. 125 The court did not consider whether Mrs. Sard
or the average member of the community should have been aware of the risk
of failure. Future decisions will determine whether this limitation will
continue to be so narrowly construed.
Sixth, Sard also recognized a qualified privilege to withhold, on
therapeutic grounds, information that would normally be material. 12 6 The
physician may withhold disclosure in an emergency situation when it is
impractical to obtain the patient's consent or when the patient is incapable
of giving his consent by reason of mental disability or infancy. 127 He may
also withhold disclosure of alternatives and consequences that might have a
detrimental effect on the physical or psychological well-being of the
patient. 28
Although the court did not specify the procedural effect to be given to
these three limitations, the purpose of the doctrine, as well as theoretical
consistency, indicate that these therapeutic limitations should be affirma-
tive defenses for the physician. The purpose of the informed consent doctrine
is to secure for the patient any information relevant to his decision. By
establishing that the undisclosed information was material, the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie breach by the physician of his duty to disclose.
Such a breach effectively denies the patient information to which he has a
prima facie right, and the physician should therefore have the burden of
proving that his withholding was justified on these therapeutic privilege
grounds. 129 Placing the burden of proof on the physician would also tend to
125. 281 Md. at 445-46, 379 A.2d at 1023.
126. See id. at 444-45, 379 A.2d at 1022.
127. Id. at 445, 379 A.2d at 1022; see, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
788-89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940,
947 (3d Cir. 1970); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261,104 N.W. 12 (1905); Small v. Gifford
Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 557, 349 A.2d 703, 706 (1975); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 227 N.W.2d 647, 653 (1975). See generally D. HARNEY,
supra note 8, § 2.1(A)-(B); Annots., 25 A.L.R.3d 1439 (1969); 56 A.L.R.2d 695, 699 (1957);
139 A.L.R. 1370 (1942); 76 A.L.R. 562 (1932); 53 A.L.R. 1056 (1928); 26 A.L.R. 1036
(1923).
128. 281 Md. at 444-45, 379 A.2d at 1022. See generally Shartsis, Informed
Consent: Some Problems Revisited, 51 NEB. L. REV. 527 (1972).
129. Compare Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
516 (1972) and Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1, at 643 and Informed Consent,
supra note 30, at 1410-14 (burden of proof on defendant) with Canterbury v. Spence,
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promote greater respect for the disclosure requirement. 130 Recognizing that
he will have the burden of proof, the physician will be likely to give greater
consideration to the reasons supporting his decision to withhold than if the
plaintiff has the burden. Moreover, the factors relevant to the physician's
decision are beyond the patient's knowledge and control. Whether an
emergency or incapacity exists, or whether disclosure would be likely to
cause a detrimental physical or psychological reaction are essentially
medical decisions that must be based on the physician's special training and
expertise. The physician should have the burden of establishing the medical
correctness of his therapeutic decision.' 3'
Although most courts recognize a privilege to withhold information that
would cause harm to the patient, there is a significant divergence with
respect to its scope. Some courts limit the privilege to those situations in
which disclosure will unduly upset an unstable patient. 3 2 The more common
position permits nondisclosure when disclosure would so increase the
patient's fear and apprehension that it would complicate or hinder the
proposed treatment. 3 3 Some courts even permit withholding the disclosure
of information likely to frighten the patient to the extent that he would be
likely to forgo the treatment. 34 The standard announced in Sard3 5 is
sufficiently ambiguous to embrace all of these viewpoints. A very restricted
privilege would be more consistent with the tenor of the Sard opinion and
would best promote the purposes of the informed consent doctrine. Initially,
a broad privilege would permit a physician so much discretion that it could
swallow the duty to disclose. The physician could claim the privilege and
withhold disclosure merely to induce the patient's consent to the treatment
the physician prefers. 36 This is inconsistent with the right of the patient to
464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) and Small v. Gifford
Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d 703 (1975) (burden on defendant only to come
forward with evidence).
130. See Informed Consent, supra note 30, at 1410.
131. See generally id. at 1410-14.
132. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516
(1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
133. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103, clarified in &
rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668,
674 (Mo. 1965); note 107 supra.
134. See ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 25-26, 499 P.2d
1, 9-10 (1972); note 104 supra. See generally D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note
92, 22.02. See also Neglected Aspects of Informed Consent, 296 NEw ENGLAND J.
MED. 1127 (1977) (letter to the editor) (claiming one death by myocardial infarction
after disclosure but before treatment, and one patient suffering a paroxysmal atrial
tachycardia 12 hours after disclosure but before treatment; neither patient had prior
history of cardiac disease).
135. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
136. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1, at 642-43. Compare Oppenheim,
supra note 104, at 25 with Note, supra note 51,. at 1564-69 (strongly criticizing
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determine for himself whether it is in his best interests to submit to a
proposed treatment - the right to choose is (necessarily) the right to choose
correctly or incorrectly. 137 Furthermore, there is an obvious inconsistency in
permitting a physician to withhold information, which might so increase the
patient's apprehension that the success of the treatment would be
endangered, when disclosure of the information might have caused the
patient to reject the treatment. Full disclosure may, in fact, decrease the
patient's anxiety by lessening his fear of the unknown and creating a sense
of confidence in the physician. Therefore, the scope of the therapeutic
privilege should be confined so as to permit the witholding of significant
information only when a reasonable medical certainty exists that the
patient would be so psychologically distraught that he would be incapable of
rationally assessing and evaluating the information, 138 or when it would be
physicians for the attitude that they know what is best and should be able to manage
the therapy without hindrance).
137. See Informed Consent, supra note 30, at 1407. It is doubtful that many
patients would in fact refuse treatment that would be in their best interests. See Waltz
& Scheuneman, supra note 1, at 641-42; Note, supra note 81, at 562. See also Alfidi,
Informed Consent - A Study of Patient Reaction, 216 J.A.M.A. 1325 (1971) (study
concluding patients react rationally to disclosure and are not deterred from
treatment).
138. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516
(1972); 75 HARv. L. REV. 1445, 1448 (1962). See generally D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
supra note 92, 22.02.
An additional problem, unaddressed by the Sard court, is how the physician
establishes his claim that he withheld disclosure of information because he believed to
a reasonable medical certainty that disclosure would be too physically or psychologi-
cally detrimental to the patient. The physician's decision to withhold disclosure on the
therapeutic grounds would be a medical decision, suggesting that the claim of the
therapeutic privilege should be established by proof that the physician acted in accord
with a professional custom or standard of care. Expert testimony would be introduced
to establish under what circumstances, or due to what factors, the custom of the
profession permitted or obligated the physician to withhold disclosure and whether
the defendant-physician acted in conformity with the custom of the profession under
the circumstances. This approach, however, presents dangers similar to those pre-
sented by the professional standard of disclosure. See notes 44 to 60 and
accompanying text supra. Once expert testimony that the physician conformed to the
professional standard of care was introduced, his claim of the privilege would have to
be upheld, thereby justifying his failure to disclose unless there was a substantial
conflict between the experts. The problem would be magnified if the professional
standard permitted a wide degree of individual discretion in evaluating whether the
patient's physical and mental condition required withholding disclosure. Irrespective,
therefore, of the scope of the privilege, the effect of permitting the claim to be
established by professional custom would again be to vest the profession with the
virtually absolute and unchecked discretion to claim the privilege and withhold
disclosure.
Alternatively, the privilege claim could be resolved by a factual determination
by the jury, after evaluating expert testimony describing the patient's physical and
mental condition and the probable effect of the disclosure on the patient. This
testimony, however, would not be conclusive. Rather, the jury would decide whether,
on the basis of the data available to the physician in the particular case, the
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likely to cause a physical reaction so severe that the treatment would be
impossible to perform even if the patient did consent. A disclosure intended
to promote and enhance the patient's choice fails to serve that purpose when
the patient becomes psychologically incapable of making a choice.
Similarly, no benefit is gained from a disclosure that makes impossible the
performance of a treatment that the patient would have willingly accepted.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
To complete the traditional negligence cause of action, the Sard court
defined the test to be used to establish the causal relationship between the
failure to disclose and the resulting harm. The proximate cause rule prevents
the plaintiff from recovering unless he can establish that he would not have
given his consent had a full and adequate disclosure been made: "The
patient obviously has no complaint if he would have submitted to the
therapy notwithstanding awareness that the risk was one of its perils."'1 39
Although this requirement suggests that the critical inquiry is what the
actual patient would have done, consistent with its earlier adoption of a
reasonableness standard of disclosure, the court adopted an objective test of
proximate cause, requiring that the patient establish that a reasonable
person in the patient's position would have withheld consent to the surgery
or therapy had all the material risks been disclosed. 140
Originally, most courts employed a subjective test of causation in which
the plaintiff had to establish that he would not have consented if an
adequate disclosure had been made. 4 1 The courts differed, however, on the
manner in which causation was to be established. Some courts required the
physician's claim of the privilege was reasonable and justified. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8
Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972) (whether physician relied
on facts that would demonstrate to a reasonable man that disclosure would have
seriously upset the patient); Note, supra note 51, at 1567. In effect, the jury would
judge the physician by the standard of the reasonable person who practices medicine.
Id. at 1567 n.101. Although this alternative would have a lay jury judge the
appropriateness of the physician's exercise of his medical judgment, it would prevent
the possibility that the therapeutic privilege would be used to swallow up the
disclosure obligation through the mere claim of the privilege. And in practice, unless
there was an inference that the physician had withheld disclosure on therapeutic
grounds in bad faith, or that the claim of the privilege was an after-the-fact
rationalization or trial defense, it is likely that expert testimony that the claim of
privilege in the specific instance was warranted and reasonable would be viewed as
extremely persuasive by the jury. Nevertheless, it is clear that both positions pose
intractable problems and demonstrate the difficulty of translating the doctrine into
practical application.
139. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
140. 281 Md. at 450, 379 A.2d at 1025. See also text accompanying notes 70 to 77
supra. The court should have added that the plaintiff must also establish by expert
testimony that the undisclosed risk in fact occurred and was the medical cause of his
injury.
141. See, e.g., Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965); modified on
other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966); Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186,
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plaintiff to plead and testify that he would not have consented if he had
been informed of the risk,142 while others were willing to infer liberally from
the evidence that the plaintiff would not have consented. 143
The Sard court concluded that two criticisms of the subjective standard
required adoption of an objective standard of causation. First, the subjective
standard essentially rests on the patient's speculative response to the
hypothetical question of what he would have done if the risk had been
disclosed, 4 4 making the credibility of the patient's testimony, which would
naturally be influenced by the occurrence of an unfortunate result, the
determinative factor. 45 Second, the physician would be jeopardized by the
patient's hindsight and bitterness. 46 Under the objective test, the plaintiffs
testimony about what he would have done is relevant but not determina-
tive.147
The arguments advanced by the court are not necessarily persuasive.
First, whether an objective or subjective test is used, the very nature of the
cause of action requires the patient to plead and testify that he would not
have consented, for he would defeat his own suit as soon as he testified that
he would have consented in spite of the nondisclosure. Second, a traditional
function of any jury is to resolve the witness' credibility, and potentially self-
serving testimony is an inherent risk whenever an interested party testifies.
A cautionary instruction could be employed to warn the jury that the
credibility of the testimony must be carefully scrutinized. There does not
appear to be any reason suggesting that a jury is less capable of
354 P.2d 670, denying rehearing and clarifying 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); D.
HARNEY, supra note 8, § 2.4(D); D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 92, 22.04.
142. See Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d74 (1965); modified on other
grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966); Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d 609, 616
(Iowa 1973); Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 393-94, 158 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1968).
143. See Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670, denying rehearing and
clarifying 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo.
1965); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967). But see Watson v. Clutts,
262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964) (rejecting plaintiff's testimony that she would not
have consented as speculative hindsight in case of paralysis of vocal chords and
reasoning that all surgery involves risk). The increasing trend appears to be an
adoption of the objective standard of causation. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. at 450,
379 A.2d at 1025 (citing cases).
144. See 281 Md. at 449, 379 A.2d at 1024-25.
145. Id.; see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972). Actually, the patient's testimony would be known as soon as the
suit is brought. He must say that he would not have consented or he will not have a
cause of action.
146. 281 Md. at 449, 379 A.2d at 1025; see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
790-91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Zeleznick v. Jewish Chronic
Disease Hosp., 47 A.D.2d 199, 207, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163, 171 (1975).
147. 281 Md. at 450, 379 A.2d at 1025. For a criticism of the use of a causation test
in informed consent cases, see Riskin, supra note 26; Comment, supra note 26.
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determining the truth in informed consent actions than in any other suit. 148
Furthermore, under the objective test the jury is asked to determine whether
the reasonable person would not have consented - the same sort of
speculative, hindsight guess that the subjective test requires of the plaintiff.
The more persuasive reason for adopting the objective test is simply that
the appropriateness of an individual's conduct is judged by the standard of
conduct of the reasonable man.149 Regardless of what each individual would
or would not do in a given situation, each person is expected to act in
conformity with the behavior of the reasonably prudent person. This
traditional foundation of negligence law is equally applicable to a claim
based on the informed consent doctrine. 1 ° Although the objective standard
may not totally remove the necessity of engaging in hindsight, instructing
the jury to consider what the average person would have done may, at least,
mitigate the problems inherent in such a speculative determination. Further,
it may decrease the tendency to decide for the patient out of sympathy.
Few courts or commentators have examined this area analytically.
Although most of the controversy at trial may center on the materiality of
the risk and the obligation to disclose, the most critical inquiry is probably
whether the patient would have decided differently if the risk had, in fact,
been disclosed. Given the breadth of the lay standard of disclosure, it is
probable that any risk actually worth litigating would be material. It is not
as probable that the reasonable patient would have acted otherwise if the
material risks had been fully disclosed. One commentator has suggested
that it would be reasonable to conclude that the average person in need of
brain surgery to survive would not reject the treatment even if a risk of
impaired speech existed. 51 The correctness of this suggestion should not be
148. The ability of a jury to evaluate credibility is also essential under the objective
standard, and a failure to judge correctly can lead to anomalous results. For example,
assume that A would have consented, in spite of the physician's failure to disclose,
but lies and says he would not have consented. Assume also that B honestly would
not have consented. Further, assume that the reasonable person would not have
consented. In this case, if the jury fails to recognize that A is lying, both A and B
would win. In comparison, assume A would have consented, B would not have, and
that the reasonable person would have consented. In this case, B would lose even
though he would not have consented.
149. See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
150. Use of an objective standard to determine causation also undermines the
individual patient's right of self-determination. Unlike use of an objective standard in
the disclosure situation, however, in which the patient is simply a passive recipient of
the information, see note 77 supra, the causation inquiry assumes hypothetically that
the patient would have acted (by deciding whether to consent) if the risk had been
disclosed. Because this hypothetical decision is critical in determining whether the
harm suffered is in fact attributable to the physician's failure to disclose, it is not
unreasonable to judge this hypothetical decision against the decision that would have
been made by a reasonable person in the same circumstances.
151. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1, at 648. Some courts seem to assume
willingly that a reasonable person would not reject the treatment if he had been
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readily assumed. If the surgery would not reasonably guarantee success, or
if it would only prolong the patient's life for a relatively short time, a
reasonable person might conclude that a normal but shortened life was
preferable to a longer life, the quality of which would be decreased by the
impediment. Similarly, in diagnostic or elective surgery, or when the
condition to be cured is not severe, a reasonable person may very well reject
a treatment involving only moderately serious risks. The benefit to be
gained in such circumstances simply may not outweigh the potential
danger. As the Sard court noted, the factors relevant to determining whether
a reasonable person would not have consented may be similar to those used
to analyze the materiality of the information. 152 Mrs. Sard's concern for her
health and financial ability to raise the child would support an inference
that she would have chosen the procedure that would most likely achieve her
objectives. Thus, the jury could conclude that the failure to reveal
information about the risk of failure or that more efficient alternatives
existed might have induced a reasonable person in Mrs. Sard's position to
consent to a treatment that she would not have accepted had a full
disclosure been made.153
DAMAGES
Although proof of actual damage is an essential element of any
negligence action, 5 4 the Sard court did not discuss the measure of damages
applicable to informed consent cases and there has been little discussion of
it by other courts. 15 5 One court in dicta suggested that the plaintiff would be
entitled to the loss resulting from the risk that materialized even if the
treatment itself was performed carefully. 56 Although the patient should, of
informed. See Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), modified on
other grounds, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966); Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386,
158 S.E.2d 399 (1968).
152. See 281 Md. at 450, 379 A.2d at 1025. See generally text accompanying notes
93 to 100 supra.
153. See 281 Md. at 450-51, 379 A.2d at 1025-26.
154. See W. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 143.
155. Although the Sards raised a claim for compensatory damages for the cost of
raising the child born after the sterilization, see Brief for Appellant, Joint Record
Extract at E-5 & E-9, the court studiously avoided any mention of this potential
element of damage. While at times referring to a concern for the financial burden of
raising a child, the court emphasized that Mrs. Sard was concerned with the potential
damage to her physical well-being. See 281 Md. at 446, 450-51, 379 A.2d at 1023, 1025.
For a discussion of how other courts have treated a claim under the so-called
"wrongful birth" cases, see Annots., 69 A.L.R.3d 1250 (1976); 43 A.L.R.3d 1224,
1251-55 (1972); 27 A.L.R.3d 906 (1969); 22 A.L.R.3d 1441 (1968). See generally
Comment, Liability for Failure of Birth Control Methods, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1187
(1976); Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life" [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN.
L. REV. 58 (1970); Note, Remedy for the Reluctant Parent: Physicians' Liability for the
Post-Sterilization Conception and Birth of Unplanned Children, 27 U. FLA. L. REv.
158 (1974); 12 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 819 (1977).
156. See Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107, clarified in &
rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
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course, be compensated for the entire injury caused by the materialization of
the risk, such a simplistic statement of the measure of damages obscures the
difficult and complex considerations required to determine exactly what was
the entire harm caused by the risk. An uncritical compensation for the entire
harm suffered by the patient is potentially unfair to the physician who was
neither negligent in the performance of the treatment nor capable of
preventing the actual materialization of the risk.1 57
The basis of liability arising out of a failure to secure an informed
consent is that the patient would not have consented to the treatment if the
risk had been properly disclosed. To insure that the patient is compensated
only for the harm actually caused by the risk without holding the physician
liable for injuries that would have arisen even if a proper disclosure had
been made, the patient should be compensated only to the extent that the
undisclosed risk would in any event have contributed to his condition. 158 The
issue presents a mixed question of causation and damages. If the patient
would not have consented if the risk had been disclosed, he would have
either refused all possible treatments or chosen an alternative treatment. It
is possible that some "injury" would have occurred under either of these
courses, either through a continuing decline in the original condition or the
materialization of the same or different risk in an alternative procedure. If it
can be established with some certainty that the patient's probable condition
had he refused the treatment would be worse than the injury actually
suffered, or conversely, if it cannot be established that his probable
condition would be better than his actual condition, the patient cannot prove
that the physician's failure to disclose actually caused him any damage. 159
Therefore, the basic measure of damages clearly should be the difference
between the patient's probable condition if he had rejected the treatment
actually undergone and his actual condition after the undisclosed risk
materialized.' 6 0
The simplest situation illustrating the application of this measure of
damages is that in which the undisclosed risk materialized in the only
available method of treatment appropriate to treat or cure the patient. If the
patient would not have consented upon a proper disclosure, no alternative
treatment existed and the original condition sought to be cured would
remain uncured. The patient's probable condition would be that probably
resulting from leaving his original condition untreated. Thus, the measure of
damages would be the economic valuation of the difference between his
157. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1, at 649.
158. Id.
159. See generally Rewis v. United States, 503 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1974); Dillon v.
Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 (1932); State, Dep't of
Environmental Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d
337 (1976); Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hosp. Management Comm., [1969] 1Q.B. 428; Peaslee, Multiple Causation And Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1934). See
also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 31 (1935).
160. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1, at 649; Note, supra note 81, at 550.
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actual condition after the undisclosed risk materialized and his probable
condition without any treatment.16 1 In effect, the damage attributable to the
risk must be offset by the damage that would probably occur if the patient
did not undergo treatment. 162
The availability of alternative treatments, however, creates many
practical problems in determining the patient's probable condition. The jury
must first determine whether the patient would have chosen one of the
alternative treatments if the undisclosed risk had been disclosed origi-
nally. 63 If the patient would have rejected all alternative treatments, then
the situation would be the same as if no alternative treatments had existed,
and the measure of damages would be similarly calculated. 6 4 If the patient
would not have rejected all alternative treatments, the measure of damages
may be substantially modified. The jury must determine which alternative
the patient would have chosen. If the undisclosed risk was not present in
any alternative that would have been chosen, the patient would be
compensated for the entire harm caused by the risk.65 Because the
alternative treatment would most probably have been successful, the
patient's probable condition would be that of a person with a successfully
completed treatment. Therefore, the difference between his probable
161. See note 160 supra.
162. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L.
REV. 489, 498 (1977).
163. An additional issue is whether the determination of the plaintiffs probable
choice of alternatives should be governed by the probable choice of the actual patient
or an objective standard based on the probable choice of the reasonable person.
Because the determination of the patient's probable choice may determine whether he
suffered any legal injury (i.e., whether the physician's failure to disclose caused the
actual injury), see notes 164 to 169 and accompanying text infra, it could be argued
that the objective standard should be used for the same reasons it is used to resolve
the causation issue, see notes 144 to 150 and accompanying text supra. Once the
patient has established that he would not have consented had the information been
disclosed originally, however, the question is the damage to the actual, rather than
reasonable, patient. Therefore, the question of the patient's probable choice should be
based on the choice of the actual rather than objective patient. But see Note, supra
note 81, at 550. As noted previously, the objective standard undermines the actual
patient's right of choice, and the probable choice of treatment is a uniquely subjective
choice made after analyzing the risks and hazards presented by each treatment in
light of the patient's subjective preferences. The use of an objective standard to
govern resolution of the causation issue and a subjective standard to resolve damage
issues reaches a reasonable accommodation of the competing interests of patient and
physician. The physician receives sufficient protection against the unfair imposition
of liability by the objective causation element, see notes 139 to 140 & 144 to 150 and
accompanying text supra, and the use of a subjective standard for resolving damage
issues gives effect to the right of the individual patient to choose the treatment based
on his own subjective preferences. Moreover, if the jury finds that the patient's
testimony is incredible - for example, if it appears to have been offered solely to
secure a more advantageous measure of damages - then it should estimate what the
patient's actual conduct would have been.
164. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
165. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 1, at 649.
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condition and his actual condition would be the entire harm caused by the
risk, and there would be no offset of damages due to the patient's probable
condition.
The patient may have chosen an alternative in which the undisclosed
risk was also present at the same or different frequency. 166 Because the same
risk is involved in both the treatment actually chosen and the treatment
that would have been chosen if the risk had been disclosed, it is possible that
the same risk would also have materialized in the alternative that would
have been chosen. Therefore, to be able to determine the patient's probable
condition, and thereby the damages, it must be determined if the risk would
also have actually materialized if the alternative that would have been
chosen had been performed. To reach this conclusion, it must be determined
whether the materialization of the risk in each alternative would be caused
by the "same or similar" medical factor(s). It cannot be said that the risk
that actually occurred would probably materialize in the alternative merely
because the risk occurred in the treatment actually performed. Only if the
medical factor(s) causing the risk to materialize in one alternative are the
166. Alternatives involving the same risk that was originally undisclosed present
conceptual and practical difficulties. To prove the causation element of his cause of
action, the patient must establish that the reasonable person would not have
consented if the risk had been disclosed. If it is probable that, upon disclosure, the
patient would have chosen an alternative that included the same risk at the same (or
greater) frequency of occurrence, it would seem that the patient could not prove a legal
injury because he is at the same time stating that he would both have accepted and
rejected the same risk. Although it is more likely than not that a patient would not
choose an alternative containing the same risk at the same or greater frequency, the
possibility would exist in some circumstances. Each alternative treatment may
contain a "package" of various risks, hazards, probabilities of success, and probable
outcomes, and it is reasonable to assume that an informed patient would consent to a
particular treatment after evaluating the mix of each "package." For example, one
treatment may offer a 99% probability of success and contain a 5% probability of risk
A, a 1% chance of risk B, and a 1/2% likelihood of risk C. A second treatment may offer
a 90% probability of success and a 5% probability of risk A and a /2% chance of risk X.
Thus, each alternative treatment contains a different "package" of risks. Without
disclosure of a particular risk, one "package" may be preferable to another. The other
"package," however, may be preferable upon disclosure even though it contains the
same risk. For example, in the hypothetical above, the patient may have selected the
first treatment, due to its greater probability of success, if the 5% probability of risk A
had not been disclosed. If the risk were disclosed, however, the second treatment with
the same risk and offering a lower probability of success may have been preferable.
The total danger presented by the combination of risks A, B, and C in the first
treatment may have caused the patient to refuse to consent if the danger of A had
been disclosed. Even though risks B and C alone were insufficient to have caused the
patient to withhold consent to the first treatment, they are not present in the second
treatment. Thus, as long as the medical factor(s) that would cause risk A to
materialize in each treatment are not the "same or so similar" in their causal
relationship to the risk that it can be said that the risk would probably materialize in
the second treatment, then the second treatment offers a 90% probability of success
and a 95% probability that risk A would not materialize. It might, therefore, be
preferable to the first treatment.
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same, or similar in their causal relationship to the risk, to the medical
factor(s) causing the risk to materialize in the other alternative can it be
said that if the risk materializes in one alternative that it will probably
materialize in the other. If the medical factor(s) that produce the risk are not
the same, or similar in their causal relationship to the risk, then they are
independent, and it cannot be said that the same risk would probably
materialize if the alternative had been chosen. 167 Thus, whenever the same
risk is involved in each alternative, two different damage situations are
possible. If the medical factor(s) causing the risk to materialize in each case
are neither the same factor(s), nor similar in their causal relationship to the
risk, then even though the same risk is present in each alternative, the occur-
rence of the risk in the original treatment does not indicate that the risk
would be substantially likely to materialize in the alternative. If the factor(s)
triggering the risk in each alternative are thus independent of each other,
then, because the incidence of most risks is well below fifty percent,168 the
unchosen alternative treatment probably would have been successful and
uneventful. Therefore, the damage - the difference between the actual
(injured) condition and the probable (uninjured) condition of a successful
operation - would be the entire harm caused by the risk. Alternatively,
expert testimony may be able to establish that the medical factor(s) that
cause the risk to materialize in each alternative are the same or so similar in
their causal relationship to the risk that more probably than not the same
risk would also have materialized in the alternative that the patient would
have chosen. The patient's probable condition would then reflect the
probable materialization of the same risk that actually occurred, and his
damages would be the difference between his actual condition and the
condition incident to the materialization of the same risk in the alternative
treatment. Thus, because the same risk that actually occurred would more
167. The Sard case offers a possible example. The risk of failure in the actual
treatment performed was two percent. The alternative treatments offered risks of
failure of less than one-tenth of one percent. 281 Md. at 437, 379 A.2d at 1018. If the
reason that the risk of failure materializes in the alternative treatments is not the
same as the reason that the risk of failure occurred in the actual treatment, then the
cause(s) of the failures in each alternative are independent of each other and it cannot
be said that the failure would probably materialize had one of the alternatives been
chosen. Thus, if the cause(s) of the failure are independent, then the probability of
success if one of the alternatives had been chosen is at least 99.9%.
168. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 92, 94, 95 & 96 supra. It must be remembered that
the measure of damages in informed consent cases is based on the difference between
the patient's actual condition and probable condition. See text accompanying note 160
supra. The frequency of the occurrence of most risks is relatively low, usually less
than 10 %. For any given treatment, therefore, the probability that the risk will not
materialize is usually at least 90%. Unless the medical cause(s) of the occurrence of the
risk in the alternative that would have been chosen are the same as the cause(s) in the
treatment actually performed, it is more probable than not that the same risk would
not have materialized in the alternative even though it did occur in the treatment
actually performed. Thus, the patient's probable condition, had the alternative been
chosen, would be that of a successful treatment.
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probably than not also materialize in the alternative that would have been
chosen, the defendant would have a very compelling argument that the
patient had suffered no damages.16 9
Finally, aside from the problems presented whenever the alternative
treatment involves the same risk that was undisclosed in the actual
treatment, any determination of the patient's probable condition must also
consider the possibility that an additional risk, causing an entirely different
injury, might have resulted from the alternative treatment. In theory, the
patient's probable condition would have to be adjusted to reflect the
possibility that the additional risk would have materialized. In practice,
however, it is most unlikely that a jury would be permitted to consider this
question Because its frequency of occurrence is usually fairly low, any
attempt to determine whether the additional risk would have occurred would
be extremely speculative. 17° At best, therefore, the jury might be permitted to
169. This, of course, assumes that the plaintiff is held to an all-or-nothing recovery,
that is, that he can recover the entire loss if he can establish that, based on the
difference between his actual and probable conditions, he has been damaged, but can
recover nothing if he is unable to prove that it is more probable than not that he was
damaged by the doctor's failure to disclose. Damages need not be calculated on an all-
or-nothing basis, however, and it should be noted that even if the defendant produces
expert testimony that the same risk probably would have materialized in the
alternative treatment, it might still be possible for the plaintiff to recover at least part
of his loss. The plaintiff may be able to produce expert evidence demonstrating the
statistical probability that the same risk would materialize only a certain percentage
of the time in the alternative that would have been chosen if it in fact occurs in the
treatment actually performed. For example, suppose risk X occurred in the actual
treatment A. Because the factor(s) causing risk X to occur in treatment A are the
"same or so similar" in their causal relationship to the factor(s) causing risk X to
materialize in the alternative treatment B that would have been chosen, expert
testimony can establish that the risk probably would have materialized in treatment
B and that the plaintiff did not therefore suffer any legal injury. The plaintiff may
then be able to prove that if risk X materializes in treatment A, there is only a 65%
chance (for example) that it would also materialize in treatment B even though the
factor(s) causing risk X to materialize in either treatment are the "same or similarly"
related. In this situation, the plaintiff should be able to argue that his damage was the
lost 35% chance of a successful treatment and should be entitled to recover 35% of the
economic value of the injury suffered. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 159,
§ 31, at 122-23 (in valuing a less-than-even chance for a single specific event, if the
value of the chance is not outweighed by countervailing risk of actual loss and fairly
measurable by calculable odds, evidence bearing specifically on the probabilities, or
by expert opinion, and the amount of expected gain is itself fixed or approximately
ascertainable, the jury should be allowed to value the lost opportunity).
170. For example, assume that the highest frequency of occurrence of any of the
risks inherent in the treatment is five percent. It would be extremely difficult for a
jury even to begin to predict whether that risk would have materialized for any given
performance of the treatment, and it is unlikely that any expert testimony could
establish whether it would materialize. Moreover, the probability that it would not
materialize is 95%. Thus, although in theory some allowance for the possible
occurrence of such a risk should be made in determining the patient's probable
condition, it would be too difficult to do so in practice. The net effect may be that it
would have to be presumed that such a risk would not have occurred.
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reduce the damage award if such additional risks have a fairly high
incidence. If not, the jury would be instructed to presume that the additional
risk would not have occurred.
Quite simply, it is clear that a proper attempt to calculate damages in
informed consent cases opens the proverbial can of worms. The jury will
have to make extremely complex and difficult calculations. It will have to
determine both the patient's probable course of conduct if he had refused the
treatment and the probable condition resulting from that choice, and
estimate the economic value of the difference between the actual harm
caused by the undisclosed risk and the probable harm of the condition that
would have resulted if the treatment had been rejected. Although this
valuation would not be difficult when the patient is to be compensated for
the entire harm caused by the risk, it could be extremely difficult when the
actual damages are to be offset by a valuation of the patient's probable
condition. The difference between the actual and probable conditions may be
de minimus or too speculative to prove. For example, it may simply be too
difficult to determine damages when a serious ulcer, which would have gone
untreated because the patient would have refused the treatment had a risk
been disclosed, is treated, and the risk's occurrence necessitates the removal
of the spleen and causes the development of a gastric ulcer. 171 An additional,
and in some respects disturbing, consequence is that a patient, though
seriously injured in fact, may not be able to establish that his injury resulted
from the physician's failure to disclose. If the damages are de minimus, or
too speculative, or legally nonexistent because death would have resulted
without treatment or the probable condition would be worse than the
condition resulting from the risk's occurrence, the plaintiff could not
establish any damage and, therefore, could not prove one of the elements of
his cause of action.
The Sard case itself offers an interesting example of the potential
difficulties associated with calculating damages in informed consent cases.
Initially, the court found that the physician failed to inform the Sards that
the operation might not be totally successful. 172 The damage alleged to have
resulted from this failure to disclose was the birth of the child with extra
pain and suffering and economic expense attributable to the delivery, as
well as the economic expense of raising the child. 113 To establish one part of
her cause of action, Mrs. Sard would have to plead that she would have
refused the treatment if the risk had been disclosed. If Mrs. Sard had refused
the sterilization and not chosen to adopt alternative birth control methods, it
is probable that she would still have become pregnant. Therefore, because
her probable condition without the treatment would be the same as her
actual condition, she could not allege that the failure to disclose the risk
171. This example is taken in part from Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1,
104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
172. See 281 Md. at 445-46, 379 A.2d at 1023.
173. See note 155 supra.
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caused any harm that probably would not have occurred if the risk had been
disclosed.174 It is likely, however, that Mrs. Sard would have chosen to
employ an alternative method of prevention. Mrs. Sard could have chosen to
use an oral contraceptive, diaphragm, or intrauterine device. Alternatively,
Mr. Sard could have chosen, for example, to have a vasectomy. Although
each of these methods includes an inherent risk of failure, 175 the medical
cause of the failure would probably be different than the medical cause of
the failure of Mrs. Sard's tubal-ligation. Therefore, even though there is
some possibility that Mrs. Sard would also have become pregnant had she
chosen one of these alternatives, the possibility is so speculative that it
would have to be assumed that her probable condition would have been a
successful prevention of a pregnancy. Thus, Mrs. Sard would be entitled to
damages for the entire harm caused by the failure of the sterilization.
Mrs. Sard could also have chosen one of the alternative methods of
performing the sterilization, in which case the risk of failure would have
been reduced to less than one-tenth of one percent, or she could have chosen
to delay the sterilization until after the Caesarean section, in which case the
risk of failure would have diminished dramatically. If the medical cause(s)
of the failure of the sterilization procedure for these alternatives are not the
"same or so similarly" related that it can be said that more probably than
not the risk would have materialized no matter which alternative had been
chosen, then the probability of success would be at least ninety-nine percent,
and Mrs. Sard's probable condition would have been a successful steriliza-
tion. Her damages would be the entire harm caused by the failure of the
actual treatment performed. If the medical cause(s) of the failure in each of
the various sterilization procedures are the same or so similar in their causal
relationship to the risk that it was more probable than not that the
alternative sterilization methods would also have failed, then it is more
probable than not that Mrs. Sard would have still become pregnant.
Therefore, because her probable condition would have been the same as her
actual condition, she could not prove that the physician's nondisclosure
caused her any damage. 176
The net result of cases such as Sard is that a plaintiffs inability to
prove actual damage will relieve the physician of liability even though he
failed to meet his duty to disclose information material to the patient's
condition. In one sense this is consistent with the traditional principle that
negligence without harm is not actionable and that there will not be
compensation without actual injury. It does, however, seem unfair. First,
174. See text accompanying notes 159 to 160 supra.
175. Each of these alternatives may also include some additional inherent danger.
For example, use of an oral contraceptive has an inherent risk of a stroke. See
Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1976).
176. In this situation, Mrs. Sard could attempt to prove the statistical probability
of the risk's materialization in one of the alternatives when it occurs in the actual
treatment, and argue that her damages are the economic value of the lost chance or
opportunity for a successful treatment. See note 169 supra.
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there is a deprivation of the right of choice promoted by the doctrine of
informed consent. 77 Second, the plaintiff may, in fact, have suffered some
harm yet be unable to prove it due to the speculativeness of the inquiry.
Therefore, although the denial of the information may have caused a
significant harm, the physician's breach will remain unremedied.
178
CONCLUSION
The problems posed by the damage element graphically demonstrate the
problems of consistently translating theory into practical application and
reaching a balanced accommodation of the essentially diverse interests
inherent in the informed consent doctrine. There is no a priori reason to
require disclosure. The patient is seeking a cure and the physician has
proposed the optimal treatment to effect that cure. It is very unlikely that a
physician would propose a treatment with a significant likelihood of
occurrence of an adverse risk, except in certain extreme and desperate cases.
Further, it must be remembered that there is some risk of death or serious
injury in even the simplest treatments. Nevertheless, it is part of the
traditional American philosophy that the individual is more capable of
determining what action most advances his own best interest than is
another individual and that an individual should not be required to assume
177. Although the patient may have suffered a loss of this dignitary interest, see
Comment, supra note 26, such an injury is not generally compensated by negligence
law. See Riskin, supra note 26, at 589.
178. A possible resolution would be to abandon the traditional negligence
formulation and declare that as a matter of social policy it is unfair to expect a patient
to bear the full brunt of the infrequent, unpredictable, and unpreventable risks that
may occur, and that society will assume, by cost sharing through insurance, the
responsibility to aid the patient so victimized. This resolution would also provide
compensation for the denial of the right of choice and self-determination, which
negligence law does not compensate, see note 176 and accompanying text supra, and
would provide compensation for the plaintiff who may in fact have suffered an injury
but be unable to prove his damages due to the difficulties of proof outlined above. See
notes 157 to 170 supra. The effect of such a scheme would approach strict liability. An
additional benefit would be the elimination of strained attempts to find fault in the
physician's conduct in order to fit the remedy within traditional negligence law. See
generally Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 3d 399, 414-21, 426 P.2d 525, 535-40, 58 Cal. Rptr.
125, 135-40 (1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring).
One commentator has suggested that informed consent is part of a trend
approaching strict liability. See Meisel, The Expansion of Liability For Medical
Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability By Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB.
L. REV. 51 (1977). The evolution of the doctrine provides some support for this view.
The informed consent doctrine allows the patient to hold the physician liable even
though he could not be sued in traditional malpractice for negligent treatment and
even though the occurrence of the risk is medically unpreventable. Similarly,
although the professional standard of disclosure follows traditional malpractice law
by judging the physician by the customs of the profession, the lay standard permits
the jury to judge the appropriateness of the physician's conduct. If the "but for"
aspect of causation is eliminated by recognizing that part of what is lost is the
patient's right of self-determination, see Riskin, note 26 supra, then the last bastion
protecting against strict liability would be eliminated.
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responsibility for a risk unless he was aware of the risk. Thus, courts
adopting the lay standard have decided that it is better policy to permit the
individual to decide whether the benefits outweigh the risks.
Having decided that the individual right of self-determination is
sufficient to impose a duty on the physician, the standard adopted in Sard
reaches an accommodation that effectively promotes the right of choice.
Although sacrificing the individual's right of choice to some degree, the
objective standard does protect against retrospective speculation and
personal idiosyncracies. Nevertheless, the lay standard more effectively
promotes disclosure of information necessary to an intelligent choice than
does a standard relying on the medical profession itself. Although the
physician's discretion is significantly circumscribed, it is consistent with the
policy choice to let the patient make the ultimate decision, and a measure of
discretion remains in the therapeutic privilege when a medical decision is
truly required. Whether the court will continue to construe the disclosure
requirement as broadly as indicated in Sard and suggested by this Comment
is unclear. There is language in the court's opinion that would permit a court
to find as a matter of law that a risk is so obvious or so common that
disclosure is not required. Whether the Court of Appeals will deem it wise to
control the limits of the required disclosure remains to be decided. 179
179. Although the Sard opinion could not be cited to support the proposition, the
reasoning of the opinion would indicate that the informed consent doctrine could be
successfully applied to attorneys. A client should have the same right to make the
ultimate decision over the course of his legal affairs, and adequate information is as
essential to this decision as it is to deciding the patient's course of medical treatment.
Both the physician and the attorney are professionals. Each has a fiduciary
relationship with the client obligating him to act in the client's best interest. Both can
potentially control and significantly influence the outcome of the patient's future.
Both deal with a body of knowledge outside the common understanding of the
average layman. Information relating to the future or alternative courses of a client's
suit and the related potential risks and consequences is as essential to plotting a
course as the information that must be disclosed by the physician. In addition,
information about legal affairs is probably more comprehensible to the layman than
is medical information. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILIrY,
Ethical Considerations 7-5 to -12 (1976).
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INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS:
A NEW TORT FOR MARYLAND - HARRIS v. JONES
In Harris v. Jones,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals joined the majority
of American jurisdictions 2 by authorizing an independent cause of action for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 3 Essentially, this tort permits
a plaintiff to recover for extreme and outrageous conduct that intentionally
or recklessly causes him severe emotional distress.4
Throughout his life, William Harris, the plaintiff, had stuttered severely,
at times causing him to shake his head up and down when he attempted to
speak long words or sentences.5 While employed by the General Motors
Corporation, Harris' supervisor was Jones, who over a five month period
approached Harris several times, chiding Harris about his nervousness and
ridiculing him by physically and verbally mimicking his stutter. Although
Harris at one point requested a transfer to another department, Jones
refused the request while mockingly imitating the manner in which Harris
bobbed his head up and down and mimicking Harris' mispronounciation of
the word "committeeman."6 As a result of this incident, Harris filed a
grievance complaint with his union committeeman. General Motors
responded by instructing Jones to act in a manner befitting a supervisor and
the grievance was satisfactorily settled. When Jones continued the taunting,
Harris filed another complaint which was also satisfactorily settled after
General Motors again instructed Jones to conduct himself properly in the
future.7 Finally, after five months of sporadic taunting, Harris filed a civil
1. 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
2. Cases from 21 jurisdictions are collected in Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 119-26
(1959). For an additional collection of cases, see Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 564-65
n.1, 380 A.2d 611, 613 n.1 (1977). See generally 38 AM. JUR. 2d Fright, Shock, and
Mental Disturbance § 17 (1968).
3. 281 Md. at 566, 380 A.2d at 614. As used here, "emotional distress" is
indistinguishable from other terms such as mental distress, emotional harm, or
psychic damage. Such a usage is consistent with the usage of courts and other
commentators.
Prior to Harris, Maryland permitted compensation for emotional distress only
as an element of damages resulting from the defendant's commission of an
independently recognized tort. See notes 18 to 28 and accompanying text infra. The
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress recognizes emotional equilibrium as
a legally protected interest per se and is distinct from actions in which mental distress
is compensable only as an element of damages. See Campos v. Oldsmobile Div., G.M.
Corp., 71 Mich. App. 23, 246 N.W.2d 352 (1976) (tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress distinguished from an action for defamation, in which damage to
reputation is the gravamen of the tort and mental distress is merely an element of
damages).
4. See 281 Md. at 566, 380 A.2d at 614.
5. See id. at 562, 380 A.2d at 612. At trial, Harris frequently responded to
questions by writing out the answers. See Joint Record Extract at 1-3, 67-68, Jones v.
Harris, 35 Md. App. 556, 371 A.2d 1104, affl'd, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
6. 281 Md. at 562, 380 A.2d at 612. Harris pronounced "committeeman" as
"mmitteeman."
7. Id. at 562-63, 380 A.2d at 612.
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action against Jones and General Motors for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.8 The defendants appealed from a jury award in favor of
Harris.
Acknowledging the widespread recognition of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the Court of Special Appeals was persuaded
that the tort would be viable in Maryland in a proper case.9 It concluded that
Jones' actions were intended to inflict emotional distress, 10 but that the
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish either that Harris
had suffered severe emotional distress or that any distress that had been
suffered was caused by Jones' conduct.1
The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed. In an opinion written by
Chief Judge Murphy, the court acknowledged the widespread acceptance in
other jurisdictions of a right to recover for severe emotional distress caused
by the intentional act of another 2 and agreed that the tort should be
8. Harris alleged that Jones' actions occurred during the course of his
employment with General Motors and that General Motors had ratified this conduct.
Id. at 562, 380 A.2d at 612. Although an employer generally is not held responsible for
the intentional torts of its employees, liability will be imposed in some circumstances.
One such circumstance is intentional conduct that occurs during the course of the
employee's employment. The requirements for imposing liability on the employer in
this situation were set forth in Lepore v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 Md. 591, 595, 207 A.2d
451, 453 (1965): (1) the act of the agent must have been done within the scope of his
employment; (2) the act must have been done in furtherance of the employer's
business; and (3) the act must have been authorized by the employer, in the sense that
the act was incident to the performance of the duties given to the agent by the
employer even if in opposition to the employer's express orders.
Alternatively, liability may be imposed if the employer ratified the employee's
conduct. See, e.g., Turner v. American Dist. Tel. and Messenger Co., 94 Conn. 707, 110
A. 540 (1920); Edwards v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 289 Ky. 375, 158 S.W.2d 935 (1942);
Tauscher v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 153 Or. 152, 56 P.2d 318 (1936). At least one court
has indicated that a principal may be liable for his agent's intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In Rosenberg v. Packerland Packing Co., 55 111. App. 3d 959, 370
N.E.2d 1235 (1977), the plaintiff brought an action against the principal corporation
for an agent-driver's intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff alleged
that an unknown driver of the defendant drove a tractor-trailer at speeds of 70-80
m.p.h. within two feet of plaintiff's car. Even after the plaintiff signalled for the truck
driver to pass, the driver continued to feint at the rear of plaintiff's car. The court held
that two theories could sustain an action against the principal. First, an action could
be maintained against the defendant trucking company for willful, wanton, or
intentional entrustment of its truck to an incompetent driver. Id. at 965, 370 N.E.2d at
1240. Second, if the plaintiff could demonstrate that the defendant negligently
permitted its truck to operate in violation of Interstate Commerce Commission rules
and regulations, the jury could find that the driver's intervening intentional tort was
foreseeable and that the defendant's violation of the rules and regulations was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 955-56, 370 N.E.2d at 1240-41.
9. Jones v. Harris, 35 Md. App. 556, 558-61, 371 A.2d 1104, 1106-07, affl'd, 281
Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
10. See id. at 570, 371 A.2d at 1111.
11. See id. at 570-71, 371 A.2d at 1111-12.
12. 281 Md. at 564, 380 A.2d at 613.
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sanctioned in Maryland. 13 The court then defined the four elements of the
tort that must coalesce before liability can be imposed. The plaintiff must
establish that: (1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2)
the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless; (3) there was a causal
connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4)
the emotional distress was severe.' 4 In addition, two difficulties -
"distinguishing the true from the false claim," and "distinguishing the
trifling annoyance from the serious wrong"'15 - were identified as inherent
in recognizing such a tort, and the court stressed that the four elements of
the tort should be strictly followed in order to minimize these problems.'
6
After discussing each element, the court held that in Harris' case, the
"fourth element of the tort - that the emotional distress must be severe -
was not established by legally sufficient evidence justifying submission of
the case to the jury.' 17
Partially due to the inherent difficulty of determining whether a person
actually has suffered emotional distress, courts have struggled for decades
to define the appropriate scope of protection to be accorded emotional
equilibrium. Traditionally, most courts were reluctant to permit the
infliction of emotional distress to provide the sole basis for a cause of
action.' 8 Although refusing to recognize emotional equilibrium as a legally
protected interest per se, most courts allowed recovery if mental distress was
claimed as an additional, parasitic element of damages attached to an
independent, traditionally recognized tort such as a battery or an action for
false imprisonment.19 As long as some other legally protected right had been
13. Id. at 566, 380 A.2d at 614. Strictly speaking, the court's apparent recognition
of the tort is dicta, because it subsequently affirmed the Court of Special Appeals'
holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the tort.
14. Id. at 566, 380 A.2d at 614. The Harris court relied heavily on Womack v.
Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974). In Womack, the Virginia Supreme Court
held that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress may be
maintained even though the mental distress is unaccompanied by physical injury.
Womack essentially followed the provisions of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1965) which provides in part: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for
such bodily harm."
15. 281 Md. at 566, 380 A.2d at 614.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 570, 380 A.2d at 616 (footnote omitted).
18. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 49-50, & § 54, at
328-29 (4th ed. 1971). Lord Wensleydale observed over a century ago that "[m]ental
pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the
unlawful conduct complained of causes that alone." Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep.
854, 863 (H.L. 1861).
19. See W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 12, at 51-52. As stated in RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 47, Comment b, (1934), an individual's interest in emotional well-being was
given only partial legal protection. If the sole effect of the tortious conduct was to
cause emotional distress, the plaintiff could not maintain a cause of action against
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violated, courts generally were willing to permit recovery for emotional
harm. Nevertheless, to insure objectively that the plaintiff was not feigning
emotional harm, most courts required that the emotional distress be
accompanied by, or result in, some physical injury.20
The search for objective corroboration of alleged mental distress is
reflected in the rules commonly used to determine whether recovery will be
permitted for mental distress that results from conduct that is merely
negligent. Most courts, while clearly permitting recovery for mental harm or
anguish attributable to physical injuries caused by the defendant's
negligent conduct, will not permit recovery when the negligent conduct
causes only mental distress. 21 When, however, a physical injury results from
the plaintiffs fright or shock caused by the negligent conduct, two distinct
rules - the "impact rule" and the "subsequent physical injury rule" - have
developed to determine whether the mental distress is sufficiently corrobo-
rated. Courts that follow the "impact rule" permit recovery if there has been
some contemporaneous physical impact upon the plaintiffs person,22
apparently on the theory that the occurrence of an impact provides adequate
assurance that the resulting emotional distress is genuine. Other courts
conclude that sufficient objective corroboration exists when the mental
distress causes and is evidenced by a subsequent physical injury.23 The
the defendant. If the defendant's conduct caused other recoverable damages, however,
the emotional disruption could have been attached as an additional element of
damages. See also Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Cal. 2d 109, 130 P.2d 389 (1942) (malicious
assault and battery); American Security Co. v. Cook, 49 Ga. App. 723, 176 S.E. 798
(1934) (trespass); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (invasion of
privacy); Patapsco Loan Co. v. Hobbs, 129 Md. 9, 98 A. 239 (1916) (trespass); Fisher v.
Rumler, 239 Mich. 224, 214 N.W. 310 (1927) (false imprisonment); Haeissig v. Decker,
139 Minn. 422, 166 N.W. 1085 (1918) (seduction); Williams v. Underhill, 63 A.D. 223, 71
N.Y.S. 291 (1901) (assault; snemble battery); Allen v. Hannaford, 138 Wash. 423, 244 P.
700 (1926) (assault).
20. See W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 12, at 59.
21. See id. § 54, at 330. In a cause of action for negligence, the occurrence of
physical harm is considered sufficient evidence that mental harm was actually
suffered to permit recovery for mental distress as a parasitic element of damage.
22. Although its terms vary among jurisdictions, unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that he sustained a physical impact as a result of the defendant's
conduct, the "impact rule" precludes recovery for mental distress. See 42 U. Mo. K.C.
L. REV. 234 (1973). Once in force in most jurisdictions, the "impact rule" has been
criticized extensively and presently has been abandoned by most jurisdictions. The
Maryland Court of Appeals refused to adopt the "impact rule" at a time when the rule
was prevalent elsewhere. See Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909).
23. With the abandonment of the "impact rule," courts have increasingly
permitted evidence of subsequent physical injuries to validate the existence of mental
distress. Considerable disagreement, however, surrounds the definition of physical
injury. Some courts only permit miscarriages, heart attacks, or other similarly
dramatic physiological changes to corroborate the existence of mental distress. In
contrast, other courts have accepted such physical manifestations as headaches,
dizziness, sleeplessness, irritability, nausea, and back pains. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d
100, 127 (1959). See generally Hallen, Damages for Physical Injuries Resulting from
Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L. REV. 253 (1933); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and
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"impact rule" and the "subsequent physical injury rule" have been followed
primarily because of their facility of application by courts faced with the
evidentiary difficulty of determining whether a plaintiff had, in fact,
Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 (1944). The Maryland
Court of Appeals defined the "subsequent physical injury rule" in Bowman v.
Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933). In Bowman, the plaintiff watched through
his dining room window as a truck raced out of control down an icy hill, jumped a
curb, crossed the sidewalk, and crashed into the foundation of the plaintiff's house
just below the dining room. The plaintiff's young children were playing in the
basement at the time of the accident. Although the plaintiff did not sustain any
physical impact, he suffered severe nervous shock and fright, and the Court of
Appeals allowed him to maintain an action for emotional distress in accordance with
the following test:
[A] plaintiff can sustain an action for damages for nervous shock or injury
caused, without physical impact, by fright arising directly from defendant's
negligent act or omission, and resulting in some clearly apparent and
substantial physical injury, as manifested by an external condition or by
symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological, or
mental state.
Id. at 404, 165 A. at 184.
The Court of Special Appeals recently applied the Bowman rule in Vance v.
Vance, No. 78-384 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 11, 1979). After almost 20 years of
apparent marriage, Mr. Vance, the defendant, filed a petition to annul his marriage to
Mrs. Vance and set aside an alimony and support decree, alleging that the marriage
upon which the decree was based was invalid because he had not secured a final
divorce a vincula mattimonii from his first wife prior to marrying the second Mrs.
Vance. Mrs. Vance sued Mr. Vance for negligently misrepresenting to her that his
divorce was final and claimed to have suffered mental distress. Although the jury
returned a verdict in her favor, the trial court granted a judgment non obstante
veredicto on the ground that emotional distress alone is not compensable for negligent
misrepresentation.
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence
presented at trial satisfied the Bowman rule that emotional distress resulting in
physical injury is compensable. Slip op. at 8, 9. Mrs. Vance had testified that she
could not sleep or function as a result of the defendant's conduct, and that she was
embarassed to socialize with former friends or to go out in public. Moreover, she
testified that she thought she was going to have a nervous breakdown and had
developed symptoms of an ulcer. The court did not allude to any expert medical
testimony substantiating these assertions, but the plaintiffs testimony was
corroborated by the testimony of both her mother and son. The plaintiffs mother
testified that the plaintiff was "in a state of emotional collapse," and her son testified
that his mother was emotionally depressed and that her "'hair was unkept (sic), the
cheeks were sunken, the eyes were dark. She was a wreck."' Id. at 7. The court held
that the plaintiffs "nervousness, spontaneous crying, hollowed appearance, and
inability to relate to the present, all constituted evidence of an external condition"
satisfying the Bowman subsequent injury rule, id. at 9, thus clearly taking a liberal
view of the nature and quality of the evidence sufficient to satisfy the "clearly
apparent and substantial physical injury" rule of Bowman.
In dicta, the court went on to question the continued vitality of the subsequent
physical injury rule. The court noted that in other jurisdictions, an exception to the
physical injury rule permits recovery when the circumstances of the case present "'an
especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress . . . which serves as a
guarantee that the claim is not spurious."' Id. at 9 (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note
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suffered mental distress.24 Both rules have been soundly criticized as
arbitrary limitations bearing slight logical relation to the existence of
emotional distress.
25
18, § 54, at 330). Moreover, the mere fact that permitting recovery for mental distress
unaccompanied by physical injury possibly could result in fictitious claims or an
increase in the number of law suits is insufficient justification for denying redress of
the injury. The court concluded that
We believe it is time that courts unbind themselves from the outmoded
belief that there can be no injury to the mind without overt manifestations of
bodily harm. We should recognize what the health professionals already
know, that the psyche is as susceptible of injury as the body, and that the
absence of apparent physical damage does not serve to lessen the extent of the
mental injury.
Slip op. at 10 (footnote omitted).
24. In Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 77, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909), the Court of
Appeals rejected the argument that the "impact rule" should be adopted as a matter of
judical expediency. Yet, twenty-four years later the court adopted a "subsequent
physical injury" test for compensating mental distress. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md.
397, 165 A. 182 (1933). More recently, the court explained that considerations of
expediency formed the basis of the holding in Bowman, H & R Block v. Testerman,
275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975), and applied the Bowman rule to deny the plaintiffs
claim for mental distress, stating that "[tihe law is clear in Maryland that physical
impact is not a prerequisite to mental anguish damages .... The cases have adhered
to the Bowman rule, however, in requiring that there be a clearly apparent and
substantial physical injury, to guard against the possibility of feigned claims." Id. at
48, 338 A.2d at 55 (citations omitted).
25. The logical basis of the "impact rule" has been repudiated in a number of
scholarly articles. See Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence
Without Impact, 50 U. PA. L. REv. 141 (1902); Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. Rev. 1033, 1036 (1936); McNiece, Psychic
Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1949). Although
evidence satisfying the "subsequent physical injury rule" would be more likely to
demonstrate the existence of severe emotional distress than would the "impact rule,"
the subsequent physical injury rule has not escaped criticism. See, e.g., Ver Hagen v.
Gibbons, 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970). In a 4-3 decision, the Ver Hagen court
refused to abandon the requirement that a plaintiff must become physically ill as a
result of the mental distress. The dissent argued that "frequently it is only an accident
of pleading that the adverse consequences complained of are characterized as mental
rather than physical." Id. at 229, 177 N.W.2d at 88 (Wilkie, J., dissenting). For
commentary arguing that one should be able to maintain an action for negligently
inflicted mental distress, see Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The
Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1971); Note, Negligence and the
Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. CHI.
L. REV. 512 (1968).
In the so-called "bystander" cases, the "zone of danger" rule imposes an
additional limitation on recovery for negligently inflicted mental distress. The "zone
of danger" rule is based on the physical proximity of the plaintiff to an area within
which he is in danger of personal injury from the risk created by the defendant's
negligent conduct. According to this rule, recovery by a bystander who has suffered
mental distress as a result of witnessing harm to a third party will depend on whether
the bystander was physically endangered by being within the zone of danger created
by the defendant's conduct. Thus, if the plaintiff was not threatened with physical
injury because of his physical remoteness from the defendant's conduct, he may not
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Although continuing to limit recovery for negligently inflicted mental
distress, many courts began to accord emotional equilibrium far greater
protection from intentional disruption.26 The first cases recognizing
emotional equilibrium as a legally protected interest per se arose in
situations in which a special relationship existed between the plaintiff and
defendant. For example, liability was imposed when employees of common
carriers insulted passengers. 27 If a special relationship could not be found,
some courts imposed liability under traditional negligence and consequen-
tial damages analysis for what was actually the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.28 Frequently, however, the judicial attempt to discover
the necessary independent tort upon which to peg the mental distress as a
parasitic damage element proved too far-reaching to be plausible.
recover damages. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 54, at 333-35. The "zone
of danger" rule has been eroded recently in response to Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. 2d 728,
441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). In Dillon, the California Supreme Court rejected
the "zone of danger" rule and allowed a mother to recover for the emotional distress
she suffered after witnessing her daughter's death. Compare Resavage v. Davies, 199
Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) (zone of danger rule applied) and Guilmette v. Alexander,
128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969) (no recovery) with Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App.
647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973) (rejecting zone of danger rule) and D'Ambra v. United
States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975) (qualified adoption of zone of danger rule).
In addition to the "zone of danger" rule, some courts use a "fear for personal
safety" test. The "zone of danger" rule involves an inquiry into whether plaintiff was,
in fact, physically imperiled. Under the "personal safety" test, the plaintiff must also
show that he personally feared physical injury. See Smith v. Rodene, 69 Wash. 2d 482,
418 P.2d 741 (1966); Murphy v. City of Tacoma, 60 Wash. 2d 603, 374 P.2d 976 (1962).
26. Mental equilibrium has long been protected from certain kinds of intentional
disruption. The tort of assault, for example, protects one's right to be free from
apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive bodily contact. In order to maintain
an action for assault, bodily contact does not have to occur; apprehension of
immediate harmful or offensive bodily contact will suffice. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 18, § 10.
Because the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress encompasses a
broader range of intentional acts, it arguably subsumes the tort of assault. Both torts
require that the defendant's intentional conduct cause the plaintiff to suffer mental
distress, but the emotional distress required by the tort of intentional infliction can be
general in nature, while the tort of assault specifically requires that the plaintiff fear
actual bodily contact. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress reaches
any conduct that is "extreme and outrageous," but the tort of assault reaches only
conduct that reasonably may elicit fear of immediate offensive bodily contact.
27. See Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956) (tracing the
historical development of special liabilities that extended to common carriers,
innkeepers, telegraph companies, and other groups performing public services).
28. See, e.g., Young v. Western & AtI. R.R., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929);
Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 135
S.W. 59 (1890); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916); Lambert v. Brewster,
97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924); Prosser, supra note 27, at 40.
The Maryland Court of Appeals also has analyzed apparently intentional
torts according to traditional negligence and consequential damage standards. See
Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 71 A.2d 923 (1951); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Roch,
160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931). In Mahnke, an illegitimate four-year-old girl suffered
severe emotional distress and resulting physical harm when her father murdered her
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Recognizing the difficulties confronting those courts attempting to
compensate deserving plaintiffs under existing tort law, several legal
scholars during the 1930's proposed formulating a new tort that would
expressly recognize the expanded, but not yet openly recognized, judicial
protection of emotional equilibrium from intentional harm. 29 The shifting
position of the American Law Institute (ALI), as set forth in its Restatement
of Torts, reflects the ensuing widespread adoption of the tort: In 1934,
section 46 of the Restatement stated that one is not liable for causing
another to suffer mental distress, even though that suffering was inflicted
intentionally,30 but in 1948, the ALI took the liberal position that any
conduct intended to cause mental distress subjects the actor to liability for
such distress and for resultant harm.31 Thereafter, cases based on the tort
mother before her eyes. The father used a shotgun, "blowing away the right side of
her head, a portion of her skull coming to rest on the kitchen table, and her body
collapsing backward over a chair with her head resting in one pool of blood and her
feet in another." 197 Md. at 63, 77 A.2d at 924. The father kept the child with the gory
corpse for six days. He then shot himself in her presence with the shotgun "causing
masses of his blood to lodge upon her face and clothing." Id. The court held that the
girl could maintain a tort action against the father's estate but did not specify which
tort formed the basis for the action. The Mahnke court referred often to the
defendant's conduct as cruel, inhumane, malicious, and an assault, in addition to
discussing a negligent failure to perform a parental duty in inflicting excessive
punishment and keeping the home in negligent disrepair; but expressly refused to
state that the defendant's conduct constituted a tort. Id. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926.
In Roch, a customer ordered a loaf of bread from a grocery store. Instead, the
manager of the store "mistakenly" sent a dead rat. Upon opening the package, the
customer fainted and allegedly suffered severe mental distress and physical injuries.
The manager of the store apologized to the customer's spouse for his "mistake," and
the court used this apology to provide the basis for a "negligent mistake" action even
though the declaration could have been construed to allege a case of an intentional
and deliberate practical joke. A possible explanation for the court's analysis is that if
the court had not proceeded under a negligence theory, the principal-store would not
have been liable for its manager-agent's intentional tort. For a discussion of the
liability of a principal for an agent's intentional infliction of emotional distress, see
note 8 supra.
29. The evolution of the tort has been recounted in a number of excellent articles,
some of which may have been responsible for its open recognition. See Borda, One's
Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and Tranquillity, 28 GEO. L.J. 55 (1939); Magruder,
supra note 25; Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37
Micu. L. REV. 874 (1939); Seitz; Insults - Practical Jokes - Threats of Future Harm
- How New as Torts?, 28 Ky. L.J. 411 (1940); Vold, Tort Recovery For Intentional
Infliction Of Emotional Distress, 18 NEB. L. BULL. 222 (1939).
30. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934) provided: "[Clonduct which is intended or
which though not so intended is likely to cause only a mental or emotional
disturbance to another does not subject the actor to liability (a) for emotional distress
resulting therefrom, or (b) for bodily harm unexpectedly resulting from such
disturbance."
31. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §46 (Supp. 1948) provided: "One who, without a
privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable
(a) for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it."
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proliferated, and the ALI discerned a need "for a more limited statement
which [would] set some boundaries to the liability .... -32 As a result, it
moved to restrict liability under the tort by requiring a plaintiff to
demonstrate not only that the defendant intended to cause mental distress
but also that he achieved that objective by engaging in extreme and
outrageous conduct.33
Today, most jurisdictions follow the ALI position and impose liability
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress if a defendant intention-
ally and through extreme and outrageous conduct causes another to suffer
severe emotional distress.3 4 Thus, in shedding its parasitic status, recovery
for mental distress has become independent of physical injury; the plaintiff
is not required to prove that physical injury either accompanied or resulted
from the mental distress. 35
The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
recognized by the Court of Appeals in Harris essentially follow the ALI's
definition of the tort.36 Although much of it is dicta, the court described
several factors that may be relevant in determining whether each element of
the tort is met in future cases. The first element, that the defendant's
conduct must be extreme and outrageous, 37 was carefully scrutinized as the
Harris court devoted a substantial portion of its opinion to discussing the
"particularly troublesome" question of determining the conduct that
properly may be considered extreme and outrageous. 38 This element plays a
critical role in defining the tort by limiting the types of conduct for which
liability may be imposed. As the court explained, liability should not be
extended
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Note to the Institute, §46, at 21 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1957).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) provides in part: "One who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily
harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm."
34. See, e.g., Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 341, 210 S.E.2d 145, 147
(1974); note 2 supra.
35. See note 14 supra.
36. Compare text accompanying note 14 supra with note 33 supra.
37. 281 Md. at 567, 380 A.2d at 614.
38. The Harris court recited the facts of several cases from other jurisdictions but
expressly refused to approve or disapprove their characterization of the defendant's
conduct. Id. at 568-69, 380 A.2d at 615. The cases cited included: Paris v. Division of
State Compensation Ins. Funds, 517 P.2d 1353 (Colo. App. 1973) (supervisor sending
plaintiff a letter of reprimand stating, "You must realize that your job was created for
you because of your handicap" held not extreme and outrageous conduct); Pakos v.
Clark, 253 Or. 113, 453 P.2d 682 (1969) (police officer telling plaintiff that he was crazy
as a bedbug and would be put back into an asylum and his children taken away from
him held not extreme and outrageous conduct); Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn.
469, 398 S.W.2d 270 (1966) (mortgage lender being abusive and insulting to plaintiff
homeowner and wrongfully undertaking to foreclose his property held not extreme
and outrageous conduct); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963)
(abusive, insulting, and deceitful language held not extreme and outrageous).
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"to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
other trivialities. The rough edges of our society are still in need of a
good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount
of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsider-
ate and unkind." 39
Without expressly adopting any standard, the Harris court implicitly
approved the Restatement position that extreme and outrageous conduct is
conduct that so exceeds all possible bounds of decency that it may be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.40
Although certain conduct may not normally be characterized as extreme
and outrageous, the Harris court noted that the presence of two special
factors militates in favor of characterizing the defendant's conduct as
extreme and outrageous. First, the court stated that conduct is more readily
labeled extreme and outrageous if it is undertaken with actual knowledge
that the plaintiff is "'peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason
of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity." '41 Second, the
defendant's conduct will be "carefully scrutinized" if his ability to inflict
mental distress is enhanced by his special relationship with the plaintiff.42
39. 281 Md. at 567, 380 A.2d at 614 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF Torts
§ 46, Comment d (1965)). To emphasize this point, the court also stated that "[a]gainst
a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to
participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better
protection than the law could ever be .... 281 Md. at 568, 380 A.2d at 615 (quoting
Magruder, supra note 25, at 1035).
The importance of .this objective limitation on liability should not be
overlooked. It is the defendant's conduct that is the crucial element of the tort, and
liability will not be imposed unless the defendant's conduct can objectively be
considered extreme and outrageous. In Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683, 57 N.W.2d 915
(1953), liability was imposed for the intentional infliction of emotional distress when
the defendant placed a single telephone call to the plaintiff and threatened to give an
unfavorable recommendation to the plaintiffs new employer. Curnett has been
criticized for failing to apply the limitation that the defendant's conduct must
objectively be determined to be extreme and outrageous. See Note, An Independent
Tort Action for Mental Suffering and Emotional Distress, 7 DRAKE L. REv. 53, 62-64
(1957).
40. 281 Md. at 567, 380 A.2d at 614 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46,
Comment d (1965)).
41. 281 Md. at 567, 380 A.2d at 615 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF Torts
§ 46, Comment f (1965)). Comment f further provides:
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the
actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional
distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. The
conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor
proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not
know.
42. 281 Md. at 569, 380 A.2d at 615. See also Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d
493, 495-96, 468 P.2d 216, 218-19, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90-91 (1970) (employer-employee
relationship). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment e (1965) provides
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Thus, if either factor is present, conduct that normally would not be
sufficiently opprobrious to satisfy this element of the tort could be
considered extreme and outrageous. In determining whether conduct is
extreme and outrageous, however, Chief Judge Murphy warned that courts
should not scrutinize the defendant's conduct in a sterile setting,4 3 as it
would be inappropriate to evaluate only the nature of the defendant's
conduct and ignore the context of the surroundings in which the conduct
occurred. Rather, the totality of the circumstances must be considered, and
an attempt should be made to gain some insight into the behavioral
interaction of the parties by considering the personality and conduct of the
plaintiff as well.
Although the court expressly refused to decide whether Jones' conduct
could be considered extreme and outrageous, 44 had that issue been before it,
it would seem that both of these special factors were present and would have
been relevant to an analysis of whether Jones' conduct was extreme and
outrageous. First, even though the grievance complaints filed by Harris
provided Jones with actual knowledge that his behavior was causing Harris
to suffer mental distress, Jones refused to stop his harassing behavior.
Instead, armed with that knowledge, Jones focused his attack on Harris'
peculiar speech impediment and his susceptibility to nervous disruption. In
addition, Jones' supervisory position apparently would have triggered
"careful scrutiny" of his behavior. 45 Due to economic need, Harris could not
escape the taunting by quitting his job, and this enhanced Jones' ability to
inflict mental distress.
As the Harris court warned, however, even if both special factors are
applicable, the defendant's conduct should not be characterized as extreme
and outrageous without first considering the entire setting in which the
conduct occurred. 46 For instance, Harris and Jones worked at a General
Motors assembly plant along with many "tough guys. '47 In this assembly-
line environment, roughhousing, profanity, and name-calling were common
occurrences among the employees, and Harris testified that he would be
more nervous than usual after a generally bad day on the job. Perhaps most
that "[tihe extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse
by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or
apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests."
43. 281 Md. at 568, 380 A.2d at 615. The Harris court quoted with approval from
Prosser, supra note 29, at 887: "There is a difference between violent and vile
profanity addressed to a lady, and the same language to a Butte miner and a United
States Marine."
44. The court stated: "While it is crystal clear that Jones' conduct was
intentional, we need not decide whether it was extreme or outrageous. 281 Md.
at 570, 380 A.2d at 616.
45. See also Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr.
88 (1970) (recognizing higher level of judicial scrutiny when an employer-employee
relationship exists).
46. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
47. 281 Md. at 563, 380 A.2d at 612.
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importantly, Harris admitted at trial that co-workers other than Jones
mimicked his stutter and made fun of him; his problems with supervisors
had been chronic; and "bosses" in general made him nervous.48 Harris had
been suspended from work ten or twelve times as a result of his chronic
problems with "bosses," and after one such suspension had threateningly
followed a supervisor home on his motorcycle. 49 One instance of friction
between Jones and Harris occurred when Harris crumpled a cigarette
package and flagrantly threw it on the floor in front of Jones. When Jones
asked Harris to pick it up, Harris responded that it was not his job as he was
not a janitor.5° Jones then mocked Harris' stutter and Harris filed a
grievance complaint. Therefore, it is possible that Jones' conduct may not
have been extreme or outrageous in the context in which it occurred and
may have resulted in part from Harris' instigation. Harris had acquiesced in
behavior of others that was identical to that of the defendant, had exhibited
an inherent hostility to an entire class of people of which Jones was a
member, and had engaged in behavior that arguably was inflammatory. In
such circumstances, courts should be hesitant to label a defendant's conduct
as extreme and outrageous.
The second element of the tort is that the defendant's conduct must be
intentional or reckless. Although stating that "it was crystal clear that
Jones' conduct was intentional,"5' the Harris court apparently recognized
that a defendant may also be liable for the reckless infliction of emotional
distress. According to the court, a
defendant's conduct is intentional or reckless where he desires to inflict
severe emotional distress, and also where he knows that such distress is
certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct; or where the
defendant acts recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of
probability that the emotional distress will follow. 5 2
This potentially broader formulation of liability has been expressly rejected
by at least one court,5 3 but although some may argue that imposing liability
for the reckless, rather than intentional, infliction of emotional distress
unduly extends liability by including conduct that unintentionally inflicts
harm, the possibility of an unwarranted extension of liability is diminished
by the interaction of the recklessness standard with the extreme and
outrageous conduct element of the tort. The state of mind with which a
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Joint Record Extract at 67-68, Jones v. Harris, 35 Md. App. 556, 371 A.2d
1104, aff'd, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
51. See note 4 supra.
52. 281 Md. at 567, 380 A.2d at 614.
53. Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 257-58, 124 N.W.2d 312, 317 (1963) (court
stated that recklessness standard was essentially the same as the gross negligence
standard which it previously had abandoned as a basis for liability).
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defendant inflicts mental distress should be an important factor in
determining whether his conduct was extreme and outrageous. In some
situations, the decision whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous
will be a close one. Presumably, conduct that was actually intended to inflict
harm in such a situation could be more egregious than reckless conduct
having the same effect. Thus, the fact that the conduct was reckless rather
than intentional may be a mitigating factor in determining whether the
conduct was extreme and outrageous.5 4
The third element of the tort is that a plaintiff must show a causal
connection between the defendant's behavior and the harm suffered by the
plaintiff, a requirement that is not unique to the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress. What is troublesome about this application of the
causation element, however, is the fact that the chain of causation must be
traced through the plaintiffs psyche.5 5 Because it is difficult to verify
whether the defendant's conduct actually caused the mental condition
alleged to have occurred, courts have employed a reasonable person
standard, which prevents the imposition of liability unless a person with
reasonably well-developed personality defenses would have suffered severe
emotional distress as a result of the defendant's conduct.5 6 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides that "[tihe law intervenes only where the distress
54. See Vance v. Vance, No. 78-384 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 11, 1979), discussed
in note 23 supra. This may be so especially if the defendant has knowledge that the
plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress. "'The conduct may become
heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such
knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not know. It must be emphasized ...
that major outrage is essential to the tort ... ' Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. at 567, 380
A.2d at 615 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment f (1965)).
55. Prior Maryland cases have discussed when expert testimony is necessary to
establish a causal connection between a defendant's conduct and the harm allegedly
suffered by a plaintiff. Generally, expert testimony is not required unless the chain of
causation between the defendant's behavior and the plaintiffs mental condition is
attenuated and not readily apparent to laymen. Compare Tully v. Dasher, 250 Md.
424, 244 A.2d 207 (1968) (expert testimony not required to establish existence of
headaches and upset stomach following false arrest) and Wilhelm v. State Traffic
Safety Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 185 A.2d 715 (1962) (expert testimony unnecessary if
alleged injuries follow defendant's negligence closely in time, and connection is
clearly apparent from the injury itself) with Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cooper, 248
Md. 536, 237 A.2d 753 (1968) (expert medical testimony necessary to demonstrate that
accident caused psychological illness manifested by extreme tension and nervous-
ness) and Prince George's County v. Timmons, 150 Md. 511, 133 A. 322 (1926) (expert
medical testimony necessary to demonstrate that brain concussion could cause
depression).
56. See, e.g., Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899) (hysterical
reaction at seeing man dressed in women's clothing not reasonable); Oehler v. L.
Bamberger & Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 1003, 135 A. 71 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (stroke is not a
reasonable response following threat of arrest for failure to pay for vacuum cleaner),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 103 N.J.L. 703,137 A. 425 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927). See
also Aronoff v. Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md. 528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951) (no recovery for
mental distress resulting from fear or shock following damage to one's property).
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inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure
it,"57 and a number of courts have sustained a defendant's demurrer by
assuming the truth of a plaintiff's allegations and concluding that such
behavior would not cause a reasonable person to suffer severe emotional
distress. 58
The question of causation is particularly difficult when, as in Harris, a
plaintiff alleges that a preexisting nervous condition is exacerbated by the
defendant's conduct. The Harris court noted that in such a case a plaintiff is
not prevented from recovering compensation simply because he has a pre-
existing susceptibility to emotional distress, as long as he can demonstrate
that the defendant's conduct intensified that preexisting condition.5 9
The fourth element of the tort is that the plaintiff must suffer severe
emotional distress. Traditional tort law will impose liability if the harm to a
legally protected interest exceeds the de minimis level, but liability cannot
be imposed under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
unless the harm to a plaintiff's emotional well-being is "severe." 6 Although
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965). The distress,
however, does not have to be a reasonable reaction to the defendant's conduct if the
plaintiff can show that the defendant knew of the plaintiffs peculiar susceptibility to
suffering distress and played upon that susceptibility. Comment j further provides
that "[t]he distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and
there is no liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable
emotional distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of
which the actor has knowledge." Id. (emphasis added). See W. PROSSER, supra note 18,
§ 12, at 59.
58. See, e.g., March v. Cacioppo, 37 Ill. App. 2d 235, 185 N.E.2d 397 (1962)
(garnishment of bank account based on void or exorbitant cognovit judgment would
not produce severe emotional disturbance in person of ordinary sensitivities); cf.
Swanson v. Swanson, 12 Ill. App. 3d 163, 257 N.E.2d 194 (1970) (nervousness,
sleepless nights, and fear of nightmares from defendant's refusal to inform plaintiff of
his mother's death not severe distress). A finding that defendant's conduct is not
extreme and outrageous must be implicit in such cases.
59. 281 Md. at 570 n.2, 380 A.2d at 616 n.2. The Court of Special Appeals held that
Harris failed to establish that Jones' conduct caused any emotional distress. 35 Md.
App. at 570-71, 371 A.2d at 1111-12. Although Harris attempted to establish that his
temporary separation from his wife was caused by Jones' conduct, his wife's
testimony established that the separation occurred prior to the incidents between
Harris and Jones. Harris also attempted to attribute his drunken behavior at a
christening to Jones' acts, but the court concluded that Harris had conducted himself
in a similar manner prior to his encounters with Jones and that any connection
between Jones' harrassment and Harris' behavior at the christening was purely
speculative. Id. at 571, 371 A.2d at 1112. /This conclusion was reinforced by the fact
that Harris had received medical treatment for a nervous condition before Jones'
harrassment began. Thus, Harris' single visit to his family doctor during the period of
his encounters with Jones, "unaccompanied by medical evidence tending to establish
that the medical treatment described by Harris flowed as a direct consequence of the
Jones activities, ma[de] the connection a matter of the purest conjecture." Id.
60. "The severity of the emotional distress is not only relevant to the amount of
recovery, but is a necessary element to any recovery." 281 Md. at 570, 380 A.2d at 616.
Logically, if recovery is premised on the existence of "severe" emotional distress, it
379
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emotional distress could include everything from fright, grief, and embar-
rassment to mental or nervous shock,61 the Harris court essentially defined
severe emotional distress as a "severely disabling emotional response to the
defendant's conduct. ' 62 As may be gleaned from the court's quotation of
other sources, one purpose for requiring severe emotional distress is to
prevent the imposition of liability for emotional responses that result from
trivial affronts, mere rudeness, or bad manners. "'Complete emotional
tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient
and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among
people.'"63 Thus, according to the court's analysis, recovery should be
allowed only if the distress is so "'severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it.' ' 64
The requirement that the distress must be severe is illustrated by the
court's evaluation of the evidence presented by Harris at the trial to
establish his emotional distress. This evidence consisted primarily of Harris'
subjective testimony that Jones' conduct aggravated his preexisting nervous
condition and speech impediment. 65 Although Harris sought to establish
that Jones' behavior contributed to a two-week separation between Harris
and his wife, it was clear from the wife's testimony that they separated
several months prior to Harris' first encounter with Jones.6 6 The only
objective evidence presented by Harris was that he was treated once by his
physician during the period of friction with Jones and medication was
prescribed for his nerves. Harris admitted, however, that he had received
would seem that in every successful action under the tort the jury must return a
substantial compensatory damage award. However, a relatively meager award may
simply indicate that the jury encountered great difficulty in translating plaintiffs
subjective feelings into a monetary amount.
The difficulty of formulating standards that can be used to judge the severity
of emotional distress was recognized in Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81,
83 (Mun. App. D.C. 1946):
Again we are brought back to placing liability on the seriousness of the
mental disturbance suffered by defendant, but with no rule for distinguishing
between serious and nonserious distress .... [I]f there are no rules or
standards by which courts may be guided in determining whether the
evidence warrants submitting the case to the jury, and no rules or standards
for the jury in determining whether the evidence sustains the charge, then
every case of fancied insult and hurt feelings must be submitted to the jury
and its verdict must stand.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965).
62. 281 Md. at 570, 380 A.2d at 616 (emphasis in original).
63. Id. at 571, 380 A.2d at 616 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46,
Comment j (1965)). See Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 85, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164 (1961) (not
every emotional reaction is the basis for a cause of action; indiscriminate allowance of
actions for mental anguish would encourage neurotic overreactions to trivial injuries).
64. 281 Md. at 571, 380 A.2d at 616 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 46, Comment j (1965)). See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co. 10 Cal. App. 3d
376, 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 90 (1970).
65. 281 Md. at 572, 380 A.2d at 617.
66. Id. at 563, 572, 380 A.2d at 612-13, 617. See also note 59 supra.
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essentially the same treatment from his physician for the six years prior to
his encounters with Jones.67 Harris' wife testified that her husband's
nervous condition became worse during his trouble with Jones, and that
Harris had "'got to drinking"' at a christening party.68 Finally, one witness
testified that after an encounter with Jones, Harris "'would be shaken up -
that he would be real nervous and walk away.' "69 The Harris court
concluded that neither the "intensity and duration" of Harris' distress nor
the degree to which his speech impediment had been aggravated had been
reflected in the evidence. 70 All that was shown was that Harris was "shaken
up" and so humiliated by Jones' harrassment that he felt" 'like going into a
hole and hid[ing].' "71 Drawing all permissible inferences from this evidence
in favor of Harris, the court held "that the humiliation suffered was not, as
a matter of law, so intense as to constitute the 'severe' emotional distress
required to recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 7
2
Although the Harris court is not alone in requiring severe emotional
distress, there is sharp disagreement among the jurisdictions adopting this
requirement on the appropriate definition of severe emotional distress. In
Alsteen v. Gehl,73 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin articulated perhaps the
narrowest definition of severe emotional distress, limiting the application of
the phrase "severe emotional distress" to instances in which the plaintiff
suffers an "extreme disabling emotional response. . . [so] that he [is] unable
to function in his other relationships because of the emotional distress
caused by defendant's conduct."74 Other courts have taken a less restrictive
view of the severe emotional distress requirement. As stated by one court, for
example, "the recent trend has been to require less severe distress in
pleadings and proof than is required in the Restatement. '75 Moore v.
Greene7 6 is illustrative of this less restrictive view. In Moore, an attorney
67. Id. Harris' physician did not testify at the trial.
68. Id. at 563, 380 A.2d at 613. See also note 59 supra.
69. Jones v. Harris, 35 Md. App. at 568, 371 A.2d at 1111.
70. 281 Md. at 572-73, 380 A.2d at 617. Presumably, aggravation of a speech
impediment would satisfy the "subsequent physical injury" rule that is applied in
cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Because this rule is not a sine qua
non of the intentional infliction of emotional distress, see note 35 and accompanying
tect supra & notes 92 & 93 and accompanying text infra, it may be assumed that the
court's attention to the lack of evidence of an aggravation of the speech impediment
was in response to an allegation of such damages contained in Harris' declaration.
71. Id. at 572, 380 A.2d at 617.
72. Id. at 573, 380 A.2d at 617.
73. 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963) (court held that recovery not allowed
because ddfendant's conduct was not extreme and outrageous; thus its discussion of
the severe emotional distress element was dicta).
74. Id. at 360-61, 124 N.W.2d at 318.
75. Newly v. Alto Riviera Apts. 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 298, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 554
(1976) (referring to Restatement provision quoted in text at note 57 supra).
76. 431 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1970).
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sued a former client for alleged nonpayment of legal fees after a series of
letters sent by the attorney to the client failed to produce payment. In one
letter the attorney threatened: "'You have seen me flay men, Mr. Greene.
The instructions herein will be followed literally, or you may expect to be
flayed in like degree and with the same permanence.' ,,77 The client
counterclaimed for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The only
evidence presented by the client to substantiate his claim that he had
suffered severe emotional distress was subjective testimony such as
assertions that the letter made him "'full of fear and anxiety,'" and that his
dealings with the attorney made him "'a little bit ill.' 78 The attorney
appealed from a jury award in favor of the client, claiming that there was
insufficient evidence of severe emotional distress to satisfy that element of
the tort, and the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence of severe emotional
distress, although "not overwhelming," was sufficient to sustain the jury
award. 79
Harris, Aisteen, and Moore illustrate the difficult problems faced by
courts in separating the problem of defining severe emotional distress from
the distinct but interrelated evidentiary problem of defining the quantum or
type of evidence necessary to establish that the plaintiff has suffered such
distress.80 Although they are distinct, both problems reflect continuing
attempts by courts to prevent feigned claims by requiring objective
corroboration of the distress.8 1 Harris appears to favor the Alsteen definition
of severe emotional distress over the Moore definition. Both Harris and
Alsteen stated that a plaintiff may not recover under the tort unless he
suffers a severely disabling emotional response.8 2 Alsteen required the
distress to be so severe that the injured person must be unable to function in
his other relationships.83 Similarly, the Harris court stated that the distress
77. Id. at 591 n.4.
78. Id. at 591 n.5.
79. Id. at 591. Although it is at least conceivable that the court's holding was to
some extent influenced by the traditional judicial solicitude for clients in such suits by
their attorneys, its opinion did not purport to rely on this factor.
80. In the medical profession, mental distress is defined as a psychic reaction to a
traumatic stimulus. A traumatic stimulus is defined as any impact, force, or event
that acts upon an individual for a brief or extended period and may be either purely
physical, purely psychic, or a mixture of the two. Generally, mental distress elicited by
a traumatic response falls into either of two categories: primary or secondary
reactions. Primary reactions are of short duration, are difficult to validate objectively,
and are usually characterized by such emotional responses as fear, anger, grief,
shock, mutilation, or embarrassment. Secondary reactions encompass the more severe
psychic responses, and thus are more amenable to objective proof. One type of
secondary reaction, the anxiety reaction, is characterized by symptoms such as
nausea, weight loss, stomach pains, weakness, and backaches. See Comment, supra
note 25, at 1248-54. See also Keschner, Simulation of Nervous and Mental Disease, 44
MICH. L. REv. 715 (1946); Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L.
REV. 473 (1962).
81. See notes 18 to 35 and accompanying text supra.
82. See text at notes 62 & 74 supra.
83. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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must be so severe that a reasonable person cannot be expected to endure it.84
MQreover, Harris appears to reject the Moore approach that permitted
recovery for distress from which the plaintiff was full of "fear and anxiety"
and felt a "little bit ill":85 the court expressly held that humiliation and
being "shaken up" were insufficient to constitute severe emotional distress.86
Although it may be questioned whether so strict a standard is necessary, the
definition enunciated in Harris insures that recovery will not be allowed for
a trivial distress resulting from conduct that amounts only to rudeness or
bad manners.87 Further, the Harris definition of severe emotional distress
would appear to be consistent with the court's warning that each element of
the tort must be strictly followed in order to minimize the problems of
distinguishing the minor from the serious wrong, and the true from the false
claim.88 It may be expected that severe emotional distress will produce more
observable symptoms than the minor, transient distress resulting from a
trivial wrong.
Once a definition is chosen, however, the difficult question of the
quantum or type of evidence necessary to establish the distress must be
faced, and it is here that the requirement of objective corroboration to
distinguish the true from the false claim is most stringent. The Harris court
appears to have rejected the Moore reasoning that severe emotional distress
may be found by the jury solely on the basis of the plaintiff's subjective
testimony that he was full of "fear and anxiety."8' 9 The evidence supporting
the plaintiff's claim in Harris consisted primarily of Harris' subjective
testimony that he was shaken up and that his nervousness had been
aggravated. The court characterized this testimony as vague and weak and
noted that it was "unaccompanied by any evidentiary particulars," other
than a single visit to the doctor, reflecting the "intensity and duration" of
the distress.9 Thus, although the Harris court acknowledged that a cause of
action would lie for the intentional infliction of emotional distress unaccom-
panied by physical injury, it failed to provide any guidance with respect to
the type of evidence (other than physical manifestations) necessary to
establish a purely mental injury other than that the evidence must show the
"intensity and duration" of the distress. 91 In contrast, the standard for
84. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
85. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
86. See text accompanying notes 71 & 72 supra. Compare this conclusion,
however, with the conclusion of the Vance court discussed in note 23 supra. If the
Vance reasoning remains undisturbed, it appears that it will be easier to establish
severe emotional distress when it is negligently inflicted than under the test set out in
Harris for intentional infliction.
87. See notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
89. See notes 78 to 86 and accompanying text supra.
90. See 281 Md. at 572, 380 A.2d at 617.
91. See id. at 565-66, 380 A.2d at 613. Perhaps the only satisfactory evidence,
other than evidence of physiological changes, would be evidence that the plaintiff's
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determining whether negligently inflicted mental distress is compensable in
Maryland is defined essentially from an evidentiary perspective. Mental
distress is not compensable unless it results in a "clearly apparent and
substantial physical injury, as manifested by an external condition or by
symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological, or
mental state. ' 92 Because the issue in the case of either negligent or
intentional infliction of mental distress is whether the claim of mental
distress can be corroborated, it could be argued that the negligent infliction
standard should also be applied to define the scope of protection afforded
mental equilibrium from intentional disruption. This, however, would erode
any distinction between the intentional and negligent infliction of distress,
and would fail to acknowledge that an action for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress is permitted without an accompanying physical injury.
Indeed, it is quite possible to suffer severe emotional distress without
manifesting any observable physical effects of the suffering,93 and the
distinction seems justified because the inference that emotional distress has
resulted is clearly stronger in cases of intentional and outrageous conduct
than in cases in which conduct is merely negligent.
Objective corroboration of the distress, therefore, should be accomp-
lished by means other than requiring strict evidentiary proof. The Harris
court's goals of restricting liability to instances of serious wrongs,
preventing false claims, and avoiding litigation of claims based on bad
manners can be effected by adopting a narrow view of the type of behavior
that can be characterized as extreme and outrageous. By focusing on the
defendant's conduct, rather than on the degree of harm suffered by a
plaintiff, the court can regulate liability by scrutinizing external behavioral
interactions rather than a purely internal mental state. As long as the
defendant's conduct is shown to be extreme and outrageous, little additional
evidence should be required to establish sufficient objective verification that
the plaintiff's distress is severe. Extreme and outrageous conduct can be
expected to cause severe emotional distress in the reasonable person, and
proof that the defendant's behavior fell into this category should be
normal pattern of conduct and relationships with others had been disrupted. Harris
attempted to provide similar evidence. See notes 59 & 65 to 69 and accompanying text
supra.
92. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 404, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933); see note 23
supra.
93. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment k (1965) stresses that
subsequent physical injury, although usually present in cases of severe emotional
distress, should not be a prerequisite to recovery. See also Vanace v. Vance, No.
78-384 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 11, 1979), discussed in note 23 supra; MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 14-203 (1975) (permitting recovery for emotional distress, whether or not
accompanied by physical injury, against debt collectors violating code provisions).
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sufficient to establish that severe distress was substantially likely to occur.94
If the court instead regulates liability by focusing on the degree of harm
suffered by the plaintiff, it will leave open the possibility that conduct that is
utterly intolerable in a civilized community will go undeterred while the
mental suffering produced by such conduct goes unrequited, simply because
a plaintiff was unable, or lacked the foresight, to document the existence of
that mental distress. 95
A person engaging in extreme and outrageous conduct for the purpose of
inflicting mental distress should not be able to escape liability by claiming
that he failed in his objective, nor should his tale of failure be aided by a
requirement that the plaintiff overcome strict evidentiary standards
regarding proof of mental distress. If courts faithfully refuse to permit a jury
to find that a defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous unless it is
truly socially despicable, then the existence of mental distress could be
adequately corroborated by looking to the nature of the defendant's conduct
and considering the probable effect of that conduct on the ordinary person.
The conduct of the defendant is the essence of this tort, and the "extreme
and outrageous conduct" element of the tort is the element most suitable for
judicial regulation of liability.
94. See W. PROSSER, supra note 18,§ 12, at 52, 59-60. Comment j of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) states: "Severe distress must be proved; but in many
cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself
important evidence that the distress has existed."
95. See generally Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 379, 397,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 90-91 (1970) (unreasonable to expect vivid accounts of emotional
distress from an inarticulate plaintiff); Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury
Cases, 14 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 586, 594 (1965).
Plaintiffs in cases such as Harris could have an especially difficult time
proving severe distress if they already suffer from some type of nervous condition.
The objective, demonstrable manifestations of the preexisting condition could be so
severe that any change in the plaintiff's conduct attributable to the aggravation
caused by the defendant would not appear appreciably different. Thus, the court
should regulate liability by focusing on the outrageousness of the defendant's
conduct. Jones' conduct was sufficiently outrageous to provide a guarantee that
Harris was substantially likely to suffer distress, and the strength of Harris'
testimony of his distress should go to the extent of damages. If the jury does not
believe a plaintiff's subjective testimony, it can award essentially nominal damages.
Moreover, a judge can counteract an excessive jury award by granting the defendant
a remittitur.
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